Talmud - Ketubot 100a כתובות ק׳ א׳

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha pertaining to the judges. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to the judges. Just as the judges have an advantage because they do not assess the value of property for their own benefit, so too, the agent also does not act for his own benefit; this is to the exclusion of a widow who sells for her own benefit.

Rav Shmuel, son of Bisna, said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow. Just as a widow is an individual, so too the agent is an individual. This is to the exclusion of the court, which is composed of many people. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to this matter, an agent is like a widow.

The Gemara asks: And in what way is that case different from this case? As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma, the agent separates teruma in accordance with the mind-set of the homeowner. And if he does not know the mind-set of homeowner, he separates an intermediate measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce. If he subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth of the produce, his teruma is considered teruma. If the agent is comparable to a widow, then why isn’t the halakha that the teruma that he has separated is nullified, since he did not act in accordance with the wishes of the homeowner?

The Gemara answers: There, since there are those who separate in a miserly fashion one-sixtieth, and there are those who separate generously one-fortieth, the agent can say to his employer: I estimated you to be generous or miserly. However, here there is no logical reason for the mistake made by the agent. It is simply an error on the part of the agent, and so the owner can say to him: You ought not to have erred.

§ Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. The Gemara asks: Does Rav Naḥman not agree with the argument: What advantage is there to the power of the court? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel said: In a case of orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [apotropos] for them and selects for the orphans appropriate portions and divides the property accordingly. Afterward, once the orphans have matured, they are able to protest this division of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: Once the orphans have matured, they are not able to protest, as if they were able to do so, what advantage would there be to the power of the court? This proves that Rav Naḥman agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. The case of the mishna was one where the judges erred in their assessment, and therefore Rav Naḥman said that the sale is void in accordance with the Rabbis. However, the case of the division of property among the orphans is one where they did not err, and so he ruled in accordance with the principle of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the court is given an advantage and the orphans are not able to protest the division.

The Gemara asks: If the case is one where the judges did not err, with regard to what could the orphans protest? After all, the judges acted correctly. The Gemara answers: They can protest with regard to the locations; one of the orphans can contend that he prefers property in a different location than he was given.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: A similar incident occurred and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reversed his ruling about the incident.

Rav Dimi would teach the incident in this way, as described above. Rav Safra would teach it in this slightly altered way: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wished to act in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not take action according to the statement of the Rabbis.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. And one Sage, Rav Safra, holds that if one erred in this manner the decision is not revoked. This is why, in Rav Safra’s version, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi changed his mind before issuing his ruling.

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. There is no fundamental dispute between them, only a disagreement as to the details of the case. One Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way, and one Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way.

§ Rav Yosef said: In the case of a widow who sold property to support herself or as payment of her marriage contract, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Therefore, if she sold liened property that was then seized from the purchasers in payment of a previous debt, the buyers are entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the orphans. And so too, if the court sold property for the same purpose, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The widow does not sell her own property, but rather she sells property from her husband’s estate to pay off his debts to her, and so clearly the guarantee rests on his properties that now belong to the orphans.

The Gemara answers: In truth, it was not necessary for Rav Yosef to mention this with regard to the widow, as it is clear that the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Where it was necessary for him to mention this halakha was with regard to the court. Lest you say:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 100a examines whether an agent selling property follows the standard for judges or for a widow, comparing this to rules on separating teruma.