Talmud - Ketubot 100b כתובות ק׳ ב׳

Everyone who buys from the court buys with the implicit understanding that the sale generates publicity, as a court sale is conducted in public with notices. The buyer could therefore think to himself that if no claimants came forward until the time of the actual purchase, then it is certain that there can be no problem with his purchase and he forgoes his property guarantee. Lest you say this, Rav Yosef teaches us that there is nevertheless a guarantee on the property, and it rests upon the orphans and not on the court.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that even if the judges err, the transaction is not void because of the prerogative of the court. The Gemara asks: And to what extent can they err without causing the deal to be reversed? Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet said: Until half of the value.

That is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: A court that sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars, or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid. Since he doesn’t give as an example a larger gap between the market value and the sale price, this must be the most extreme case in which the transaction is not reversed.

Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef: With regard to a court that sold without an announcement, it is considered as if they erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna and their decision is reversed.

The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Yosef say that it is considered as if the court erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, when it certainly erred in this manner? As we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21b): The assessment of the orphans is for thirty days, and the assessment for consecrated property is for sixty days, and they make announcements during the thirty and the sixty days respectively both in the morning and in the evening. The mishna states explicitly that announcements must be made. If the court did not make the announcements, it clearly erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna.

The Gemara answers: If all the information that I had were from that mishna, I would say that this applies to an agent but not to a court. Therefore, Rav Yosef teaches us that even a court that sold property without making announcements has erred.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to the statement of Ameimar: The mishna teaches that the halakha with regard to the assessment of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it through the judges is as follows: In a case where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. One can see from here that if the judges sold the property for its value, their sale is valid. What, is the mishna not discussing a case where no announcement was made? Ameimar replied: No, the case under discussion is one where they did make an announcement.

The Gemara asks: Since the last clause is referring to a case where the court made an announcement, the first clause must be referring to a case where they did not make announcements, as it teaches in the final clause: If they made a document of inspection and announced the sale publicly, then even if they sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid.

Rather, this should be understood differently. Actually, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where they did not make an announcement, and this is not difficult. Here, Ameimar is referring to items for which one makes an announcement, and if this was not done then the sale is void. There, the mishna is speaking of items for which one does not make announcements.

And these are the items for which one does not make an announcement: Slaves, movable property, and contracts. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that slaves are sold without an announcement? Slaves are sold without an announcement lest they hear that they are about to be sold and escape. Why is the sale of movable property and contracts also not announced? Lest they be stolen.

And if you wish, say instead that here Ameimar is referring to a time when one makes an announcement, while there the mishna is referring to a time when one does not make an announcement.

When does one not make an announcement? As the Sages of Neharde’a say: For the purpose of paying head tax, and for payment to provide for children’s sustenance, and for burial, the court sells property inherited by orphans without an announcement because these are pressing needs. There is no time to wait for an announcement.

And if you wish, say instead that here, Ameimar is referring to a locale where one makes an announcement, while there, the mishna is referring to a locale where one does not make an announcement, as Rav Naḥman said: They never made a document of inspection in Neharde’a.

Some of the students understood from Rav Naḥman’s statement that no announcements were made in Neharde’a because the Sages there were all expert in the appraisal of an article’s value. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said to them: This was explained to me personally by Rav Naḥman himself: It was because those who purchase the property are called: People who consume property that was publicly announced. This disparaging nickname was given because the purchasers were perceived as taking advantage of the distress of others by running to buy the property of someone in trouble. Since decent, honest people did not wish to buy property whose sale had been announced, they stopped making announcements.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Movable property that belongs to orphans is appraised and sold immediately so that it not deteriorate over time. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: The movable property is sold on a market day, when there are many potential buyers and the items will sell for a proper price.

The Gemara notes: And they do not disagree with each other. Rather, this opinion, that the items are sold on a market day, applies when the market day is approaching, so the property is not sold immediately. That opinion, that the items are sold immediately, applies when the market day is far off.

Rav Kahana was in possession of beer that belonged to Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai, who was an orphan. He delayed selling it until the Festival. He explained the rationale for his actions and said: Although it is possible that it may deteriorate [itzatzta] and sour a little, it nevertheless brings in money at the time of the Festival, as it will sell for a higher price and for money, not credit. Consequently, it is in the best interests of Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai to hold off and sell the beer at the next Festival.

It is also related that Ravina was in possession of wine belonging to the orphan Ravina the younger, who was his sister’s son. He also had wine of his own, which he was taking to Sikhra to sell.

He came before Rav Ashi and said to him: What is the halakha here, am I able to bring his wine along with my wine, or must I wait for a more opportune time to sell it? He said to him: Go to Sikhra and take his wine along as well, as his is no better than yours, and if you sell your own wine in this manner, it is clear that you think this is the best way to sell, and it is permitted for you to sell his wine in this manner.

MISHNA: An orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority may refuse to continue living with her husband upon reaching the age of majority, thereby retroactively annulling their marriage. In the case of one who refuses to continue living with her husband in this manner; and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative by rabbinic law; and in the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract; and they are not entitled to remuneration for the produce that the husband consumed; and they are not entitled to sustenance; and they are not entitled to their worn clothes that were brought in to the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage.

If, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, then she is entitled to payment of a marriage contract.

In the case of a widow who married a High Priest; or a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza and later married a common priest; or a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] who married an Israelite; or a Gibeonite woman who married an Israelite; or a Jewish woman who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, although each of these unions is prohibited by Torah law, the woman is still entitled to payment of a marriage contract.

GEMARA: Rav taught that a minor girl who was married off by her mother or by her brother and who is divorced with a bill of divorce is not entitled to her marriage contract. According to Torah law, this marriage never took effect, and it was never established that in this situation she would receive a marriage contract. And all the more so, one who refuses to continue living with her husband and annuls the marriage herself is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract.

Shmuel taught that one who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.

The Gemara notes: And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning, as Shmuel said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.

Shmuel also said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not disqualified from marrying one of the brothers of her husband. Her refusal annuls the marriage, and it is as if it never happened. And for the same reason, unlike a divorcée, this girl is not disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood. However, one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is disqualified from marrying one of the brothers and is also disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood.

Another difference between a woman who refuses to continue living with her husband and a woman who was divorced normally is the following: One who refuses to continue living with her husband does not need to wait three months before remarrying, as other women who separate from their husbands must.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 100b examines court-ordered property sales, addressing liability guarantees for orphans and how much pricing error voids a transaction.