Talmud - Nedarim 36b נדרים ל״ו ב׳

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another, does he require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce or not? Do we say: Since it is a benefit for the other to have his produce tithed, it does not require his knowledge, as one may act in a person’s interest in his absence? Or, perhaps it is his mitzva, and it is preferable for him to perform the mitzva himself, and therefore, it does not benefit him to have the produce tithed on his behalf.

Come and hear a proof from the mishna: For one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by vow, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with his knowledge and consent. The Gemara analyzes this statement: With what are we dealing? If we say that he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile, the question is: And with the knowledge and consent of whom may he do so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the one tithing the produce, who designated him an agent to do so? One cannot tithe another’s produce unless he is designated as an agent.

Rather, it must be that he is tithing with the knowledge of the owner of the pile. However, in that case, by tithing the produce isn’t he benefiting the owner, as he is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner? Rather, it must be that he separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of the owner of the pile. The Gemara asks: And with the knowledge and consent of whom is he doing so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, isn’t he benefiting the owner? He is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner. Rather, is it not that he is tithing on the basis of his own knowledge, and he is separating from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another? And if you say that in order to tithe from one’s produce on behalf of the produce of the owner, it requires the owner’s knowledge and consent, isn’t he benefiting the owner? Rather, is it not that one may conclude from here that in order to tithe from one’s produce on behalf of the produce of another, one does not require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the pile?

The Gemara rejects that conclusion. Actually, it is a case where he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile. However, the circumstances here are parallel to those addressed by Rava in another context, as Rava said that there is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. Here too, this is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. In that case, one may tithe another’s produce without being designated as his agent.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In a case where one separates teruma from his own produce for the produce of another, who is entitled to the discretionary benefit, i.e., the right to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing? Do we say: If not for the produce of this one separating the teruma, would the pile of that owner of the produce be properly tithed, and therefore the one separating the teruma is entitled to the discretionary benefit? Or, perhaps we say: If not for the pile of that owner of the pile, the produce of this one separating the teruma would not be teruma, and therefore the owner is entitled to the discretionary benefit.

Rabbi Zeira said to him that as the verse states: “You shall tithe all the produce of your seed…and you shall give” (Deuteronomy 14:22, 26), this indicates that the discretion to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing is the prerogative of the one to whom the pile of the produce belongs.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from the mishna: For someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And if you say that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the owner of the pile, by separating teruma for his produce, isn’t he benefiting the owner? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the one separating the teruma. The Sages say: No, actually this could even be a case where one separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the owner of the pile, and he does so with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, where he says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma.

Come and hear a resolution of Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In a case where one consecrates an animal as an offering for another and it becomes blemished, only the one who consecrates the animal adds one-fifth to the cost of redeeming the animal, and the one seeking atonement through this offering does not. And since the body of the animal belongs to the one seeking atonement through the offering, only he renders a non-sacred animal, exchanged for the sacred animal, consecrated as a substitute. And in the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce for produce that is not his, the discretionary benefit is his.

§ We learned in the mishna that one teaches someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he may not teach him Bible? Is it due to the fact that the teacher benefits the one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by teaching him Bible? When he teaches him midrash he also benefits him. Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a place where one takes payment for teaching Bible and one does not take payment for teaching midrash. By teaching him Bible, the one for whom benefit is forbidden - benefits from the fact that he does not pay. The Gemara asks: Why was the halakha stated without qualification? There is no apparent fundamental difference between Bible and midrash. Why did the mishna refer specifically to a case where payment is taken for teaching Bible?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Nedarim 36b explores whether separating teruma on someone else's behalf requires that person's explicit knowledge and consent under Jewish law.