Talmud - Bava Batra 51a בבא בתרא נ״א א׳

but the judges of the exile said that one can establish the presumption of ownership. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the judges of the exile. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: Has the Master retracted his halakha that one cannot establish the presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a married woman? Rav said to them: I said that the opinion of the judges of the exile is reasonable, as the presumption of ownership can be established with regard the property of a married woman under certain circumstances. The Gemara comments: This is like that ruling of Rav Yosef with regard to one who possesses the land for three years after the death of the husband.

§ The mishna teaches: And a wife does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to her husband’s property. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Since she has the right to sustenance from her husband’s property, she is enjoying the profits as payment of her sustenance, so her use of the property does not establish the presumption of ownership. The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in the event that he designated another parcel of land for her sustenance. The mishna teaches that even if she enjoys the profits of a second field for three years, she does not establish the presumption of ownership of that field.

The Gemara asks: By inference, the wife has the ability to bring proof of her ownership and take possession of her husband’s field. Why is this proof valid? Let him say that he desires to expose her concealed money. If he offers to sell the field to her and she agrees, it will be discovered that she has money of which he had been unaware. His intention was never to sell the property, but to claim money to which he is entitled.

Can one conclude from this mishna that in the case of one who sells a field to his wife, she has acquired it, and we do not say that he desires to expose her concealed money? The Gemara answers: No, as one may say that the inference from the mishna that if she has proof then she has ownership rights is the halakha only with regard to a deed of gift, as, if her husband gave her the field as a gift, he cannot claim that he did so in order to expose her concealed money.

The Gemara relates: Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: The Master was not with us in the evening in the study hall that is within the boundaries of the town, where we said a superior matter. Rav Huna said to him: What superior matter did you say? Rav Naḥman responded: In the case of one who sells a field to his wife, she has acquired it, and we do not say that he desires to expose her concealed money.

Rav Huna said to him: That is obvious; remove the money from here and she will acquire the property by means of the bill of sale, as, even if she has not yet given him the money, she acquires the land by means of the bill of sale. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Kiddushin 26a): Property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, can be acquired by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of it?

Rav Naḥman said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to this that Shmuel says: They taught that the document alone suffices only if the transaction is with a deed of gift, but if the transaction is with a bill of sale, the buyer does not acquire the property until he gives him its money? Rav Huna responded: But didn’t Rav Hamnuna raise an objection to this, based on this following baraita: How is acquisition by means of giving a document performed? If he wrote it for him on paper or earthenware, then even though the paper or the earthenware is not worth even one peruta, if he writes: My field is sold to you, or: My field is acquired by you as a gift, it is thereby sold or given. This indicates that a document suffices to complete an acquisition both in the case of a sale and a gift.

Rav Naḥman responded: But is it not so that he, Rav Hamnuna, raises the objection and he himself resolves it? The baraita states its ruling with regard to one who sells his field due to its poor quality. The seller wants to be rid of his field due to its low value, and would like to transfer ownership of it as quickly as possible. In this case, writing a document suffices to complete the acquisition. By contrast, in standard cases it does not. Since the acquisition of a field requires monetary payment in addition to a bill of sale, Rav Naḥman’s statement, that if one sells a field to his wife the sale is valid and we do not say that he desires to expose her concealed money, is a novelty.

The Gemara notes that in interpreting this baraita, Rav Beivai would conclude in the name of Rav Naḥman, or, according to another version, Rav Ashi says: Why does a document suffice for him to acquire the land? It is because it is assumed that he wanted to give it to him as a gift. And why did he write the document for him employing the terminology of a sale? It was in order to enhance the power of the one acquiring the land, since with regard to a property guarantee, i.e., a document that states that if the property is seized by the seller’s creditor, the seller will reimburse the buyer for his loss, a bill of sale is superior to a deed of gift.

The Gemara raises an objection to the ruling of Rav Naḥman, that we do not say that he desires to expose her concealed money, from a baraita: If one borrowed money from his own slave and then frees him, or if one borrowed money from his wife and then divorces her, they do not have any claim on him, and he need not repay them. What is the reason for this? Is it not because we say that he desires to expose their concealed money, and his taking of the loan was a mere artifice to claim money to which he was entitled?

The Gemara answers: It is different there, because there is an additional reason to think it was an artifice, as it is uncomfortable for him to make applicable to himself the verse: “The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7). It is therefore reasonable to posit that his intention was not to borrow money, but to expose the concealed money that was in the possession of his slave or wife. This concern does not apply to one who sells property to his wife, and therefore the sale is valid.

The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Avin sent a ruling to those in the study hall: In the case of one who sells a field to his wife, she has acquired it,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaBatra 51a examines whether a wife can claim presumptive ownership over her husband's property or land he designated for her support.