Talmud - Ketubot 46a כתובות מ״ו א׳

Rav Pappa said: What of the statement that is taught there, in the baraita, that it is only if he had intercourse with her that he is flogged? It is referring to the money of the fine. The Gemara asks: And does one call monetary payment flogging? The Gemara answers: Yes, and we learned in a baraita: One who says: Half my valuation is upon me, he gives half his valuation, in accordance with the sum fixed by the Torah according to sex and age (see Leviticus 27:2–3). Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He is flogged and gives his full valuation. The Sages inquired: Why is he flogged? What transgression did he commit? Rav Pappa said: He is flogged by having to pay a full valuation. This proves that monetary payment can be referred to as flogging.

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? It is a rabbinic decree in the case of one who vows to donate half of his valuation, due to a case where one vowed the valuation of half of himself. And one who vows to donate the valuation of half of himself has effectively vowed to donate the valuation of a limb upon which his life depends, e.g., his head or heart, in which case it is as though he vowed to donate his entire valuation. Consequently, even one who vows to donate half of his valuation must donate his entire valuation.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the halakhot of the defamer. The Sages taught the following baraita, based upon the following verses: “And the Elders of that city shall take the man and chastise him. And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them to the father of the young woman” (Deuteronomy 22:18–19). “And they shall fine [ve’anshu] him”; this is referring to money. “And chastise him”; this is referring to flogging.

The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the phrase “and they fine [ve’anshu] him,” although the word ve’anshu can refer to any punishment, in this case it is referring to money, as it is written: And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them to the father of the young woman. However, with regard to the statement of the baraita that: “And chastise him”; this is referring to flogging, from where do we derive this?

Rabbi Abbahu said: We learned the meaning of the word chastise in the case of a defamer by verbal analogy from the word chastise stated in the verse “if a man have a stubborn and rebellious son [ben], that will not listen to the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and though they chastise him, will not listen to them” (Deuteronomy 21:18). And the implication of the word chastise in that verse is derived from the word son that appears in the same verse. And the implication of the word son [ben] with regard to a rebellious son is derived from the word bin in the verse “Then it shall be if the wicked man deserve [bin] to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2).

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the warning, i.e., the prohibition that serves as the source for the flogging for a defamer? Rabbi Elazar says that the prohibition is derived from the verse “You shall not go up and down as talebearer” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Natan says that it is derived from: “Then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing [davar ra]” (Deuteronomy 23:10), which is expounded to mean dibbur ra, evil speech.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Elazar did not state that it is derived from this verse quoted by Rabbi Natan? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse for the statement of Rabbi Pineḥas ben Yair, as it was taught: “Then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing”; from here Rabbi Pineḥas ben Yair said: A person should not think impure thoughts by day and thereby come by night to the impurity of an emission.

The Gemara asks the reverse question: And what is the reason that Rabbi Natan did not state that it is derived from that verse cited by Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Natan explains that verse, which includes the term talebearer [rakhil], as a warning to the court that it should not be soft to [rakh la] this litigant and harsh to that one, but it must treat both sides as equals.

§ The Gemara cites another statement that deals with a defamer: If the husband did not say to witnesses: Come and testify for me that my wife committed adultery, but they testify for him of their own accord and are subsequently discovered to be liars, the husband is not flogged and does not give the one hundred sela, as he did not harm her. She and her conspiring witnesses are brought early to the place of stoning.

The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that she and her conspiring witnesses are stoned? If she is liable to be stoned, they are not conspiring witnesses, and conversely, if they are conspiring witnesses, they are stoned and she is exempt. Rather, this must mean: Either she or her conspiring witnesses are brought early to the place of stoning. If they were telling the truth, she is stoned. If they conspired and offered false testimony, they are liable to be stoned.

The Gemara infers from the baraita that the reason the husband is not flogged or fined is that the husband did not tell them to testify, but if he told them to testify, although he did not hire them but merely persuaded them to testify that his wife had committed adultery as a betrothed woman, he is flogged and must pay the fine. This serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The husband is liable to the punishments of a defamer only if he hired witnesses.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? Nowhere does the Torah explicitly state that the husband hired false witnesses. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived by a verbal analogy between the term placing, written with regard to a defamer, and the term placing, written with regard to the prohibition against charging interest. It is written here, with regard to a defamer: “And he place wanton charges against her” (Deuteronomy 22:14), and it is written there: “Neither shall you place upon him interest” (Exodus 22:24). Just as below, with regard to interest, the verse is referring to money, so too here, in the case of a defamer, it is referring to money, thereby indicating that the husband paid money in order to substantiate his false accusation.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rav Yosef Tzidoni likewise taught in the school of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: It is derived from the verbal analogy between the term placing, written with regard to a defamer, and the term placing, written with regard to the prohibition against charging interest.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, if the husband hired the false witnesses with land instead of money, what is the halakha? If he hired them with less than the value of a peruta, what is the halakha? If he hired both witnesses with a peruta, what is the halakha? Since this halakha is derived from the case of interest, perhaps, like the prohibition against charging interest, it applies only with regard to money, rather than land, and only with money that is greater than the value of a peruta.

