Talmud - Bava Batra 84b בבא בתרא פ״ד ב׳

Wine and vinegar are one type of food, which means that if, for example, one separated teruma from one of these with the intention that it should exempt the other, his action is effective. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are two types of food. Apparently, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. The Gemara rejects this claim: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only with regard to the issue of whether one can separate tithe and teruma from wine to redeem vinegar and vice versa. And the Rabbis hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ela.

As Rabbi Ela says: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce, i.e., in order to fulfill the obligation of separating teruma from the high-quality produce, that his teruma is valid teruma? As it is stated: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing as you have set apart from it its best” (Numbers 18:32).

The verse is understood as indicating that one who sets aside inferior produce has sinned. It also demonstrates that if one did, in fact, set aside teruma from poor-quality produce in order to render permitted superior-quality produce, his action is effective and the inferior produce is sanctified as teruma. The reason is that if the inferior produce is not consecrated, why would one bear a sin? It should be considered as though he did nothing. From here it is derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce that his teruma is valid teruma. The Rabbis agree and hold that in the case of one who separates vinegar in order to redeem wine, his teruma is valid despite the difference in quality, as wine and vinegar are considered a single type of food.

But with regard to buying and selling, everyone, including the Rabbis, agrees that wine and vinegar are two types of food, as they have different uses. There are those for whom wine is preferable and vinegar is not preferable, and there are those for whom vinegar is preferable and wine is not preferable.

MISHNA: This mishna discusses several methods of acquiring movable property. With regard to one who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce through the act of acquisition of pulling. If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he has not acquired it, and either the seller or the buyer can decide to rescind the sale. If the buyer is perspicacious and wants to acquire the produce without having to pull it, and he wishes to do so before the seller could change his mind and decide not to sell, he rents its place, where the produce is located, and his property immediately effects acquisition of the produce on his behalf.

With regard to one who buys flax from another, because flax is usually carried around this purchaser has not acquired it until he carries it from place to place and acquires it by means of the act of acquisition of lifting. Pulling the flax is ineffective. And if it was attached to the ground, and he detached any amount, he has acquired it, as the Gemara will explain.

GEMARA: The mishna mentions several modes of acquisition without elaboration. It does not explain in which domain the act takes place, whether on the property of the seller or in the public domain. Likewise, it does not specify who performs these actions. The Gemara clarifies these details. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If the seller measured the produce and placed it in an alleyway, which is not the public domain but a location where people can keep their belongings, then even if the buyer did not pull the produce, he acquires it.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Perhaps my teacher heard this halakha from Rabbi Yoḥanan only with regard to one who measures into his basket, i.e., that of the buyer, in which case his possessions effect acquisition of the produce for him. But if the produce is placed on the floor of the alleyway, the buyer does not acquire the produce. Rabbi Asi said to him: This one of the Sages, i.e., Rabbi Zeira, seems like one who has not studied halakha. If he measured it into the basket of the buyer, is it necessary to say that he acquires it? If an item is placed in the buyer’s basket it is clearly acquired by him, regardless of the location of the basket. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement with regard to an alleyway must be referring to items placed on the floor of the alleyway.

The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Zeira accept this claim from Rabbi Asi, or did he not accept it from him? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rabbi Yannai says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to a courtyard belonging to partners, which is similar in status to an alleyway, the partners acquire from one another. What, is it not correct to say that there is no difference between placing items on the ground and in their basket, as a partner acquires an item even when it is placed upon the ground, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Asi? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is referring to a case where the item is measured into the basket of the buyer.

The Gemara points out: So, too, Rabbi Zeira’s statement is reasonable, as Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one measured and placed an item in an alleyway, the buyer has not acquired it. Apparently, these two halakhot cited in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan are difficult, as they contradict each other, since earlier it was stated that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the buyer can acquire an item in this manner. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this apparent contradiction that here, i.e., in the statement cited by Rabbi Asi, he is referring to one who measures into the basket of the buyer, which effects acquisition; and there, i.e., in the statement of Rabbi Yaakov, he is referring to one who measures onto the ground, which does not effect acquisition. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he does not acquire it. What, is it not referring to one who did so in an alleyway, which indicates that placing produce on the ground of an alleyway does not effect acquisition, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira? The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the mishna is referring to one who did so in the public domain. The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the first clause: If the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce. But does pulling in the public domain effect acquisition?

But don’t Abaye and Rava both say that passing effects acquisition in the public domain and in a courtyard that does not belong to either of them; pulling effects acquisition only in an alleyway or in a courtyard that belongs to both of them, but not in the public domain; and lifting effects acquisition in every place, even in the seller’s domain? This demonstrates that pulling in the public domain does not effect acquisition.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the phrase: If he pulled it, that is taught in the mishna? It means that he pulled it from the public domain into an alleyway. The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause: If the buyer is perspicacious he rents its place, i.e., where the produce is located. The Gemara explains the difficulty: But if the mishna is referring to a spot in the public domain, from whom can he rent the place where the produce is located? The Gemara answers: The latter clause is referring to a separate halakha, and this is what the mishna is saying: And if the produce is in a domain that has an owner, if he is perspicacious he rents the place where the produce is located from the owner.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the manner in which an acquisition takes place. Rav and Shmuel both say:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaBatra 84b examines whether wine and vinegar count as one or two food categories, focusing on tithing, teruma separation, and commercial transactions.