Talmud - Bava Batra 85b בבא בתרא פ״ה ב׳

What, is it not stating that a buyer’s vessels effect acquisition of items on his behalf even in the actual public domain, which contradicts Rav Pappa’s explanation? The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to an alleyway, not the actual public domain. The Gemara asks: How can this be what the baraita means? But the baraita teaches that it is similar to a courtyard that does not belong to either of them, i.e., a location to which neither of them have any rights, whereas they both have some rights in an alleyway. Consequently, this must be referring to the actual public domain, not an alleyway.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the phrase: A courtyard that does not belong to either of them? It also refers to shared property, specifically a courtyard shared by partners, which does not belong to this one entirely and does not belong to that one entirely, but rather it is the property of both of them. Consequently, this courtyard is comparable to an alleyway.

Rav Sheshet raises a dilemma before Rav Huna: If the vessels of the buyer are in the domain of the seller, does the buyer acquire the merchandise once it is placed in his vessels or not? Rav Huna said to him: You learned the answer already in a mishna (Gittin 77a): A wife is divorced when her husband hands her a bill of divorce or places it in a manner that is considered equivalent to handing it to her, e.g., placing in her courtyard. Accordingly, if the husband threw the bill of divorce to her into her lap or into her basket [kaltah], this woman is divorced even if she was in her husband’s domain at that time. By the same token, even if the buyer’s vessels are in the domain of the seller, they effect acquisition of the sold items on his behalf.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: What is the reason that you resolved Rav Sheshet’s dilemma from that mishna, which has already been struck with one hundred strikes of a hammer [uklei be’ukela]? In their analysis of this mishna, the Sages have already inserted so many qualifications that it cannot be understood in a straightforward manner.

As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This halakha of the mishna in Gittin applies only if her basket was hanging from her body, so that it is considered on her or in her hand. And Reish Lakish says: It is sufficient if it was tied to her, even though it is not hanging from her, but resting on the ground. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The mishna is referring to a case where her basket was placed between her thighs. Although it is not hanging from her, since it is placed on her body it serves to acquire the bill of divorce on her behalf. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rabbi Ami, says: This is referring to a case where her husband was a basket seller. Since he is not particular about the place where the basket into which he placed the bill of divorce is located, as his entire courtyard is full of baskets, it is considered as though he expressly granted her the right to make use of its location.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The place of her lap, i.e., the place within her husband’s property where she stands or sits, belongs to her, and the place of her basket is acquired to her. Rava said: What is the reason behind the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It is because a person, including a husband, is not particular neither about the place of her lap nor about the place of her basket, as she requires these areas and they do not take up much space. It is evident from all of these qualifications that one cannot infer a halakhic principle from here with regard to a buyer’s vessels in a seller’s domain.

Rather, resolve the dilemma from that which was taught in a baraita: If the merchandise was in the domain of a seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise until he lifts it or until he removes it from the domain of the seller. What, is it not referring to merchandise placed in the vessels of the buyer, which proves that the buyer’s vessels do not effect acquisition of the merchandise on his behalf when they are in the seller’s domain? The Gemara answers: No, this does not serve as proof, as it is referring to merchandise placed in the vessels of the seller. That is why the buyer must lift or pull the merchandise to acquire it.

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the first clause is referring to the vessels of the seller, as currently understood, the latter clause must also be referring to the vessels of the seller. Say the latter clause: If the merchandise was in the domain of the buyer, once the seller accepts upon himself to sell an item, the buyer acquires it. And if this is referring to merchandise in the vessels of the seller, as in the earlier clause, why does the buyer acquire it? The Gemara answers: In the latter clause, we come to a different scenario, which involves the vessels of the buyer.

The Gemara asks: But if the clauses of the baraita are addressing different cases, why was it stated without qualification? The Gemara answers: The normal way of things is that in the house of the seller the vessels of the seller are commonly found, and in the house of the buyer the vessels of the buyer are commonly found. In sum, the dilemma cannot be resolved from the baraita.

Rava said: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita: If one pulled his donkey drivers, thereby dragging along with them the donkeys laden with goods, and likewise, if he pulled his laborers, who were carrying merchandise he wished to purchase, and he brought them into his house, whether he fixed a price before he measured the merchandise or whether he measured before fixing a price, both parties can renege on the sale, provided that the merchandise has not been unloaded from the laborers or the donkeys.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaBatra 85b explores whether a buyer's vessels acquire goods within an alleyway or seller's domain, drawing a comparison to divorce bill delivery rules.