Talmud - Nedarim 88b נדרים פ״ח ב׳

In accordance with whose opinion among the tanna’im does Rav’s halakha correspond? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said as a principle that the hand of a woman is like the hand of her husband. According to Rabbi Meir, a slave has no independent right of acquisition, and anything given to a slave belongs to his master even if it was stipulated otherwise (see Kiddushin 23b). Rav assumes that similarly, a married woman has no independent right of acquisition, but rather, anything that she attempts to acquire for herself is automatically acquired by her husband.

Rabbi Zeira continues: And raise a contradiction from an unattributed mishna (Eiruvin 73b), which presumably follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir: How does one merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway in order to permit its residents to carry on Shabbat from one courtyard to another in the same alley, if a person wishes to act on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway? He places a barrel filled with his own food or wine and says: This is for all the residents of the alleyway. For this gift to be acquired by the others, someone must accept it on their behalf, and the tanna therefore teaches that he may transfer possession to them even by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant, whom he does not own, and likewise by means of his adult son or daughter, and similarly by means of his wife. These people may acquire the eiruv food on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway.

Rabbi Zeira states the contradiction: And if you say that a woman’s husband acquires anything given to her, the eiruv food has consequently not left the husband’s domain when he gives it to his wife, for anything she acquires belongs to him. Rather, it can be seen from here that Rabbi Meir does not extend his principle from a slave to a married woman, in opposition of the ruling of Rav.

Rava said in response: Even though Rabbi Meir said that in general the hand of a woman is like the hand of her husband, in accordance with the ruling of Rav, Rabbi Meir nevertheless concedes with regard to the merging of alleyways that since it is her aim to acquire the eiruv food for others from the hand of her husband, and not to acquire it for herself, she can acquire it from him for this purpose.

Ravina raised an objection to Rav Ashi from the following baraita: These are the people who can acquire eiruv food on behalf of others: The eiruv food can be acquired by means of his adult son or daughter, and by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant. And these are the people who cannot acquire an eiruv on behalf of others: The eiruv food cannot be acquired by means of his minor son or daughter, or by means of his Canaanite slave or maidservant, or by means of his wife. This indicates that a married woman does not have an independent right of acquisition to acquire the eiruv food on behalf of others, in opposition to the ruling of the mishna.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: In the mishna in Eiruvin, we are dealing with a woman who possesses a courtyard of her own in that alleyway, i.e., it is a case where the husband had earlier stipulated that she should have property of her own, to which he renounces all his rights. As, since she acquires the eiruv food for herself by virtue of the courtyard that she owns in that alleyway, she likewise acquires it for others.

MISHNA: The Torah states: “But every vow of a widow, and of her that is divorced, with which she has bound her soul, shall stand against her” (Numbers 30:10). How so? If a widow or divorced woman said: I am hereby a nazirite after thirty days, then even if she was married within thirty days, her new husband cannot nullify her vow.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Nedarim 88b examines Rabbi Meir's view on a wife's acquisitions belonging to her husband, testing it against eiruv laws for shared courtyards.