Talmud - Ketubot 13a כתובות י״ג א׳

Because if that were not so, it is difficult, as there would be a contradiction between one halakha and another halakha. Since, on the one hand, we maintain a principle in halakhic ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman in civil law; and, on the other hand, in that case involving the claims of the bride and the groom Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. Rather, can we not conclude from this apparent contradiction that the matter must be understood as we are teaching, that the opinion of Rav Naḥman can be reconciled with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case.

MISHNA: In a case where she says: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood, i.e., she admits that her hymen is not intact but claims that it was not ruptured through intercourse, and the groom says: No; rather, you are one who was trampled by a man, and your hymen was ruptured through intercourse, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible and her claim is accepted because she certainly knows what actually happened. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives; rather, she retains the presumptive status of one who was trampled by a man, until she brings proof supporting her statement that her hymen was ruptured by wood.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are their respective financial claims? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The bride claims that since her hymen was ruptured by wood, her legal status is that of a virgin and she is entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred dinars; and the groom claims that she engaged in intercourse and is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars. Rabbi Elazar said: The bride claims that although her hymen is not intact she did not completely deceive him, as she never engaged in intercourse, and therefore she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars; and the groom claims that she engaged in intercourse, rendering the betrothal a mistaken transaction, and therefore she is entitled to nothing at all.

The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute between the bride and groom is whether the marriage contract is two hundred dinars or one hundred dinars, because the tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Whether the husband was aware that her hymen was ruptured by wood or whether he was not aware of her condition, she receives payment of her marriage contract of two hundred dinars and it is not a mistaken transaction. And Rabbi Elazar says: The dispute between the bride and groom is whether the marriage contract is one hundred dinars or whether she is entitled to nothing at all, because the tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said: Whether the husband was aware that her hymen was ruptured by wood or whether he was not aware of her condition, she receives payment of her marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

The Gemara asks: Granted, Rabbi Elazar did not state his explanation of the mishna in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan because he preferred to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, according to which the halakha is ruled, and not the opinion of Rabbi Meir. However, what is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not state his explanation of the mishna in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Elazar?

The Gemara answers: The reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan explained the mishna in that manner is that he holds: If the groom married a woman with the presumptive status of a virgin, and she is found to be a non-virgin, she receives payment of her marriage contract of one hundred dinars. Therefore, here, according to the explanation of Rabbi Elazar, who explains the mishna according to the opinion of the Rabbis, he is saying that she engaged in intercourse and is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars; and she is saying that her hymen was ruptured by wood and she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars. What difference is there between his claim and her claim? Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the dispute between the bride and the groom is whether she is entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred dinars or a marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

Again we question: Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, who explains that the dispute between the bride and the groom is with regard to whether she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars because her hymen was ruptured by wood, or whether she is entitled to nothing because she engaged in intercourse, that is why the tanna teaches two similar disputes, in this mishna and in the previous one. One dispute, in this mishna, comes to exclude the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama, who said: If he was not aware that her hymen was ruptured by wood, everyone agrees that she receives no marriage contract at all, as the marriage was a mistaken transaction. From this mishna it is clear that according to her claim that her hymen was ruptured by wood, she is entitled to one hundred dinars.

And one dispute, in the previous mishna, is brought in order to exclude that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Sheshet said: If the groom married a woman with the presumptive status of a virgin and she is found to be a non-virgin, she receives payment of her marriage contract of one hundred dinars. In the previous mishna he claims: Before I betrothed you, you were raped and my transaction was a mistaken transaction, indicating that she is entitled to nothing. However, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, why do I need the tanna to teach two similar disputes? In his opinion, the previous mishna could not have been taught to exclude that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Sheshet said. It has already been established that Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with the opinion that if she is found to be a non-virgin, she receives payment of her marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

The Gemara answers: The two similar disputes were necessary. One is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and the extent of the credibility that he accords to her claim; and one is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua and the extent to which he does not accord credibility to her claim. The Gemara elaborates: The first mishna, where she admits she was raped but claims that it was after betrothal, conveys to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua: That even though there is room to say that her claim is bolstered by a miggo, she is not deemed credible. The second mishna, where she claims that her hymen was ruptured by wood and he claims that she engaged in intercourse, conveys to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel: That even though there is no room to say that her claim is bolstered by a miggo, in his opinion she is deemed credible.

MISHNA: If people saw a woman speaking to one man, but they did not recognize him, and they said to her: What is the nature [tivo] of this man? And she said to them: He is a man called so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Rather, she assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse with a Gibeonite or with a mamzer, men of flawed lineage who disqualify her from marrying a priest, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

Similarly, if a single woman was pregnant, and people said to her: What is the nature of this fetus? And she says to them: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Rather, she assumes the presumptive status of one who conceived from a Gibeonite or a mamzer, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of speaking mentioned in the mishna? Ze’eiri said: It means that she secluded herself with a man and it is unknown whether she engaged in intercourse. Rav Asi said: It means that she engaged in intercourse. Granted, according to Ze’eiri, that is why the mishna teaches the case employing the term speaking, as it is certain only that they were in seclusion. Perhaps all they did was speak. However, according to Rav Asi, what is the reason the mishna employed the term speaking if the reference is to intercourse? The Gemara answers: The mishna employed a euphemism, as it is written with regard to licentious women: “She eats and wipes her mouth and says: I have done no wickedness” (Proverbs 30:20). The verse euphemistically ascribes the act of intercourse to the mouth instead of to the appropriate body part.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Ze’eiri, who said that speaking means that she secluded herself with him, that is the reason that the tanna teaches two cases in the mishna: A woman speaking to a man and a woman who is pregnant. However, according to Rav Asi, if speaking means that she engaged in intercourse, why do I need two cases addressing the same issue?

The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches one case, the case of speaking to a man, to deem her fit to marry a priest, because although she engaged in intercourse, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel rule that she is deemed credible and is not considered to have engaged in intercourse with a man of flawed lineage. And the tanna teaches one case, the case of the single woman who is pregnant, in order to deem her daughter born from that pregnancy fit to marry a priest, as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel rule the mother is deemed credible.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: With regard to the statement of the one who deems her fit to marry a priest, he deems her daughter fit to do so as well. However, according to the one who says: With regard to the statement of the one who deems her fit to marry a priest, he nevertheless deems her daughter unfit, what is there to say? Why did the mishna cite two cases addressing the same issue? The Gemara answers: Rav Asi holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who said: With regard to the statement of the one who deems her fit to marry a priest, he deems her daughter fit to do so as well.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Ze’eiri, who said: What is the meaning of the term speaking? It means that she secluded herself, and Rabbi Yehoshua said that she is not deemed credible to say that she engaged in intercourse with a man of proper lineage, but the assumption is that she engaged in intercourse with a man of flawed lineage. Didn’t Rav say: One flogs a man and a woman for entering into seclusion, for violating rabbinic law, but one does not render a woman forbidden to her husband for entering into seclusion? Only if it is established as a certainty that she engaged in intercourse with a man other than her husband, is she forbidden to her husband.

Let us say that this statement of Rav is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as Rabbi Yehoshua rules that she assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse with a Gibeonite or with a mamzer, and she is forbidden to marry a priest even for entering into seclusion. The Gemara rejects that conclusion. Even if you say that Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, the Sages established a higher standard with regard to matters of lineage. Although she is not forbidden to her husband for entering into seclusion, she is deemed unfit to marry a priest.

The Gemara raises an objection: If people saw that a woman entered with one man into seclusion,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 13a examines conflicting rulings on marriage contract sums when a bride claims her hymen tore from a non-intercourse cause versus the groom's dispute.