Talmud - Ketubot 56a כתובות נ״ו א׳

In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one’s intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, the Gemara concludes: Both Rav and Rabbi Natan follow the principle of assessing intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way.

According to the one who says the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out well. According to the one who says the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, here too, this is an assessment of his intention. Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? It was due to a sense of intimacy between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since he did demonstrate a sense of intimacy with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum.

Rav Ḥanina, who was known for teaching biblical verses, sat before Rabbi Yannai and said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Yannai said to him: Go out and read your verses outside. Your area of expertise is biblical verses, not halakha. What you said is incorrect and should not be said in the study hall, as the halakha is actually not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

And Rav Naḥman also said his own statement: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And the Sages of Neharde’a say in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The Gemara comments: And although Rav Naḥman cursed them and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such unspecified misfortune will happen to him, even so the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: And the practical halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

§ Since the practical halakha is that a woman who was divorced or widowed after betrothal receives the main sum of her marriage contract but not the additional sum, Ravin asks: What is the halakha with regard to a woman who entered the wedding canopy and is then widowed or divorced without having had sexual intercourse? Does the affection manifest in the wedding effect the marriage, and therefore she receives the additional sum as a married woman? Or, is it the affection manifest in the intercourse that effects the marriage, and consequently this woman is no different than a betrothed woman for the purpose of this halakha?

Come and hear that Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: He wrote the additional sum in the marriage contract for her only on account of the affection characteristic of the first night of the marriage. The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, this is why it says the affection characteristic of the first night, as the wedding ceremony is performed on the first night only. But if you say that the affection manifest in the intercourse effects the marriage, is there intercourse only on the first night and then from this point forward there is none? Consequently, the baraita implies that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, and from that point on she is entitled to the additional sum of the marriage contract.

The Gemara rejects this proof: But rather, what is the advantage of interpreting the expression: Affection characteristic of the first night, as a reference to the wedding? Is there a wedding only at night and not during the day? The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, is there intercourse only at night and not during the day? Didn’t Rava say that although the Sages generally prohibited engaging in intercourse during the day, if it was in a dark house it is permitted? The Gemara rejects this question: This is not difficult. By employing this phrase, it teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night.

Rather, the opinion that the expression is a reference to the wedding is difficult, as a wedding does not have to take place at night. The Gemara responds: The wedding reference is also not difficult, since a reference to a wedding without specification means a wedding that takes place in order to lead directly to intercourse. By using this phrase, it similarly teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night. Consequently, this baraita cannot be used as a proof for either possibility.

Rav Ashi asks a question similar to Ravin’s: If the bride entered the wedding canopy and began menstruating, and the husband then died without ever engaging in intercourse with his wife, what is the halakha with regard to the additional sum of the marriage contract? If you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, does this refer specifically to a wedding in which the couple is fit to engage in intercourse, which involves greater affection, and a wedding in which the couple is not fit to engage in intercourse does not effect the marriage? Or, perhaps it is not different. The Sages could not answer this, so the question shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he may write a marriage contract for a virgin for two hundred dinars, and she may then write a receipt as if he had paid part of that sum. They ask: And did Rabbi Yehuda hold that one writes a receipt for partial payment of a debt? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 170b): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: He should exchange the original promissory note for a new one that states the amount still owed, and Rabbi Yosei says: The lender should write him a receipt for the money he received? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a new note is preferable to a receipt because if the borrower loses the receipt, the lender is still in possession of a promissory note for the full amount and can collect a second time.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case where the receipt is written within the marriage contract itself and not as a separate document. The husband is therefore not required to hold on to a receipt, and consequently Rabbi Yehuda’s restriction against writing a receipt is not necessary.

Abaye said: Even if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where the receipt is not written within it, it is logical that Rabbi Yehuda would make an exception in this case. Granted, there, in an ordinary case of a receipt, it is certain that the borrower repaid part of the loan, and consequently there is concern that perhaps he will lose the receipt and the lender will take out the promissory note and return and collect the entire payment again. But here, in the mishna, did the husband definitely give the wife part of the payment for the marriage contract? The receipt merely amounts to something she said to him in order to waive part of the payment, although she did not actually receive it. If he saved the receipt, he saved it; if he did not save it, it is he himself who will lose. Therefore, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one writes a receipt.

They ask: Granted, it is understandable why Abaye did not say his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya, as the mishna does not teach explicitly that the receipt is written within the marriage contract. However, what is the reason that Rabbi Yirmeya did not say an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Why does Rabbi Yirmeya limit the mishna to a case where the receipt was written within the marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Although this is an unusual case, as there is no concern that the receipt may be lost, there is nevertheless a rabbinic decree with regard to this receipt due to the typical case of receipts. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would not allow a receipt unless it was written into the marriage contract itself.

With regard to the crux of the issue, the Gemara notes: The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the wife can waive part of the main sum of her marriage contract is specifically because she wrote him a receipt. However, if she said it verbally, no, it is not effective, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Why not? This is a monetary matter, and we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters in which someone makes a verbal stipulation, his stipulation stands.

This is as it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): In the case of one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no ability to claim from me food, clothing, or conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his stipulation is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, such as food and clothing, his stipulation stands; therefore, if she verbally waives part of the marriage contract, and thereby makes a stipulation about a monetary matter, it should be effective.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds: The marriage contract is a rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater force than Torah law. Therefore, if the wife waives part of the main sum of the marriage contract, Rabbi Yehuda holds that her declaration has no force unless it is written down. However, a Torah obligation, such as food and clothing, does not require this reinforcement, and consequently the wife may waive it with a verbal stipulation.

The Gemara challenges this answer: The husband’s entitlement to the produce of his wife’s property is a rabbinic decree, and nevertheless the Sages did not reinforce his rights to them, as we learned in a mishna (83a): Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the husband wrote that he waived his rights to the produce of his wife’s property, he may actually consume the produce of the produce of her property, meaning that he could invest the produce in additional property, which would also belong to his wife, but he would consume its produce. This applies unless he explicitly writes to her: I do not have any claim to your property, its produce, or the produce of its produce, forever.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 56a explores rabbinic debates over assessing marital intent and conflicting rulings on Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya's opinion regarding a bride's marriage contract.