Talmud - Sanhedrin 86a סנהדרין פ״ו א׳

A tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall recited that baraita, where the tanna holds that one is liable for abducting another and selling him to the abductee’s father, before Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet said to him: I teach that Rabbi Shimon says: From the term “of his brethren” it is derived that there is no liability unless he removes the abductee from the domain of his brethren, and you say that one who sells the abductee to his father is liable? Emend the baraita and teach instead: He is exempt.

The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty raised by Rav Sheshet? Perhaps that statement that he cited is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while this baraita is the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.

The Gemara responds: That should not enter your mind, as the unattributed baraita that was cited is a passage from the halakhic midrash on the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy entitled Sifrei, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir; an unattributed baraita in the Tosefta is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya; an unattributed baraita in the Sifra, the halakhic midrash on the book of Leviticus, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and an unattributed baraita in the Sifrei is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And all of these are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as all the Sages mentioned were his disciples. Therefore, it is unlikely that an unattributed baraita from the Sifrei would run counter to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

§ The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the liability of one who abducts his son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem him exempt?

Abaye said: It is derived from the verse that states: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren” (Deuteronomy 24:7), to exclude one who is already found in the custody of the abductor before the abduction. Since the son is already in the custody of his father, the father is not liable for abducting him.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If that is so, then the verse: “If a man shall be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both of them die” (Deuteronomy 22:22), may also be interpreted: “If a man shall be found,” to exclude one who was already found. So too, would one say that adulterers are exempt from liability if they commit adultery in, for example, the house of so-and-so, where married women are commonly found and they have a preexisting reputation for licentiousness?

Abaye said to Rav Pappa: The Rabbis’ opinion is derived from the phrase: “Or if he is found in his possession, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16), from which I am saying my inference, that it is derived: If he is found, to the exclusion of one who was already found.

Rava said: Therefore, with regard to those teachers of children [dardekei] and those who recite mishnayot to Torah scholars, the status of their students is as though they are found in their possession, and the teachers are exempt from liability for abducting them.

§ The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to liability if one abducted one who is half-slave half-freeman. We learned in a mishna there (Bava Kamma 87a) that Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no indemnity for the humiliation of a slave, since he is not a full-fledged Jew.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is derived from the verse that states: “When men struggle together, a man and his brother, and the wife of the one drew near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who smites him, and extended her hand, and grabbed his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11). This is the source for liability to pay restitution for humiliating another. From the term “his brother” it is derived that one who has brotherhood, i.e., who is halakhically related to his biological family, receives payment for humiliation. A slave is excluded, as he has no brotherhood, i.e., he is not halakhically related to his family.

And what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold that although the slave has no family ties, he is the brother of the assailant with regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to fulfill the same mitzvot that a woman is obligated to fulfill.

The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to abduction, how does Rabbi Yehuda interpret the verses and arrive at the conclusion that one is liable for abducting one who is half-slave half-freeman? Shouldn’t the term “from his brethren” render exempt from liability one who abducts a slave?

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the term in the verse: “From his brethren” (Deuteronomy (24:7), serves to exclude from liability one who abducts slaves. Had the verse continued: The children of Israel, that phrase would have been interpreted to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman. Since the verse states: “From the children of Israel,” the prefix letter mem, meaning from, indicates that there are some from the children of Israel for whose abduction one is liable and there are some for whose abduction one is exempt. That prefix also serves to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman. Therefore, this is an example of a restriction following a restriction, and there is a hermeneutical principle that a restriction following a restriction serves only to amplify the halakha and to include in the category of those who are liable one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman.

And the Rabbis, who deem one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman exempt, how do they interpret the verse? They do not exclude slaves based on the term “from his brethren,” as the slave is the brother of the abductor with regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot. Concerning the expression “children of Israel” and the more expanded expression “from the children of Israel,” one serves to exclude from liability one who abducts slaves, as the slave is not a full-fledged Jew, and one serves to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman.

§ The Gemara asks: From where is a prohibition against abducting a person derived? Rabbi Yoshiya says that it is derived from the verse: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is derived from the verse: “They shall not be sold as slaves” (Leviticus 25:42). The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree, as each requires both verses to derive the prohibition. One Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, enumerates the prohibition against abduction, and one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, enumerates the prohibition against selling the abductee into slavery.

The Sages taught in a baraita: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13), and it is with regard to one who abducts people that the verse is speaking. Do you say that the verse is speaking with regard to one who abducts people, or perhaps the verse is speaking only with regard to one who steals property? You say: Go out and learn from one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles: A matter derived from its context. With regard to what context are the adjacent prohibitions “You shall not kill; you shall not commit adultery” in the verse speaking? They are speaking with regard to capital cases. So too here, the prohibition is speaking with regard to a capital case of abduction.

It is taught in another baraita: “You shall not steal” (Leviticus 19:11), and it is with regard to one who steals property that the verse is speaking. Do you say that the verse is speaking with regard to one who steals property, or perhaps the verse is speaking only with regard to one who abducts people? You say: Go out and learn from one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles: A matter derived from its context. With regard to what context is the subsequent verse: “You shall neither exploit your neighbor nor rob him” (Leviticus 19:13), speaking? It is speaking with regard to property. So too here, the verse is speaking with regard to property.

It was stated: If the witnesses to the abduction and the witnesses to the sale of a person were rendered conspiring witnesses, Ḥizkiyya says: The typical sentence of conspiring witnesses is not implemented and they are not executed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed.

The Gemara elaborates: It is Ḥizkiyya who said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said one derives from the verse: “On the basis of two witnesses…shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), that the testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter, but not to half a matter. Since each pair of witnesses provides testimony concerning only half the transgression for which the perpetrator would be liable, i.e., they each testify to only the abduction or the sale, the testimony of each pair is not valid. Therefore, when they are deemed conspiring witnesses, they are not executed. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says his statement in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that one derives from the verse that the testimony is valid when they testify with regard to an entire matter, and even when they testify with regard to half a matter. Since the testimony of the two pairs of witnesses together constitutes a complete testimony, if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

The Gemara notes: And Ḥizkiyya concedes with regard to the final witnesses of a stubborn and rebellious son who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are executed. A stubborn and rebellious son is executed only if witnesses testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and he was flogged, and then a second pair of witnesses testifies that he again engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct. His death sentence is based solely on the testimony of the second pair, as the first witnesses could say:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 86a examines kidnapping liability under Torah law, debating whether selling a victim to his own father counts, and analyzing unattributed baraitot sources.