Talmud - Sanhedrin 62a סנהדרין ס״ב א׳

And if he did not accept that person upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, e.g., the king, what he did is nothing. Rather, is the baraita not referring to a case where the High Priest unwittingly worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone? This proves that this is also considered idol worship.

And Rava could have said to you in response: No, the baraita is not referring to this case, but to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted.

The Gemara challenges: If the baraita is referring to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted, this is a case of a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, in which case the Rabbis concede that the High Priest is obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, what is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and that of the Sages?

The Gemara answers: It is a case where he says to himself that idol worship is entirely permitted, whereas the case of a lapse of awareness in which the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a case of upholding part of the prohibition and negating another part of it, i.e., a case where the High Priest recognizes that idol worship is prohibited but mistakenly assumes that certain idolatrous activities are permitted.

§ Rabbi Zakkai taught the following baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering, and burned incense as an idolatrous offering, and poured a libation to an idol, and bowed to an idol, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that these actions were prohibited, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering; he is not obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go out and teach it outside; i.e., such a baraita must not be taught in the study hall, as the halakha is that one is obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

Rabbi Abba says: That which Rabbi Zakkai says is subject to a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out from the general category of labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it is written explicitly in the Torah in the verse: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This was done to teach that the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat is unlike other prohibited labors, as it is an ordinary prohibition, for which one is not liable to be killed by stoning. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

And Rabbi Natan says: Kindling a fire is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat. In other words, by stating one prohibited labor separately, the Torah teaches that each labor performed on Shabbat constitutes its own separate prohibition. Consequently, one who unwittingly violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of prohibited labor.

Rabbi Abba concludes: According to the one who says that of all the labors that are prohibited on Shabbat, kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out to be mentioned in the Torah to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, then bowing, in the category of idol worship, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5), was also singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, which is not punishable by stoning.

Whereas, according to the one who says that kindling a fire was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat, bowing was also singled out to divide the rites of idol worship, i.e., to teach that one who unwittingly performs several forms of idol worship is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of idol worship. Therefore, the baraita taught by Rabbi Zakkai, which states that such a person is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, is in accordance with the former opinion, i.e., the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

Rav Yosef objects to this: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei says there, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, that kindling a fire was singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition only because he derives the division of labors on Shabbat, i.e., that one is obligated to bring an offering for each category of labor that he violated, from a different verse, namely: “From one of them” (Leviticus 4:2).

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says with regard to the verse: “If any one shall sin through error, in any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and performs from one of them” (Leviticus 4:2), that there are times when one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions together, and there are times when one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression.

And Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And performs from one of them,” and Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse as follows: The word “one” is qualified, as the verse states: “From one.” Likewise, the word “them” is qualified, as the verse states: “Of them.” Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, is them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, i.e., several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

Rabbi Yonatan delineates the implementation of this principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: “One” complete violation is, e.g., a case where one wrote a whole word as he intended, such as the name Shimon. The term “from one” is referring to a case where one performed only part of a complete act of labor, e.g., he wrote only some of the letters of a word, such as shin mem, from the name Shimon. These two letters spell the word shem. In such a case, one is obligated to bring an offering for his transgression of writing two letters, shin and mem, even though he did not complete his intended act of writing the entire name of Shimon.

Rabbi Yonatan continues: “Them” is referring to the primary categories of labor. The term “of them” includes the subcategories of labor. The cases of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., it is counted as many transgressions, are those involving intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and unawareness on the part of the transgressor that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. The cases of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one are those involving unawareness on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and intention, i.e., awareness, that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring only one sin-offering.

Rav Yosef concludes his objection to Rabbi Abba’s comparison between the status of the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat and the status of the prohibition against bowing to an idol: The fact that Rabbi Yosei derives that kindling a fire on Shabbat is not punishable by death can be attributed to the fact that he derives from a different verse that one who violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. But here, with regard to idol worship, where he does not derive the division of labors, i.e., the division of categories of idol worship, from another place, perhaps everyone agrees that bowing was singled out to divide the prohibition of idol worship into different categories and bowing to an idol is punishable by death just like other forms of worship.

The Gemara asks according to both opinions, that of Rav Abba and that of Rav Yosef: Why not derive the division of labors with regard to idol worship, too, from the same verse from which Rabbi Yosei derives the division of labors with regard to Shabbat, namely: “From one of them”? Since this verse is not referring to the halakhot of Shabbat in particular, it can be interpreted with regard to idol worship in the same manner that it is interpreted with regard to Shabbat: The word “one” is referring to one complete, prohibited act of worship, such as sacrificing an animal as an idolatrous offering. The term “from one” is referring to one who performs part of an act of worship, e.g., one who did not finish slaughtering the offering, as he severed only one of the organs, i.e., the windpipe and gullet, that must be severed in ritual slaughter.

The word “them” is referring to the primary categories of idol worship that are derived from the manner in which God is worshipped in the Temple, namely, sacrificing an animal as an offering, burning incense, pouring a libation, and bowing. The term “of them” is referring to the subcategories of idol worship, e.g., one who broke a stick before an idol that is worshipped in such a manner. Breaking a stick is a subcategory of sacrificing, as an animal’s neck is broken when it is slaughtered.

The principle of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., many, can be applied to a case of intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that idol worship is prohibited, and unawareness that the particular rites of worship that he was performing are prohibited. The principle of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one can be applied to a case of unawareness with regard to the prohibition of idol worship, i.e., the transgressor was unaware that idol worship is prohibited or that he was worshipping an idol, and intention, i.e., awareness, that the rites that he was performing are prohibited.

The Gemara responds to the suggestion that the division of categories of idol worship can be derived from this verse: What are the circumstances of unawareness with regard to idol worship? If the transgressor thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven.

Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw a statue [andarta] of a person and bowed to it. This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. If he did not accept him upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, what he did is nothing.

Rather, it is clearly a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said?

Rather, according to Rava, unawareness with regard to idol worship can be explained as referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. If so, one can resolve the dilemma that Rava raised before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if one who violated Shabbat has a lapse of awareness of both this, i.e., that it was Shabbat, and that, i.e., that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat?

Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved. If the phrase “and performs from one of them” is interpreted as referring to a case where one engages in idol worship thinking that it is permitted to do so, one can resolve that the transgressor is obligated to bring only one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship, according to this interpretation of the verse. The fact that Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved therefore serves as a challenge to this interpretation. The Gemara refutes this challenge: This is not difficult; indeed, resolve the dilemma from here.

The Gemara asks: But can you interpret these verses, namely, “and performs from one of them,” with regard to idol worship at all? As here, in Leviticus, chapter 4, where this verse is written, it is written with regard to an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, stating that if he sinned unwittingly he brings a bull as a sin-offering, and with regard to a king who sinned unwittingly it is stated that he brings a goat as a sin-offering, and with regard to an ordinary individual it is stated that he brings a female lamb or a female goat.

Whereas with regard to idol worship we learned in a baraita (61b): And they agree that a High Priest who unwittingly engages in idol worship brings a female goat as a sin-offering, as does an ordinary individual. Clearly, then, the halakhot of unwitting idol worship are derived from a different source, i.e., Numbers, chapter 15.

The Gemara concludes: And there is nothing more to be discussed. The suggestion to derive a division of categories with regard to idol worship from the phrase in the verse “and performs from one of them” is groundless, and Rav Yosef’s objection to Rabbi Abba’s opinion is justified.

§ When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 62a explores idol worship liability, debating when a High Priest's unwitting sin requires one offering versus separate ones per act.