Talmud - Sanhedrin 61a סנהדרין ס״א א׳

Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering of idol worship, even if its blood was not ultimately sprinkled for idol worship or its forbidden fat burned for that purpose. And Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan concludes his analysis: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives this halakha from another source, this statement in the baraita works out well. The verse that mentions the slaughter of an animal in idol worship apparently teaches a principle, as it is superfluous with regard to the halakha of slaughter itself, as stated in the baraita. But according to Reish Lakish, who does not derive from any verse that one can have intention from one rite to another rite, one needs this verse to derive precisely this halakha, that one can have intention from one rite to another rite. Consequently, the verse is not superfluous, and it cannot be assumed that it teaches a principle with regard to the forms of idol worship that are punishable by death.

Rav Pappa objects to this: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, does one not need a verse to teach the halakha in a case of intention from one rite to another rite? Rabbi Yoḥanan initially only prohibits deriving benefit from the animal; but if not for this verse, the man who slaughtered the animal would not be liable to receive the death penalty. And therefore the verse comes to render the man liable to receive the death penalty. Therefore this verse is not superfluous according to Rabbi Yoḥanan either.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, objects to Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s challenge to the derivation in the baraita: And even according to Reish Lakish, does one need a verse to teach that the one who slaughtered the animal is liable? Reish Lakish only permits one to derive benefit from the animal; but the man is certainly liable to receive the death penalty. This is just as the halakha is in the case of one who bows to a mountain, as deriving benefit from the mountain is permitted, but nevertheless the one who worshipped it is liable to be executed by the sword. Therefore, the verse that states that one who slaughters an offering in idol worship is liable to be executed is superfluous with regard to the issue of intention from one rite to another.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye, that there is room to say that bowing was singled out in the verse to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship carries the death penalty, there is a difficulty. With regard to the verse: “Take heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them…saying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it, this is stated to exclude what?

And if you would say that this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, it is not necessary to derive this halakha from this verse, as it is derived from the halakha of bowing to an idol, as follows: Just as bowing is an honorable form of worship and is punishable by death, so too, any honorable form of worship is punishable by death when performed as idol worship, which excludes an offensive act such as defecating. Therefore, the halakha that one is not liable for defecating before an idol can be derived from bowing.

Rather, this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before the idol called Mercury, which is not its typical manner of worship. It might enter your mind to say that since the standard manner of worship of Mercury, namely, throwing stones at it, is in any event an act of degradation, so too, one who performs any act of degradation as worship of Mercury should be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one is liable only for worshiping Mercury in its standard manner of worship.

The Gemara raises an objection: But Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s interpretation of the verses appears to contradict that which Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices an animal to Mercury is liable? As it is stated: “And they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the satyrs” (Leviticus 17:7).

Rabbi Eliezer explains: If the verse is not needed for the matter of one who worships an idol in its typical manner, i.e., one who sacrifices an animal as an offering to an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, as the halakha in this case is already written in the aforementioned verse: “How do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise,” apply it to the matter of one who worships an idol not in its typical manner, by sacrificing an offering to an idol that is not typically worshipped by sacrificing offerings. Therefore, one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury is liable, even though that is not its typical form of worship.

According to Rava bar Rav Ḥanan, by contrast, it is derived that one is liable for worshipping an idol in any honorable manner, even not in its typical manner of worship, from the halakha of bowing.

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer, the reference is to one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury not as a form of worship, but rather in order to express insolence toward the Torah prohibition against sacrificing an offering to an idol. It is derived from the verse that this too is a transgression of the prohibition and renders one liable for the death penalty.

§ The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna lost his oxen and went to search for them. Rabba met him and raised a contradiction between two mishnayot. We learned in the mishna that one who worships idols is liable. By inference, one who worships idols, yes, he is liable, but one who merely says that he will worship idols is not liable. But didn’t we learn in another mishna (67a): One who says: I will worship an idol, or: I will go and worship an idol, or: Let us go and worship an idol, is liable, just as one who actually worships an idol is liable. Evidently, one is liable for merely stating his intention to engage in idol worship.

Rav Hamnuna said to him: The mishna here is referring to one who states: I intend to accept this idol upon myself as a god only through worship. Consequently, he is liable only when he actually worships it. One who intends to accept the idol as a god immediately is liable even before he actually worships it.

Rav Yosef said: This answer is unnecessary; have you removed the tanna’im from the world? It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: I am a god; come and worship me, Rabbi Meir deems him liable for incitement to idol worship, and Rabbi Yehuda deems him exempt.

The Gemara explains: In a case where those to whom the inciter spoke subsequently worshiped him, everyone agrees that the inciter is liable, as it is written: “You shall not make yourself a graven image” (Exodus 20:4), which is interpreted to include a case where one establishes himself as a god. When they disagree is in a case where the incident ended in mere speech. Rabbi Meir holds that speech is a significant matter, and therefore the inciter is liable for incitement, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that speech is nothing. Therefore, the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved by attributing each mishna to a different tanna.

Rav Yosef then said after reconsidering the matter: What I said is not correct, as even according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is deemed liable for speech as well. As we learned in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one is not liable unless he says: I will worship, or: I will go and worship, or: Let us go and worship. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable even for speech alone, not only for actual worship.

Accordingly, with regard to what principle do Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? They disagree with regard to the case of one who incites others to worship him, and the others say to him: Yes, we will worship you. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that when one incites others to worship him, they are apt to listen to him, and the response: Yes, that they say to him, is sincere. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds when one incites others to worship him, they are not apt to listen to him, as they say to themselves:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 61a examines whether benefit from an animal slaughtered for idol worship is forbidden, debating intent transfer between different ritual acts.