Talmud - Ketubot 3a כתובות ג׳ א׳

then sometimes, where he was not detained unavoidably but he fulfilled the condition willingly to effect the divorce, and the wife thinks that he was detained unavoidably, she will sit deserted, forever unable to remarry. And the concern due to licentious women is, as, if you said: Let it not be a bill of divorce, then sometimes, when he was detained unavoidably and she thinks that he was not detained unavoidably, she goes and remarries. And the result will be that the bill of divorce is void, and her children from the second marriage will be mamzerim, products of an adulterous relationship.

The Gemara questions the following premise: By Torah law, a condition that is unfulfilled due to circumstances beyond one’s control is considered fulfilled, and it is merely by rabbinic ordinance that it is deemed unfulfilled: And is there a matter where by Torah law it is not a bill of divorce, but due to virtuous women and due to licentious women we permit a married woman to others?

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is within the authority of the Sages to institute an ordinance freeing the woman from the marriage, as anyone who betroths a woman, betroths her contingent upon the agreement of the Sages, and in certain cases, such as those mentioned above, the Sages invalidated his betrothal retroactively.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: That works out well if he betrothed her with money, as in that case, the courts could declare the money ownerless, and one cannot betroth a woman with money that is not his. However, if he betrothed her with intercourse, what can be said? Rav Ashi answered: The Sages rendered his intercourse licentious intercourse.

Some say, to the contrary, that Rava said: Just as with regard to postponement of a wedding due to circumstances beyond his control, the groom is not obligated to provide sustenance for his betrothed, the same is true with regard to the matter of bills of divorce. The Gemara concludes that apparently Rava maintains: Unavoidable circumstances have legal standing with regard to bills of divorce.

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Gittin 76b): With regard to one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, the document is not a bill of divorce. The Gemara infers: If he died, that is when it is not a bill of divorce, since a divorce cannot take effect posthumously. However, in cases involving other circumstances beyond his control, e.g., if he fell ill and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce and it does take effect.

The Gemara answers: Actually, I will say to you that in the case where one falls ill it is also not a bill of divorce, and death is merely an example of circumstances beyond one’s control. And the fact that the mishna cited that example itself teaches us that there is no bill of divorce posthumously.

The Gemara asks: Does it come to teach that there is no bill of divorce posthumously? Wasn’t it already taught in the first clause of that mishna? The Gemara answers: Perhaps it was necessary for the first clause to mention specifically the case of death, to exclude the opinion of our Rabbis.

Come and hear an additional proof from the latter clause of that mishna: If one said: This is your bill of divorce from now if I have not returned from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, then this document is a bill of divorce. What, is it not that the same is true if his failure to return is due to the fact that he fell ill? The Gemara rejects that proof. The divorce takes effect specifically in the case where he died, and he wrote the bill of divorce because he was not amenable to have his wife happen before her yavam, his brother, for levirate marriage if he had no children. However, in cases where that is not a consideration, if other circumstances beyond his control caused the condition to be fulfilled, his intention is that the bill of divorce will not take effect.

Come and hear an additional proof from the case of a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came at the end of thirty days, before the deadline passed, but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not come within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have come, see that I have come. Shmuel said: It is not considered to be a return. Apparently, even if the condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the condition is considered fulfilled.

The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps unavoidable circumstances that are common and could be anticipated, e.g., the ferry being located at the other side of the river, are different, since he should have stipulated that exception when giving his wife the bill of divorce. And since he did not stipulate it, he brought the failure upon himself.

§ Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: The Sages teach that this halakha that a virgin is married on Wednesday is in effect only from the institution of the ordinance of Ezra that courts are in regular session only on Monday and Thursday. However, prior to the institution of the ordinance of Ezra, when courts were in regular session every day, a woman was married on any day of the week.

The Gemara asks: Prior to the institution of the ordinance of Ezra? What was in the past was in the past. There are no halakhic ramifications to that statement. The Gemara answers: This is what Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak is saying: If there are courts in regular daily session today, as they were prior to the institution of the ordinance of Ezra, a woman is married on any day of the week.

The Gemara asks: Don’t we require the additional reason that a virgin is married on Wednesday because the Sages were assiduous in seeing to the well-being of Jewish women and made certain that the groom would have several days to prepare for the wedding feast prior to the wedding? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where he already exerted himself and prepared everything before Shabbat, so the feast will be prepared even if the wedding is Sunday or Monday.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 3a examines conditional divorce validity when travel delays occur, rabbinic authority over betrothal, and concerns about mamzerim from remarriage.