Talmud - Ketubot 95a כתובות צ״ה א׳

a document of authorization to repossess liened property of the seller from anyone who purchased property from him from the first of the month of Iyyar and on. Rav Yosef said to him: A purchaser can say to you: Your deed is from the first of Nisan, so that the field that you purchased is rightfully yours and it is the other man, whose deed was dated on the fifth of Nisan, who took it illegally. Therefore, you should take possession of that field rather than repossessing other property.

The Gemara asks: If so, what is his remedy? The Gemara answers: Let the deed holders write a document of authorization to each other. If the individual whose deed was written on the fifth of Nisan authorizes the other individual to repossess property on his behalf, then he will be able to repossess property sold after the end of Nisan, because regardless of when his deed was written and whose deed was written first, he now has the right to repossess liened property.

MISHNA: In a case of one who was married to two women and sold his field, and the wife whom he married first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, then the second wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, may appropriate the field from the purchaser as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, the first wife can appropriate the field from the second as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. The purchaser can then appropriate the field from the first wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-à-vis the purchaser. They continue to do so according to this cycle [ḥalila] until they agree on a compromise between them. And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And if the first wife wrote this to him, what of it? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says to another, e.g., if a field is jointly owned and one partner says to the other: I have no legal dealings or involvement with regard to this field, or: I have no connection to it, or: I have withdrawn from it, has said nothing, as such declarations have no legal validity. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he acquired it from her possession by performing an act of acquisition in order to validate her relinquishing the field, in which case her statement is legally valid.

The Gemara asks: And if they acquired it from her, what of it? Let the woman say afterward: I did it only to please my husband, as I saw that he wished to sell the field and I did not want to quarrel with him, but I did not mean it seriously. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased property from a man, even if he later went back and purchased rights to that property from the man’s wife, the transaction is nullified? Apparently, the wife can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean it, and that claim is accepted.

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult: This mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that mishna in tractate Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

As it is taught in a baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him because she did not agree to the sale, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser, and this time his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement promised to her in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, not only is the wife unable to sue the second purchaser after she signed his deed, but she cannot sue the first buyer either since he can say to her: When I purchased the field, I left you a field from which you could have collected, and you brought this loss upon yourself.

Rabbi Yehuda says that she can say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean to ratify the second sale either; and you, what claim do you have against me?

The Gemara asks: Is it possible that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, presented the unattributed mishna here in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and presented the unattributed mishna there in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Such a dichotomy is unlikely.

Rav Pappa offered another answer to the question and said: The mishna here is referring to a divorcée who wrote a note to the purchaser relinquishing her rights to the field after her divorce, and everyone agrees that her statement is binding, as she cannot claim to have acted in order to please her husband.

Rav Ashi said: It is all in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir states his opinion there only in a case where the husband sold property to two different purchasers, as they can say to her: If it is true that you acted only in order to please your husband, you should have done so with regard to the first purchaser and not just the second. However, in a case where there is only one purchaser, even Rabbi Meir concedes that she can claim to have acted only out of the desire to please her husband. And the mishna here is referring to a case where the husband previously wrote a bill of sale to another purchaser and the wife did not ratify the sale, and the second time he sold a property she did ratify the sale. Consequently, even Rabbi Meir concedes that the woman cannot claim that she acted only in order to please her husband.

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Gittin 48b): One does not collect a debt from liened property that has been sold to a third party where there is unsold property available, even if the unsold property is of inferior quality. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the unsold property became blighted and is no longer of sufficient value to pay off the debt, what is the halakha? Would the creditor be allowed to repossess liened property that has been sold to a third party?

Come and hear a solution to this dilemma based upon the following baraita: In a case where a husband wrote a bill of sale to one purchaser, but his wife did not sign it for him, and later he sold a different property to a second purchaser and his wife signed the bill of sale for him, the halakha is that she has lost the settlement specified in her marriage contract in the event that the husband is left without property from which she can collect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Now, if it should enter your mind that in a case where the unsold property became blighted the creditor would be able to repossess liened property, then even though she lost her ability to collect her marriage contract from the second purchaser, she should at least be able to collect from the first purchaser, because she never relinquished her right to the property he purchased. Although there was unsold property left at the time that the first purchase was made, that property is inaccessible to her because she relinquished her right to it. Consequently, her inability to repossess property from the first purchaser indicates that it is not possible to repossess liened property in the event that unsold property is blighted.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is possible to explain that what Rabbi Meir meant when he said: She has lost her marriage contract, is that she has lost her rights from the second purchaser alone, but not from the first.

Rava said: There are two responses with which your statement can be rejected. One is that the expression: She has lost, indicates that she has lost her rights entirely, even with regard to the first purchaser. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita: If an individual borrowed from one creditor and sold his property to two purchasers and the creditor wrote a note to the second purchaser saying: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, he has no claims toward the first purchaser either. This is because the first purchaser is able to say to the creditor: I left you a place from where to collect your debt, since when I purchased the land, unsold property still remained in the debtor’s possession, and therefore you have no claims against me.

The Gemara rejects the attempt to solve the dilemma with regard to collecting from liened property when the unsold property was blighted: There, in the case of a woman or man who wrote to the second purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, it is he who causes a loss to himself by his own direct action of signing away his rights. It cannot be proven what the halakha would be in the case of a blighted field, where the reason he cannot make use of the field is not due to his own action.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 95a explores authorization deeds for reclaiming liened property and a Mishna case involving two wives disputing marriage contract claims on a sold field.