Similarly, Rav Ashi raised a dilemma concerning a defamer: If he defamed his wife with regard to their first marriage, what is the halakha? In other words, if a man married a woman, divorced her, remarried her, and subsequently defamed her by claiming that she had committed adultery during the period of betrothal before their first marriage, what is the halakha? Similarly, if he performed levirate marriage and then defamed her with regard to his brother’s marriage to her, what is the halakha?

The Gemara comments: Resolve at least one of these dilemmas, as Rabbi Yona taught that the verse “And the father of the young woman shall say to the Elders: I gave my daughter to this man” (Deuteronomy 22:16) serves to emphasize: I gave her to this man and not to the yavam, i.e., the brother of the original husband. Consequently, if one defames his yevama with regard to her original marriage to his brother, the unique halakhot of defamation do not apply.

§ In the course of the previous discussion, the Gemara mentioned a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of the Rabbis and what is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, referred to above (45b)? As it is taught in a baraita: How does the case of defamation proceed? It involves a situation where the husband came to the court and said to the father: So-and-so, I have not found indications of your daughter’s virginity. If there are witnesses who testify that she committed adultery under his authority, i.e., while betrothed to him, she has a marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

The Gemara interrupts its citation of the baraita, as this last statement is very surprising: If there are witnesses who testify that she committed adultery under his authority, does she have a marriage contract of one hundred dinars? She is punished by stoning. The Gemara explains that this is what the tanna said: If there are witnesses who testify that she committed adultery under his authority, she is liable to receive the punishment of stoning. However, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations at the outset, before her betrothal, when she was still a single woman, she is merely guilty of deceiving her husband with regard to her virginity, and therefore she has a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, which is the standard marriage contract of a non-virgin.

The Gemara resumes its quotation of the baraita: If it was discovered that the bad name is not a bad name, i.e., the husband’s accusation was false, he is flogged and gives her father one hundred sela, whether he had intercourse with her or whether he had not had intercourse with her. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: These matters were stated only in a case where he had intercourse with his wife before defaming her. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, this is as it is written: “If a man take a wife and go in unto her” (Deuteronomy 22:13), and: “And when I came near to her, I did not find in her the tokens of virginity” (Deuteronomy 22:14), as both expressions refer to sexual intercourse.

However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, what is the meaning of the phrases “and go in unto her,” and “and when I came near to her,” if the couple never engaged in intercourse? The Gemara explains that, according to the Rabbis, “and go in unto her” is referring to the wanton charges the husband leveled against his wife; “and when I came near to her” means that he came near with words, not intercourse.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, this is as it is written: “I did not find in your daughter the tokens of virginity” (Deuteronomy 22:17), as Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov claims that the husband had relations with her and discovered that she was not a virgin. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, what is the meaning of “I did not find in your daughter the tokens of virginity,” if they did not have intercourse? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis explain that he means: I did not find for your daughter the fitness of virginity, i.e., I have discovered that she was unfaithful.

The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, this is as it is written that the father replies: “And these are the tokens of my daughter’s virginity” (Deuteronomy 22:17). He presents a cloth that proves she was a virgin, in opposition to the husband’s claim. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, what is the meaning of “And these are the tokens of my daughter’s virginity”? The Rabbis answer that the father means: And these are the proofs of the fitness of my daughter’s virginity, i.e., he either brings witnesses to counter the testimony of the husband’s witnesses or provides some other proof that his daughter was a virgin at the time of her marriage.

The Gemara poses yet another question on the same lines: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, this is at it is written: “And they shall spread the garment” (Deuteronomy 22:17). The father brings the sheet on which the couple had intercourse and shows that it is stained with blood. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim that a husband can defame his wife even if they have not engaged in intercourse, what is the meaning of the phrase “And they shall spread the garment [hasimla]”?

Rabbi Abbahu said that the Rabbis interpret this expression as follows: They shall spread, i.e., examine, that which he placed against her [sam la]. In other words, they cross-examine the witnesses who testified against her, as it is taught in a baraita: “And they shall spread the garment”; this teaches that the witnesses of this husband come forward, and likewise the witnesses of that father come forward, and the court clarifies the matter like a new garment. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: The matters are as they are written, i.e., the verse refers to an actual cloth.

§ Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Rav Ya’akov bar Giyyorei sent a message from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Although we have not found in the entire Torah that any verse distinguishes between sexual intercourse in a typical manner and sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, with regard to flogging or any other punishment. However, in the case of the defamer, the Torah does distinguish in this manner, as the husband is obligated to pay the fine only if he had intercourse with his wife, even it was in an atypical manner, and he defames her by claiming that she had previously had intercourse in a typical manner with someone else.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the husband should be liable even if he did not have intercourse with his wife. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 46a explores whether monetary fines can be equated with flogging, examining valuation vows and the biblical penalty imposed on a slanderer.