Talmud - Ketubot 37b כתובות ל״ז ב׳

and one derivation is with regard to death and lashes, exempting one liable to be executed from lashes. The Gemara comments: And both verses are necessary, as if the Torah taught us this halakha only with regard to death and monetary payment, one would assert that the exemption from payment is due to the fact that we do not administer one punishment to his body and one to his money. However, with regard to death and lashes, that both this, death, and that, lashes, are administered to his body, say it is an extended death penalty and let us administer lashes and then the death penalty to him so that his death will ensue from affliction.

And if the Torah taught us this halakha only with regard to death and lashes, one would assert that the exemption from lashes is due to the fact that we do not administer two punishments to his body. However, with regard to death and money, where one is administered to his body and one is administered to his money, say: Let us administer both to him. Therefore, both verses are necessary, to teach that one receives only one punishment in both cases.

The Gemara asks with regard to the verse “And you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death” (Numbers 35:31), which means that one does not take payment from a person sentenced to death, why do I require this verse, if that principle was already derived from another verse? The Gemara explains that the Merciful One says: Do not take money from him and exempt him from the death penalty. Similarly, the following verse: “And you shall take no ransom for him that is fled to his city of refuge” (Numbers 35:32), why do I require this verse? The Gemara explains that the Merciful One says: Do not take money from him and exempt him from exile.

The Gemara asks: And why do I require two verses to teach the same principle? The Gemara explains: One verse refers to one who killed unwittingly, and one verse refers to one who killed intentionally. The Gemara comments: And both verses are necessary, as if the Torah taught us this halakha only with regard to an intentional murderer, one would assert that payment is not accepted due to the fact that the prohibition that he violated is severe. However, with regard to an unwitting killer, where the prohibition is not severe, say no, he may pay in lieu of exile. And if the Torah taught us this halakha only with regard to an unwitting killer, one would assert that payment is not accepted due to the fact that there is no loss of life, as the killer is not executed, and therefore, there is no reason to allow payment in lieu of exile. However, with regard to an intentional killer, where there is loss of life, as he will be executed, say no, he may pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, both verses are necessary.

The Gemara asks with regard to the following verse: “And no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:33), which also indicates that he cannot be exempted by money, why do I require another verse to teach that one cannot absolve himself from the death penalty by means of payment?

The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach that which is taught in a baraita with regard to the matter of the calf that is beheaded. If a corpse whose murderer is unknown is found between two towns, the elders of the town nearest to the corpse bring a heifer and behead it in a riverbed, after which they pray for atonement for this murder. The baraita states: From where is it derived that if the calf was beheaded and the murderer was found thereafter, it is derived that one does not exempt him from punishment? It is as it is stated: “And no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:32), from which it is inferred: And not by the blood of the calf.

The Gemara asks: What about the following verse, from the conclusion of the chapter of the heifer: The verse “And so shall you put away the innocent blood from your midst” (Deuteronomy 21:9) appears to be teaching the very same halakha, that a murderer must be executed. Why do I need it? The Gemara answers that it is necessary to teach that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that with regard to those executed by sword, e.g., murderers, their execution is administered from the neck, and nowhere else? The verse states: “And so shall you put away the innocent blood from your midst” (Deuteronomy 21:9), likening all spillers of blood to the beheaded calf brought for an unresolved murder. Just as there, the calf is beheaded from the neck, so too, murderers are beheaded from the neck.

The Gemara asks: If so, just as there, in the case of the beheaded calf, it is beheaded with a cleaver [kofitz] and at the nape of the neck, here too the court executes murderers with a cleaver and at the nape of the neck. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that the verse says: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), from which it is derived: Choose for him an agreeable death. It is prohibited to abuse a guilty person while executing him, and chopping off his head with a cleaver is an unseemly death. The murderer is beheaded from the neck, not with a cleaver, and not by the other methods employed in beheading the calf.

The Gemara asks with regard to the following verse: “Anything dedicated [ḥerem], that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed; he shall surely be put to death” (Leviticus 27:29), which is interpreted here as: Anyone sentenced to be executed shall not be redeemed; this appears to teach the same halakha as above, so why do I need it? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to one taken to be executed, and one person said: His valuation is upon me to donate to the Temple, that he did not say anything and his vow is not binding?

It is derived as it is stated: “Anything dedicated [ḥerem], that may be dedicated of men [yoḥoram], shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). This verse is taken to mean that anything dedicated, through which a man who is condemned [yoḥoram] is valuated, shall not be redeemed, as the person in question is already considered dead. One might think that even before his verdict is issued this should be so, and that one who said: The valuation of so-and-so on trial for murder is upon me, said nothing of consequence. Therefore, the verse states: “That may be dedicated of men,” implying “of men,” but not entire men. If it is valuation of an entire man, one not yet sentenced to death, it is binding. If it is valuation of a partial man, one sentenced to death, it is not binding.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya, who said that even a person taken to his execution is valuated, and the vow is binding, because the money of his valuation is fixed. The sum of the valuation established in the Torah is not based on the worth of the individual; rather, there is a fixed sum determined by age and gender. Therefore, one may be valuated as long as he is alive. According to that opinion, the question remains with regard to this verse: “Anything dedicated,” what does he derive from it?

The Gemara answers: He requires it to teach that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Because we found with regard to those executed at the hand of Heaven, and not through court-administered execution, that they give money and their sins are atoned, as it is stated: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. If there be laid upon him a ransom then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him” (Exodus 21:29–30). One whose ox kills a person is essentially liable to receive the death penalty at the hand of Heaven, and pays money instead. You might think that even with regard to those liable to receive the death penalty at the hands of man it is so, and one can pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, the verse states: “Dedicated of men shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). One who is executed by man cannot be redeemed with money.

And I have derived this restriction only with regard to prohibitions punishable by severe penalties of death, e.g., striking one’s father, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation. However, with regard to prohibitions punishable by less severe penalties of death, e.g., performing labor on Shabbat, for which atonement, a sin-offering, is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation, from where is it derived that there is no payment in lieu of execution? The verse states: “Anything dedicated,” to include all prohibitions punishable by court-administered execution.

The Gemara asks: And didn’t you incidentally learn the following conclusion from the verse “And you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death” (Numbers 35:31): Do not take money from him and exempt him from death? Why, then, do I require the phrase: Any ḥerem? Rami bar Ḥama said: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 37b examines why the Torah requires separate verses exempting a person from combined punishments like death, lashes, or monetary payment.