Talmud - Ketubot 48b כתובות מ״ח ב׳

her husband’s authority in marriage via the wedding canopy. If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers to bring her to her husband and the wedding canopy, once she has been handed over she is under the husband’s authority. However, if the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, she is still under the father’s authority, as he has not fully delivered her to the husband’s messengers. If her father sent her with his own messengers and the father’s messengers delivered the woman to the husband’s messengers, from that moment onwards she is under her husband’s authority.

GEMARA: The mishna taught that a daughter always remains under her father’s authority until she has fully entered her husband’s jurisdiction. The Gemara asks: What is the significance of the term: Always, in the mishna? The Gemara explains: This comes to exclude the opinion stated in the initial version of the mishna. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time that the groom designated for the wedding arrived, and the wedding was postponed, and they were not married, the brides are entitled to eat from his food and, if he is a priest, eat teruma, like married women. The mishna here teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with this earlier ruling cited in that mishna. Rather, they are always under their father’s authority until they actually enter the wedding canopy.

§ The mishna taught that if the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers, she is under the husband’s authority, unless the father or his messengers accompanied them. Rav said: When her father delivers her she leaves his jurisdiction in all respects, apart from the issue of partaking of teruma. Even if her husband is a priest, if she is not from a family of priests, she may not partake of teruma until she is fully married. And Rav Asi said that once she has been delivered to the husband’s messengers she is under her husband’s authority even with regard to teruma.

Rav Huna raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi, and some say that it was Ḥiyya, son of Rav, who raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi: The mishna states that she is always under her father’s authority until she enters the wedding canopy. According to Rav Asi, however, as soon as her father delivers her to the husband’s messengers she is no longer under her father’s authority. Rav said to them: Didn’t I tell you not to follow, i.e., attempt to refute rulings, on the basis of sources that can be explained in opposing manners? Rav Asi can answer you that the mishna means that her delivery to the husband’s messengers is equivalent to her entrance to the wedding canopy, and the same halakhot apply in both cases.

And Shmuel said that once a woman’s father has delivered her to the messengers of her husband, she is under her husband’s authority only with regard to her inheritance, i.e., her husband inherits her property upon her death as though she had already entered the wedding canopy.

Reish Lakish said: Her delivery is also effective with regard to her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is Reish Lakish referring to when he says that she is under her husband’s authority with regard to her marriage contract? If you say it means that if she dies he inherits all her property, including the dowry specified in her marriage contract, that is the same as the statement of Shmuel, and Reish Lakish has added nothing to his ruling. Ravina said: Reish Lakish is coming to say that if the man dies before marrying her, and she then marries someone else, her marriage contract from the other man is one hundred dinars, as she is considered a widow from marriage rather than a widow from betrothal.

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Ḥanina both say that a woman’s delivery to the messengers of her husband causes her to be under his authority for all matters, even including partaking of teruma.

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (Ketubot 4:4): If the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, or if she owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with her groom to lodge, not for the purpose of marriage but merely to stay overnight until they arrive at his residence, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is already in her husband’s house, if she dies, her father inherits from her, as she is not considered to have entered her husband’s domain.

Conversely, if the father delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the groom owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with him for the purpose of marriage, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is still in her father’s house and has not yet been given to her husband, if she dies, her husband inherits from her.

The Tosefta concludes: In what case is this statement said? It is stated with regard to the husband’s right to inherit from her. However, with regard to teruma, the halakha is that a woman who marries a priest may not partake of teruma until she actually enters the wedding canopy. This baraita is apparently a refutation of all of them, i.e., all of the opinions cited previously that hold that once the woman is delivered to the husband’s messengers, if the husband is a priest, the woman may partake of teruma. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. You said in the Tosefta that if she entered with him to her courtyard to lodge for one night, and she dies, her father inherits her property. The reason is because it specified that they entered only to lodge there, from which it may be inferred that if they entered without specification it is as though she entered for the sake of marriage. Say the latter clause of the Tosefta: If she entered with him to his courtyard for the purpose of marriage, and she dies, her husband inherits her property. This indicates that if she entered without specification, i.e., without saying that they were doing so for marriage, it is considered as though they entered merely to lodge. The inferences from these two clauses of the Tosefta apparently contradict one another.

Rav Ashi said: This is an incorrect interpretation, as the tanna taught the halakha of entering one type of courtyard without specification and the halakha of entering a different type of courtyard without specification, as follows: If they entered her courtyard without specification it is assumed that they entered merely to lodge, whereas if they entered his courtyard without specification, it is assumed that they did so for the sake of marriage, unless they expressly stated that they had another purpose in mind.

§ A Sage taught in a baraita: If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers and she subsequently committed adultery, she is sentenced to strangulation, in accordance with the halakha of a married woman who committed adultery, rather than stoning, which is the punishment for a betrothed woman who commits adultery. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama said that the verse states, in the context of the command to stone a young woman who commits adultery during betrothal: “To play the whore in her father’s house” (Deuteronomy 22:21), which excludes a case when the father has delivered her to the husband’s messengers, when she is no longer in her father’s house.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that the verse is excluding a case where she has entered the wedding canopy but she has not yet had intercourse, whereas if her father has merely delivered her to the husband’s messengers she is still considered to have sinned in his house and is punishable by stoning like any other betrothed woman.

In answer to this question, Rava said: The verse cannot be excluding that case, as Ami said to me that the case where she already entered the wedding canopy is not derived by inference from that verse; it is explicitly written in the following verse: “If there is a young woman who is a virgin betrothed to a man” (Deuteronomy 22:23). The terminology of the verse indicates that it applies to a “young woman” and not to a grown woman; to a “virgin” and not to a non-virgin; and to a “betrothed” woman and not to a married woman.

The Gemara analyzes this statement: What is the meaning of the term: A married woman, in this context? If we say that she is actually married and has already engaged in intercourse with her husband, this ruling is the same as the previous one, that she must be a virgin and not a non-virgin. Rather, is it not the case that it is referring to a woman who has entered the wedding canopy but has not had intercourse, and yet if she committed adultery at this stage she is sentenced to strangulation, like one who had engaged in relations with her husband? Consequently, the other verse, cited by Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama, cannot be referring to this case.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 48b examines when a bride transfers from her father’s to her husband’s authority, and the related dispute over her eligibility to eat teruma.