Talmud - Ketubot 2b כתובות ב׳ ב׳

as it is clear that she cannot say to him that his field was inundated. Here, the circumstances were avoidable, and postponement of the wedding is attributable to her. When you should raise a dilemma is in a case where menstruation began not at the time of her set period. What is the ruling there? Since it is not the time of her set period, it is comparable to the case of her illness, and she can say to him that his field was inundated. Or, perhaps since there are some women whose set period changes, it is avoidable, and its legal status is like menstruation at the time of her set period, and postponement of the wedding is attributable to her.

Rav Aḥai resolved these dilemmas through a careful reading of the mishna: If the time arrived and they were not married, the brides are entitled to eat from his food and eat teruma. It doesn’t teach: And the grooms didn’t marry, in the active form. Rather, it teaches: And the brides were not married, in the passive form.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances described in the phrase: They were not married? If the brides postpone the marriage, why do they eat from his food and eat teruma? Rather, is it not referring to a case where they were compelled by circumstances beyond their control in that manner, e.g., the bride falling ill or beginning to menstruate, and it teaches: The brides eat from his food and eat teruma, and his bad fortune is responsible for his situation.

Rav Ashi said: Actually, I will say to you: In any case of unavoidable circumstances, whether they affect him or they affect her, she doesn’t eat from his food, and the mishna is referring to a case where grooms postpone the wedding. And by right, the tanna should have taught: They didn’t marry, which would have established that grooms caused the postponement. And since the tanna taught the first clause of the mishna cited above in terms of a bride: The Sages give a virgin twelve months, it taught the latter clause in terms of a bride. Therefore, no inference may be drawn from the formulation of the latter clause. Only if the groom postpones the wedding is he obligated to provide sustenance for the women when the time designated for the wedding arrives.

Rava said: And although delays caused by circumstances beyond his control exempt the groom from providing support to his betrothed at the time originally designated for the wedding, with regard to bills of divorce that is not so. Apparently, Rava maintains that unavoidable circumstances have no legal standing with regard to bills of divorce. If one stipulated that the bill of divorce will take effect only with the fulfillment of a condition, even if that condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the bill of divorce takes effect.

The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle? If we say it is from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b) with regard to one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, if I do not return from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, the document is not a bill of divorce. Therefore, if she has no children from her deceased husband, the halakhot of levirate marriage would apply to her. The Gemara infers: If he died, that is when it is not a bill of divorce, since a divorce cannot take effect posthumously. By inference, in cases involving other circumstances beyond his control, e.g., if he fell ill, and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce and it takes effect. Apparently, if the reason for his failure to arrive is a circumstance beyond his control, the divorce takes effect.

The Gemara refutes that proof. And perhaps, actually I will say to you that in the case where he falls ill it is also not a bill of divorce, and the mishna cited the case of death merely as an example of circumstances beyond his control. And the reason that example itself was chosen is to teach us that there is no bill of divorce posthumously. Even if the divorce is not conditional, and the husband simply states that it will take effect after he dies, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: Does it come to teach that there is no bill of divorce posthumously? Wasn’t it already taught in the first clause of the mishna (Gittin 72a) that if one on his deathbed said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after I die, he said nothing. The bill of divorce does not take effect after his death.

The Gemara answers: Perhaps it was necessary for the first clause to mention specifically the case of death, to exclude that which our Rabbis said and not to exclude the case of one who fell ill, as it is taught in a baraita: And our Rabbis permitted her to remarry, in a case where he died within the twelve months that he stipulated. And we said: Who are our Rabbis mentioned here? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is the court that permitted the oil of gentiles for consumption. In this regard, they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: The time written in a document proves when it takes effect. The fact that a certain date is written in the bill of divorce indicates that one’s intention was that the divorce take effect from the day that it was written and delivered, not after his death. In any event, there is proof neither for nor against Rava’s opinion from this baraita.

And rather, proof may be cited from the latter clause of the mishna. If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not return from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a bill of divorce. This is the halakha in a case where he dies, and the same is true if he fell ill. If the divorce takes effect when his failure to return is attributable to death, the ultimate circumstance beyond his control, all the more so should it take effect if it is attributable to a less extreme circumstance.

The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps the divorce takes effect specifically in the case where he died, because he is not amenable to have his wife happen before her yavam, his brother, if he had no children. However, if other circumstances beyond his control caused the condition to be fulfilled, where levirate marriage is not a consideration, his intention is that the bill of divorce will not take effect.

Rather, proof may be cited from this case, where a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted the bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until after thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came at the end of thirty days, before the deadline passed, but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not come within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have come, see that I have come. Shmuel said: This is not considered to be a return. Apparently, even if the condition was fulfilled due to circumstances beyond his control, the condition is considered fulfilled.

The Gemara rejects that proof: And perhaps unavoidable circumstances that are common and could be anticipated, e.g., the ferry is located at the other side of the river, are different, since he should have stipulated that exception when establishing the condition, and he did not stipulate it, he brought the failure to arrive upon himself. Although he regrets it now, at the time his intent was that even if the condition were fulfilled due to that circumstance, the divorce would take effect. In contrast, however, if the condition is fulfilled due to an uncommon circumstance that could not have been anticipated, the divorce would not take effect.

Rather, Rava is stating a halakha based on his own reasoning. Circumstances beyond one’s control are not a factor in determining whether or not a condition is fulfilled, and this is due to virtuous women and due to licentious women. The Gemara articulates: There is concern due to virtuous women, as, if you said: Let it not be a bill of divorce, if the reason that the condition was not fulfilled was due to circumstances beyond his control,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Ketuvot 2b examines whether a bride's unexpected menstruation delays her wedding responsibly, weighing rabbinic debate over intent versus unavoidable circumstance.