Talmud - Sanhedrin 87a סנהדרין פ״ז א׳

it is with regard to the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court, an ordained, expert judge, that the verse is speaking. “For you [mimmekha]”; this is a reference to an adviser, who is consulted with regard to significant matters, e.g., intercalation of the year; and likewise it says: “From you [mimmekh] he emerged, who devised evil against the Lord, an adviser of wickedness” (Nahum 1:11). “A matter”; this halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles.

“Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of a menstruating woman, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. “Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law and cases of monetary law, with regard to which there are differences in evidence protocols, and laws involving the liability to receive lashes. “Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments (see Leviticus, chapter 14).

“Matters of [divrei]”; these are the dedications to God or to a priest, and the valuations of one’s value to the Temple, and the consecrations, all of which are matters of speech [dibbur]. “Controversy”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota (see Numbers, chapter 5), which results from a dispute between husband and wife; and the heifer whose neck is broken, which results from an unresolved murder (Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and the purification of a leper, who is afflicted due to evil speech. “Within your gates”; this is referring to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a], all of which are given to the poor who eat at the gates of the city.

“Then you shall arise” from the court where he sits as a judge. “And ascend”; this teaches that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands. Therefore, the language of ascent is employed with regard to travel to Eretz Yisrael. “To the place that the Lord, your God, shall choose”; this teaches that the location that God chose for the Sanhedrin to convene causes their rulings to be authoritative, in the sense here in the mishna that the rebellious elder who instructs others to act contrary to a ruling issued there is liable.

The Gemara asks: Granted, the fact that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And ascend.” But from where does the tanna derive the fact that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands? The Gemara answers that it is derived from this verse, as it is written: “Therefore, behold, the days come, says the Lord, and they will no longer say: As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of Egypt; rather, as the Lord lives, Who brought up and led the descendants of the house of Israel from the north country and from all the countries where I had driven them, and they shall dwell upon their land” (Jeremiah 23:7–8). Apparently, coming from other countries to Eretz Yisrael is also characterized as ascent.

The Sages taught in a baraita: A rebellious elder is liable only for instructing another to perform an action involving a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable for a matter whose essence is known from the words of the Torah itself and whose explanation is understood from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah. The elder is not liable if the essence of the matter with regard to which he issues his ruling does not appear in the Torah or if the entire matter is written in the Torah. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he differs with regard to one of the minutiae of the scribes in interpreting the Torah, the elder is liable, irrespective of the severity of the transgression.

The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He derives a verbal analogy between the term matter written here and the term matter that is written elsewhere. Here, matter is written in the verse: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment” (Deuteronomy 17:8), and there, it is written: “And the matter shall be concealed from the eyes of the assembly” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there, in the verse in Leviticus, the sin-offering of the congregation is brought only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “According to the Torah that they shall instruct you” (Deuteronomy 17:11), indicating that there is no liability until it is a matter that consists of elements of both the Written Torah and in that the Sages shall instruct you in interpretation of the Written Torah.

And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “That they shall declare unto you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10), from which Rabbi Shimon derives that one is liable even if he deviates from the ruling of the Sanhedrin to any degree whatsoever.

Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to Rava: Interpret for me that baraita, in which the liability of the rebellious elder for rulings in different areas of halakha is derived from the verses, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. How is such a prohibition found in each of the categories enumerated in the baraita? Rava said to Rav Pappa his student: Go and interpret it for him.

Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna: “If there shall be a matter too hard”; there the verse is speaking with regard to the most distinguished member of the court. “For you”; this is referring to an adviser, who knows how to intercalate years and establish months. How is there liability in this matter for karet or a sin-offering? It is as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 7:7): Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified that the judges may intercalate the year throughout the entire month of Adar, as the other Sages would say that the judges may do so only until the day of Purim.

A ruling contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin could result in a matter for which one is liable to receive karet, as, if his disagreement is to this side, e.g., the court intercalated the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is not intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. And if his disagreement is to that side, e.g., the court did not intercalate the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. One who intentionally eats leavened bread on Passover is liable to receive karet, and one who does so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering.

“A matter”; this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. This is a matter involving karet in the case of the halakhot of eleven days, which is the minimal number of days between one menstrual period and another, when if a woman experiences a flow of blood on three consecutive days during those eleven days, she assumes the status of a greater zava, with regard to whom there are unique halakhot, e.g., the passage of seven clean days before purification by Torah law. When the woman experiences a discharge of blood for one or two days, she is a lesser zava, and if she observes the third day clean from the discharge of blood she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. As it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood on the tenth of those eleven days. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day: Just as a discharge on the ninth day requires the woman to examine herself the following day and requires the observance of a day clean from discharges, so too does a discharge on the tenth day require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day before immersing in a ritual bath. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a woman who experiences a discharge on the tenth day assumes the status of a woman who observes a clean day for one or two days after she experiences a discharge.

And Reish Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day: Just as a discharge on the eleventh day does not require observance of a day clean from discharge before immersing in a ritual bath, so too does a discharge on the tenth day not require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day. Even if she were to experience a discharge of blood on the days that follow, the eleventh and the twelfth days, she would not assume the status of a greater zava, as in that case the blood that she saw on the twelfth day would be the blood of menstruation and not the discharge of a zava. According to Reish Lakish, she does not assume that status. Therefore, if the Sanhedrin issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with that woman before her purification is liable to receive karet. If the rebellious elder issued a ruling in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, then one who intentionally engaged in intercourse with the woman is liable to receive karet. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

“In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 87a explores qualifications of judges and biblical exegesis distinguishing laws on menstrual blood, leprosy marks, and disputes like the sota ritual.