Talmud - Bava Batra 124b בבא בתרא קכ״ד ב׳

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Ḥiyya is uncertain as to whether the principle that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in his disputes with his colleague applies specifically to a dispute with one other tanna but not to a dispute with several of his colleagues, or whether the principle that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in his disputes with his colleague applies even to a dispute with several of his colleagues, as in this case, where the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Since he was uncertain, he left the decision to each individual judge.

Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: It is prohibited to act in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara explains: Rav holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in his disputes with his single colleague, but not in his disputes with several of his colleagues.

And Rav Naḥman says his own statement: It is permitted to act in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara explains: He holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not only in his disputes with his single colleague, but even in his disputes with several of his colleagues.

Rava says: It is prohibited to act in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but if a judge acted in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, what is done is done and the decision stands. The Gemara explains: He holds that it was stated that one is inclined to follow the opinion of the Rabbis ab initio, but if a judge rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, his decision stands.

The Gemara comments that there are conflicting opinions in halakhic midrash as to whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi or in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as each opinion is supported by a different version of the midrash. Rav Naḥman taught a baraita from the other books of the school of Rav [debei Rav], i.e., a volume of halakhic midrash other than Torat Kohanim, which is a halakhic midrash on the book of Leviticus. The phrase from the verse: “By giving him a double portion of all that he has” (Deuteronomy 21:17), excludes the enhancement that the heirs brought about after their father’s death, of which the firstborn is not entitled to a double portion. The Gemara infers: But of the enhancement of the property that occurred by itself after their father’s death, he does take a double portion. The Gemara comments: And whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

Rami bar Ḥama taught a different version of the baraita from the other books of the school of Rav: “Of all that he has” excludes the enhancement of the property that occurred by itself after their father’s death, of which the firstborn is not entitled to a double portion. The Gemara infers: And all the more so, he does not take a double portion of the enhancement that the heirs brought about after their father’s death. The Gemara comments: And whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of the Rabbis. Accordingly, there is a discrepancy between the baraitot as to whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis or Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A firstborn does not take a double portion of a loan, i.e., of a debt that is owed to the father. The Gemara asks: According to whom is this halakha stated? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now that the Rabbis say that a firstborn does not take a double portion even with regard to the enhancement of property that is in the possession of the father, is it necessary to state that he is not entitled to a double portion of a loan? The debt is not in the father’s possession at the time of his death; it is merely due to him.

Rather, it must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Although he holds that a firstborn is entitled to a double portion of the enhancement of the property itself, he concedes that he is not entitled to a double portion of the payment of a debt, as it was not in the possession of his father at the time of his death.

The Gemara asks: But if so, in accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: If the sons inherited a promissory note, the firstborn takes a double portion of the payment of both the value of the loan itself and the interest? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, nor the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara answers: Actually, Shmuel’s statement that the firstborn is not entitled to a double portion of the payment of a debt is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and it was necessary to state it. It might enter your mind to say that with regard to a loan, since the creditor holds a promissory note, it is considered as though it has already been collected and is in the creditor’s possession, so too, the firstborn should be entitled to a double portion even according to the opinion of the Rabbis. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that the loan is not considered to be in the creditor’s possession, and the firstborn is not entitled to a double portion.

The Gemara relates: They sent the following ruling from there, Eretz Yisrael: If the father lent money to a gentile, the firstborn takes a double portion of the value of the loan itself, but not of the interest, as the interest is considered property due to the father.

The Gemara asks: According to whom is this halakha stated? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now that the Rabbis say that a firstborn does not take a double portion even with regard to the enhancement of property, which is in the possession of the father, is it necessary to state that they would hold that he is not entitled to a double portion of a loan? Since the debt is not in the father’s possession at the time of his death, as it is merely due to him, the rabbis would certainly not hold that the firstborn takes a double portion of it.

Rather, it must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, is it so that the firstborn is not entitled to a double portion of the interest? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A firstborn takes a double portion of both the value of the loan itself and the interest?

The Gemara answers: Actually, the halakha sent from the Sages of Eretz Yisrael is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And the Sages of Eretz Yisrael hold that the Rabbis concede that the firstborn receives a double portion of the value of the loan itself, because a loan is considered as though it has already been collected and is in the creditor’s possession. By contrast, the interest on the loan is not considered as though it is already in the creditor’s possession, and therefore the firstborn does not receive a double portion of its payment.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav said to Ravina: Ameimar arrived at our locale and taught that a firstborn takes a double portion of the value of a loan itself, but not of the interest. Ravina said to him: The Sages of Neharde’a conform to their standard line of reasoning. Ameimar followed the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who was one of the Sages of Naharde’a, as was Ameimar.

The Gemara explains: As Rabba says: If the sons collected land as payment of a debt owed to their father, the firstborn has a double portion of it, but if they collected money, he does not have a double portion. And Rav Naḥman says that if they collected money, he has a double portion, but if they collected land, he does not have a double portion.

Abaye said to Rabba: According to your opinion it is difficult, and according to the opinion of Rav Naḥman it is also difficult. According to your opinion it is difficult

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bava Batra 124b examines whether the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prevails when disputed by many sages versus a single colleague.