Talmud - Ketubot 31a כתובות ל״א א׳

and at the same time he tore another’s silk [shira’in]. The question is whether the liability to receive the death penalty exempts him from the liability for payment incurred at precisely the same moment.

§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana concedes in the case of one who steals another’s forbidden fat and eats it that he is obligated to pay for the fat, as he is already liable for theft before he comes to violate the prohibition against eating forbidden fat. The Gemara comments: Let us say that Rav Ḥisda disagrees with Rabbi Avin, as Rabbi Avin said: One who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, thereby performing a prohibited labor for which he is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and the arrow ripped silk as it proceeds, is exempt from the obligation to pay for the silk because he is liable for the more severe punishment for desecrating Shabbat. Although the silk was ripped prior to completion of the prohibited labor, as the arrow had not yet come to rest, he is nevertheless exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement. The prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat is comprised of lifting of the object and placement. Once he shot the arrow, its movement through the air is a continuation of his act of Shabbat desecration, for which he is liable to be executed. Here, too, say that lifting the fat is a prerequisite for eating, and therefore he should be exempt from payment.

The Gemara refutes this argument: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the arrow, placement is impossible without lifting, as placement without lifting is not a labor prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, lifting and placement are a single unit. In contrast, here, eating is possible without lifting as, if one wishes, he could bend down and eat without lifting the food to his mouth. Alternatively, there is another difference between the cases: There, in the case of the arrow, even if he seeks to take back the arrow after shooting it, he cannot take it back; therefore, lifting and placement constitute one action. Here, he could replace the fat after lifting it.

The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between this formulation, where the criterion is whether the second stage could be performed independent of the first stage, and that formulation, where the criterion is whether the second stage is inevitable after performing the first stage? The Gemara responds: There is a practical difference between them with regard to one who carries a knife in the public domain and tears silk as he proceeds. According to that formulation, where you said: Lifting is a prerequisite for placement, here too, lifting is a prerequisite for placement. As these two stages are inexorably connected, they constitute one action, and the one carrying the knife is exempt from paying the damages. Conversely, according to that formulation where you said: He cannot take back the arrow and that is why they are considered one action, here, he can take back the knife; therefore, lifting and placement are separate actions and he is not exempt from punishment for the damages that he caused.

§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rabbi Avin said: With regard to one who shoots an arrow from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits and the arrow rips silk as it proceeds, he is exempt, as lifting is a prerequisite for placement. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised an objection from that which is taught in a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain, a violation punishable by stoning. However, if he did not lift the purse but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, dragging and exiting, he is exempt, as the prohibition against theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated simultaneously when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property and into the public domain.

Rav Beivai concludes: But why is he liable if he carried the purse? Here, too, let us say that lifting is a prerequisite for carrying out, and therefore the theft was performed in the course of performance of the prohibited labor and he is exempt. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he lifted the pouch in order to conceal it in the same domain, not to carry it out into the public domain, and he reconsidered his plan with regard to the purse and carried it out. In that case the act of lifting was not performed for the purpose of carrying out. Therefore, he is not exempt from the obligation to pay for the theft.

The Gemara asks: And in a case like that, where he reconsidered, is one liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat? But didn’t Rav Simon say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who moves objects from one corner of his house to another corner on Shabbat, and he reconsidered his plan in their regard after lifting them and carried them out into the public domain, he is exempt, as the act of lifting was not initially performed for that purpose of carrying from one domain to another. Here, too, since the thief did not lift the pouch with the intention of carrying it out, he is not liable to be stoned.

The Gemara emends the previous answer: Do not say that he lifted it in order to conceal it; rather, say that he lifted it in order to carry it out. Nevertheless, the case of shooting the arrow and the case of stealing the purse are different, as with what case are we dealing here? It is a case where he stopped in the courtyard before taking the pouch out to the public domain. Therefore, the initial lifting is exclusively theft and not the start of a prohibited labor, as by stopping, he separated the lifting from the carrying out.

The Gemara asks: This is a case where he stopped. For what purpose did he stop? If he stopped in order to adjust the burden on his shoulder, that is the typical manner of proceeding and would not be considered an interruption in the process of carrying out the object. Rather, it must be in a case of one who stopped to rest, and when he resumes moving he initiates a separate action. The Gemara infers: But if he stopped in order to adjust the burden on his shoulder, what is the halakha?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 31a examines whether liability for a death penalty cancels payment obligations, comparing theft of forbidden fat to tearing silk with a Shabbat-violating arrow.