Talmud - Bava Batra 129a בבא בתרא קכ״ט א׳

If his statement is said to exclude the statement of Rava that the testimony of members of the third generation concerning members of the first generation is valid, this is difficult, as Rava’s statement is not in conflict with Rabbi Abba’s statement that the testimony of members of the third generation with regard to members of the second generation is valid; it merely adds to it. If it is said to exclude the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi that a grandfather can testify concerning his grandchild, this is also difficult, as it has already been established that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi. If it is said to exclude the rulings of Shmuel and Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa, that a person who became blind can testify about what he saw beforehand, this too is difficult, as their rulings were refuted based on a baraita.

The Gemara explains: Rather, Mar Zutra’s statement is said to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one cannot testify that a specific one of his sons is his firstborn, and to exclude the strong objection of Mar bar Rav Ashi to the statement of Rabbi Abba with regard to a case where a debtor admitted to part of a claim and witnesses testified that he repaid the entire debt. Despite Mar bar Rav Ashi’s objection, the halakha is that the debtor is not liable to take an oath.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one on his deathbed who apportions his property orally, granting it to his sons as a gift, and he increased the portion given to one of his sons and reduced the portion given to one other son, or equated the portion of the firstborn to the portions of the other sons, his statement stands. But if he said that they will receive the property not as a gift but as an inheritance, he has said nothing. If he wrote in his will, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, that he is granting them the property as a gift, his statement stands. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift at the beginning? What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift in the middle? What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift at the end?

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that where one on his deathbed instructed: Such and such a field will be given to so-and-so and he will inherit it, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift at the beginning. Where he instructed: And he will inherit it and it will be given to him, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift at the end. Where he instructed: He will inherit it and it will be given to him and he will inherit it, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift in the middle.

And the halakha that his statement is valid pertains specifically to a case where the two terms, giving and inheritance, are employed with regard to one person and one field. But if they are employed with regard to one person and two fields, e.g., if he says: Reuven will inherit this field and will be given that field, or one field and two people, e.g., Reuven will inherit half of this field and Shimon will be given the other half, the part that was phrased as inheritance does not take effect. Only the part that is phrased as a gift takes effect.

Rabbi Elazar says: Even in a case where the two terms are employed with regard to one person and two fields, or one field and two people, his instruction takes effect, as both terms were employed with regard to the same person or the same field. But with regard to two fields and two people, it does not take effect, as the two instructions are not connected to one another.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that if one on his deathbed said: Such and such a field will be given to so-and-so, and so-and-so, i.e., another person, will inherit such and such a field, i.e., another field, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that even the latter person, who was designated to inherit his field, has acquired it. Rabbi Elazar says: He has not acquired it.

Abaye said to Ravin: You have lightened our burden with one statement that you cited, but you have made it difficult for us with the other one. Granted, the contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Elazar that you cited and the previously cited statement of Rabbi Elazar is not difficult. There, in the previously cited statement, Rabbi Elazar said that the directive takes effect with regard to a case of one person and two fields, and here he said that the directive does not take effect with regard to a case of two people and two fields.

But the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is difficult, as Rav Dimi cited in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that his directive takes effect only in a case of one person and one field, and according to your citation in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan it takes effect even in a case of two people and two fields.

Ravin answered him: Rav Dimi and I are amora’im, and we each have a different tradition with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Ravin continued: And Reish Lakish says that one has not acquired the field in the case of two people and two fields unless the giver says: So-and-so and so-and-so will inherit such and such a field and such and such a field that I have given them as a gift, and they will inherit it.

This dispute between the amora’im of Eretz Yisrael is also the subject of a dispute between the amora’im of Babylonia. Rav Hamnuna says: The mishna taught that when both giving and inheritance are mentioned one can increase the portion of one of his sons only with regard to a case of one person and one field, but with regard to one person and two fields, or one field and two people, it is not effective. And Rav Naḥman says: Even in a case of one person and two fields, or one field and two people, it is effective, but in a case of two fields and two people, it is not. And Rav Sheshet says: Even in a case of two fields and two people, it is effective.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 6:10): If a person on his deathbed, or one who is going overseas, says to his children’s steward: Give a shekel to my children every week for their needs, and this is a situation where, based on their needs, they are fit for the steward to give them a sela, i.e., double the amount, he gives them a sela. When the father mentioned a shekel, he presumably meant that the children should be given a sum in accordance with their actual requirements, not that specific amount. But if he said: Give them only a shekel, the steward gives them only a shekel, and no more. And if he said: If my children die,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bava Batra 129a examines valid testimony across generations and firstborn inheritance, plus how deathbed gifts distributed among sons take legal effect.