Talmud - Sanhedrin 28b סנהדרין כ״ח ב׳

scrolls of parchment. They asked of him there: What is the halakha as to whether a man can testify with regard to the wife of his stepson?

In Sura they say that Rav gave the following answer: A husband is considered like his wife. Since he is married to the son’s mother, the son’s wife is considered like his daughter-in-law.

In Pumbedita they say a different version of Rav’s answer: A wife is considered like her husband. Therefore, the wife of his stepson is considered like his stepson, and he cannot testify about her. As Rav Huna says that Rav Naḥman says: From where is it derived that a wife is considered like her husband? As it is written: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother; you shall not approach his wife: She is your aunt” (Leviticus 18:14). Isn’t she the wife of his uncle, and not his aunt, i.e., his father’s sister? It can therefore be concluded, by inference, that a wife is considered like her husband.

§ The mishna teaches that among the relatives disqualified from testifying are his mother’s husband, he, i.e., the mother’s husband himself, and his son, and his son-in-law. The Gemara challenges: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother, i.e., his half brother, and the mishna already stated that his brother is disqualified.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Mentioning this case is necessary only for the half brother of the half brother, i.e., the son of his stepfather from another woman. Although they are not biologically related, they are considered relatives.

Rav Ḥisda deemed the testimony of the half brother of the half brother fit. The other Sages said to him: Did you not hear this statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, that the half brother of the half brother is disqualified? Rav Ḥisda said to them: I did not hear this, as if to say: I do not hold in accordance with this opinion.

The Gemara asks: If so, the question asked above recurs: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother. The Gemara answers: The mishna taught the case of a paternal half brother, and it also teaches the case of a maternal half brother.

§ Rav Ḥisda says: The father of the groom and the father of the bride can testify about each other, and this is because they are considered to each other only like a lid on a barrel, which is not part of the barrel, but merely rests on top of it.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: A man can testify about his betrothed wife; they are considered related only after marriage. Ravina says: We said this halakha only for testimony that removes money from her possession; but for testimony that awards her money, his testimony is not deemed credible, as he will ultimately marry her and benefit from the money.

The Gemara rejects this opinion: But that is not so. There is no difference whether the testimony removes money from her possession, and there is no difference whether it awards her money. In both cases, his testimony is not deemed credible.

The Gemara explains: What is your thinking that you deem a man fit to bear witness concerning his betrothed wife? It is as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: One does not enter acute mourning on the day of the death of his betrothed wife, nor may he become ritually impure to bury her if he is a priest. Similarly, she does not enter acute mourning for him and is not obligated to become ritually impure to bury him. If she dies, he does not inherit her property. If he dies, she collects payment of her marriage contract if he wrote it at the time of the betrothal, as it is treated like any other monetary document. Evidently, a betrothed woman is not considered related to her husband.

The Gemara comments: That halakha does not serve as a proof for the halakha of testimony, as there, with regard to ritual impurity and the like, the Merciful One renders it dependent on the question of whether the woman is “his kin” (Leviticus 21:2), and a betrothed woman is not yet his kin, as they are not yet married. But here, with regard to testimony, it is due to a sense of affinity that he is disqualified, and one feels a sense of affinity toward his betrothed.

§ The mishna teaches that his stepson alone is disqualified from bearing witness about him, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law. The Sages taught in a baraita: His stepson alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law. And it is taught in another baraita: His brother-in-law alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson.

The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? If we say that this is what it is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his brother-in-law, i.e., a brother-in-law alone is disqualified but not a brother-in-law’s son or son-in-law; and Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his stepson; that interpretation is difficult. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna, which teaches that his brother-in-law is disqualified, and this disqualification applies to he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as they both agree that the son and son-in-law of one’s brother-in-law are not disqualified.

Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to disagree and say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, but as for his stepson, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. Accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara asks: But then, in accordance with whose opinion is the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches, that eight fathers, which are the eight principal relatives mentioned in the mishna, are disqualified, which are twenty-four including the son and son-in-law of each? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather, the above interpretation should be rejected, and this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, excluding his son and son-in-law, and all the more so his stepson. And accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain deed of gift on which two brothers-in-law were signed. Rav Yosef thought to deem it valid, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Yosef assumed that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion as cited in the mishna, that only relatives who are fit to inherit are disqualified, and one does not inherit from his brother-in-law.

Abaye said to him: From where do you conclude that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the mishna, who deems one’s brother-in-law fit to bear witness with or about him? Perhaps he was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita, who deems one’s brother-in-law, though not the latter’s son and son-in-law, disqualified?

Rav Yosef answered: Do not let it enter your mind that Shmuel was referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita; as Shmuel said: For example, my brother Pineḥas and I are disqualified from bearing witness about one another. Apparently, he meant to say: We are disqualified because we are both brothers and brothers-in-law, as we married two sisters. But by inference, other brothers-in-law may well testify about each other.

Abaye raised an objection: But perhaps Shmuel said: For example, Pineḥas and I are disqualified, only because Pineḥas was his brother-in-law; he did not mean to say that they were disqualified only because they were brothers.

Due to Abaye’s objection, Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Since the witnesses signed on the document are disqualified from bearing witness together, go and acquire the gift by means of the witnesses who observed the transmission of the deed to you, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who maintains that the witnesses who effect the transaction are not those who signed the deed but rather those who observed its transmission. A legal document is signed by witnesses merely to enhance its authority, not to effect the transaction.

Abaye raised an objection: But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to a document whose falsification is inherent in it, that the deed is not valid despite the fact that it was properly transferred? In other words, although the signatures on a legal document are unnecessary insofar as effecting the transaction is concerned, a document that includes invalid signatures is not valid, and this is in order to prevent others from relying upon these witnesses. Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Go away; the rabbis do not let me give you the gift.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that if the witness married the daughter of one of the litigants he is disqualified even if the daughter died, provided that he has children from her. Rabbi Tanḥum says that Rabbi Tavla says that Rabbi Beruna says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And likewise Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

There are those who teach this ruling of Rabba bar bar Ḥana with regard to this baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpreted this verse: “And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “who will be in those days”? But will it enter your mind that a person would go to a judge that was not in his days? Rather, this is referring to one who was a relative of one of the litigants due to marriage, and then became not related. The litigant can therefore come before him only in those days that they are not related, and not while they are still related.

It is with regard to this baraita that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The ruling is the same as in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s aforementioned statement, i.e., a relative who became unrelated is fit to bear witness or serve as a judge, but it was stated in a different context.

The Gemara relates: The sons of the father-in-law of Mar Ukva

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 28b examines whether a stepson can testify about his stepmother's family, exploring disqualification rules for half brothers as witnesses.