Talmud - Ketubot 66a כתובות ס״ו א׳

which is categorized as part of her earnings and to which the husband has rights, Rabbi Akiva says the surplus belongs to her, then with regard to lost objects that she found, which are unrelated to her handiwork, do they not all the more so belong to her?

That is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion with regard to surplus, as we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): With regard to a woman who said to her husband: Anything that I produce will be konam, i.e., forbidden like an offering, to your mouth, he need not nullify the vow. The vow never took effect at all because a woman cannot prohibit her husband from items produced by actions that she is obligated to perform for him. Rabbi Akiva says: He should nullify the vow, lest she produce surplus that is more than the amount that is fitting for him, and the vow will take effect on the surplus, which she is not obligated to provide him. According to Rabbi Akiva, any surplus belongs to her. The Gemara answers: Rather, reverse the opinions: Lost objects found by a wife belong to her husband; Rabbi Akiva says: They belong to her.

The Gemara asks: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, didn’t he say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to surplus that is not produced through extraordinary effort, everyone agrees that it is the husband’s. Where they disagree is in a case of surplus that is produced through extraordinary effort. The first tanna holds that the surplus belongs to her husband, and Rabbi Akiva holds that the surplus belongs to her. Apparently, there is no need to reverse the opinions, as Rabbi Akiva acknowledges that there are instances in which surplus belongs to the husband (Rid). The Gemara responds: Rav Pappa said: A lost object found by a wife is comparable to surplus that is produced through extraordinary effort, as this is not a regular occurrence. Therefore, lost objects are subject to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: In a case where she performed two tasks for him simultaneously, what is the halakha; is the status of the earnings the same as surplus produced through exertion? Similarly, Ravina raises a dilemma: In a case where she performed three or four tasks simultaneously, what is the halakha? The dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna states that payments for her humiliation and for her degradation belong to her, but that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira holds that the husband receives a portion of the compensation. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan strongly objects to this: If that is so according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, then if one humiliated another’s horse, is it then the halakha that also such an offender is required to give him payment for humiliation? The Gemara asks: And is a horse subject to humiliation? How is a horse, who suffers no humiliation, comparable to a person, who does suffer from humiliation? Rather, the question is: According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, if one spat on another’s clothing, is the halakha that also such an offender be required to give him payment for humiliation?

And if you would say that indeed he would be required to pay, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Kamma 90a): If he spat at another person and the saliva reached him, or if he uncovered a woman’s head, or if he removed his garment from another, he is obligated to give him a payment of four hundred dinars, because of the extreme humiliation that he caused. And Rav Pappa said: They taught that he must pay four hundred dinars only when the spit reached his person. However, if the saliva reached his garment, the one who spat is exempt. Why, then, is one who humiliates a woman required to pay compensation to her husband? The Gemara rejects the comparison: When a person spits on one’s garment, he does not suffer dishonor, but if one’s wife is humiliated, she suffers dishonor, which causes him humiliation.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: However, if that is so, if one humiliated a poor person of noble descent, where there is dishonor for all members of the family, is the halakha also that he is required to give payment for humiliation to all members of the family? Rav Ashi said to him that there is a distinction between one’s wife and one’s relatives. There, where a relative was humiliated, it is not as if they themselves had suffered the humiliation. Here, since one’s wife is considered his own self, it is as if he himself were humiliated.

MISHNA: In the case of one who pledges to set aside a sum of money for his son-in-law as part of a dowry, and his son-in-law dies before receiving the money, the terms of the dowry do not transfer to the brother, who is now the yavam of the widow. The Sages said: The father-in-law can say to the yavam: To your brother, I wanted to give this money, but to you I do not want to give it.

The mishna addresses another matter. If the woman had pledged to bring in for him one thousand dinars in cash as a dowry, he then pledges, in the marriage contract, that he will give her fifteen hundred dinars against them. That is, he writes in the marriage document that in the event of divorce or his death, he will pay her that greater amount. And against the appraisal of goods such as utensils and other movable items that are included in the dowry, he pledges one-fifth less than the amount of the evaluation. This is because movable property is generally assessed at a value one-fifth higher than the actual value, and he cannot earn any money from these items.

If the appraisal is set at one hundred dinars and the property is actually worth one hundred dinars, then since the appraisal is conducted at market value he has a claim to property worth only one hundred dinars. Likewise, he may not record a decreased sum of property. His recorded appraisal of the movable property that she brings into the marriage is one hundred dinars only when she is giving thirty-one sela and one dinar, equal to 125 dinars. This is because the actual value is one-fifth less than the inflated evaluation, as explained. And similarly, he pledges four hundred dinars against her assets only when she is giving five hundred, based on the inflated assessment of their worth, such that the real value is four hundred dinars. In contrast, what

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 66a examines whether a wife's found lost objects belong to her or her husband, debating Rabbi Akiva's view on surplus earnings.