Talmud - Ketubot 97b כתובות צ״ז ב׳

However, what is the reason that a widow from betrothal may sell property when not in court? Ulla said: Due to desirability. The Sages enacted several ordinances on behalf of women, so that men will want to marry them. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by being involved in court proceedings.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case of a divorcée. According to the one who says that it is due to desirability, a divorcée also requires desirability. But according to the one who says that it is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court, a man does not care if his ex-wife is disgraced.

We learned in the mishna (97b): And a divorcée may sell only in court. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that this is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court, here he does not care if his ex-wife is disgraced. However, according to the one who says that it is due to desirability, a divorcée also requires desirability, so why should she be required to sell in court?

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this continuation of the mishna? It is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who explains that anyone who is selling property to receive payment of her marriage contract and not for sustenance is required to sell only in court, and a divorcée does not receive sustenance.

The Gemara asks: If this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then wasn’t it already taught in the first clause that a widow from betrothal sells only in court because she does not receive sustenance? Since the same reasoning applies to a divorcée, why would the mishna have to teach the halakha again in this case?

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, lest you say: In the case of a widow from betrothal, she is not in great need of her desirability, as she has not been tarnished through sexual relations and men will not hold back from marrying her, and therefore she can go to the court to manage her affairs; however, a divorcée, who is in great need of her desirability and needs assistance in getting remarried, say that she requires desirability so that she will not be disgraced and she is allowed to take care of her affairs out of court. Lest you make this argument, the halakha was clearly stated in the mishna.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t we already learn this halakha, as it also says in the mishna the following generalization: And anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court? This halakha was intended to add what? Was it not meant to add the case of a divorcée and teach that she can sell only in court, in which case the concluding remark of the mishna about the divorcée is superfluous?

The Gemara rejects this: No, it is to include a woman about whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira said: Wherever it was said: A woman that there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance until the divorce is final, and a woman in this situation may sell out of court as well.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof: Just as the widow sells when not in court, so too, her heirs, those who inherit her marriage contract, sell when not in court. Granted, according to the one who says that the reason why she may sell out of court is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by having to appear in court, it is possible to say that just as he is not amenable to the idea that she will be disgraced, he also is not amenable to the idea that her heirs will be disgraced. However, according to the one who says that she sells out of court due to desirability, what desirability do her heirs need to have? Ulla interpreted it: This could take place, for example, when her daughter or her sister inherited from her, and they too need desirability.

MISHNA: If a woman sold all or part of her marriage contract, or if she mortgaged all or part of her marriage contract, or if she gave away as a gift all or part of her marriage contract to another, then she sells the remainder only in court. And the Rabbis say: She sells even four or five times, and she is not obligated to sell everything at one time. And despite selling several times, she sells for her sustenance even when not in court, and she writes in the bill of sale: I sold this for my sustenance. And a divorcée, who does not receive sustenance, sells only in court.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: If she sold all of her marriage contract, or mortgaged her marriage contract, or if she made her marriage contract designated repayment to another, she does not receive sustenance any longer; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: Although she has not sold or mortgaged her entire marriage contract, but only half of it, she has lost her right to sustenance. Therefore, she can only sell the rest of her marriage contract in court.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Shimon holds that we do not say that part of the money has a status like the entire sum of money? Since she no longer has a claim to the entire sum of her marriage contract, it is as though she no longer has a marriage contract and loses her right to sustenance, and the Rabbis hold that we do say part of the money is like the entire money.

Didn’t we hear them say the opposite? As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse that speaks about the High Priest (Leviticus 21:13): “And he shall take a wife in her virginity,” to exclude a grown woman whose sign of virginity has diminished because when a girl goes through puberty her hymen wears away; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare as fit even a grown woman for the High Priest. This implies that they are of the opinion that the absence of a part is not considered the absence of the whole, and although part of her sign of virginity has been diminished, it is still present.

The Gemara answers: There they disagree with regard to the interpretation of the verses. Rabbi Meir holds that were it stated in the verse a virgin, this general term would have indicated that as long as she is a virgin, even if she has only part of her sign of virginity, she could marry the High Priest. However, since the verse states: “Her virginity,” it means to say until there is a sign of virginity in its entirety. The addition of the prefix “in” to the phrase “in her virginity” teaches that if she engaged in sexual intercourse in the typical manner, i.e., in the place where her sign of virginity lies, then yes, it is considered that she has engaged in sexual intercourse and is no longer considered a virgin. But if she engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, then she is not considered to have engaged in sexual intercourse.

By contrast, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold that the word virgin implies a complete virgin, whose sign of virginity is completely intact. Therefore, when the verse says: “Her virginity,” it indicates that even if she has only part of her sign of virginity, in this regard she is still considered a virgin.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 97b explores why a widow or divorcée may sell property, weighing court oversight against concerns for remarriage appeal and marital dignity.