Talmud - Sanhedrin 15a סנהדרין ט״ו א׳

With regard to one who says: The valuation of this utensil is incumbent upon me to donate, he must give the monetary value of the utensil to the Temple treasury. What is the reason for this halakha? A person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term valuation is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term imprecisely. Due to that reason, he gives its monetary value. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Valuations of movable property. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Valuations of movable property.

Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says a different explanation: Rav’s statement is discussing one who associates the object of his vow with movable property for the valuation. In other words, he took a vow to pay a valuation, and did not have actual money to pay the vow, so he consecrates movable property for this purpose. This property is then appraised by three experts. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Movable property of valuations. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Movable property of valuations.

Rabbi Abbahu says: Rav’s statement is discussing a case of one who says: My monetary valuation is incumbent upon me to donate. If the priest came to collect movable property from him to pay the vow, it must be evaluated by three experts, and if he came to collect land it must be evaluated by ten. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Granted, to take out property from consecration by redeeming it we require a panel of three experts, because if an error is made in the calculation, this will lead to the sin of misuse of consecrated property. But to elevate property to the status of consecration, why do I need three judges?

Ravina said to him: This is based on logical reasoning: What difference is it to me if he is elevating the property to consecration, and what difference is it to me if he is removing it? If he is removing it, what is the reason a court is needed? It is because perhaps he will err and set a price that is too low. When he is elevating it to consecration there is also a concern that perhaps he will err and cause a loss for the Temple treasury.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that when calculating the valuation of consecrated property, one of the people consulted must be a priest. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this is understandable, as it is written in the Torah portion about redeeming consecrated property: “Priest” (see, e.g., Leviticus 27:14). But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that any person is fit for this, why do they need the word “priest”? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the matter is difficult.

§ The mishna teaches that valuations of consecrated land are to be made by nine judges and one priest. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Shmuel says: Priests are written in this Torah portion ten times (Leviticus, chapter 27). One instance of the word “priest” is for the matter itself, i.e., to teach that there is a need for a priest. These other instances of the word are a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, as every additional instance of “priest” is a restrictive term. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify and include other matters, in this case teaching that even nine Israelites and one priest may perform the valuation.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to this explanation: According to the principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify, say that the procedure should require five priests and five Israelites, as the first incidence of the word “priest” indicates an actual priest, the second time the term serves to amplify and teach that even an Israelite is fitting, and then the third time it again indicates specifically a priest. According to this analysis, the final result would require five priests and five Israelites. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it poses a difficulty.

§ The mishna teaches that just as the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and one priest, the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow is performed in a similar manner. The Gemara asks: Can a person be consecrated? It is not possible to consecrate a person, and therefore it is unclear what sort of valuation would be necessary. Rabbi Abbahu says: The mishna is referring to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me, the court appraises him as a slave who is sold in the market, and the price that would be paid for him as a slave is the amount he must give to the Temple treasury. And as a slave is compared to land with regard to halakhot of transactions, the valuation is performed by a panel of nine experts and a priest, as is done when land is appraised.

Rabbi Avin raises a dilemma: With regard to a person’s hair that was consecrated and which is ready to be shorn, by how many judges is the appraisal made? Is such hair deemed similar to hair that has already been shorn, and accordingly it is appraised like other movable property, i.e., by three judges, or is it considered as hair still attached to the body and accordingly appraised by ten judges?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: Concerning one who consecrates his slave, a person who derives benefit from the slave is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, since the slave’s body does not become consecrated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who derives benefit from the slave’s hair is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And we maintain that it is with regard to hair that is ready to be shorn that they disagree. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that the question of whether such hair is viewed as already shorn is a dispute between tanna’im.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im. As we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b): Rabbi Meir says: There are entities that are like land in one aspect, and are not like land in other aspects; and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so? If one said to another: I gave you ten vines laden with grapes and I want to receive their value, and the other says: There were only five, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, in accordance with the halakha concerning one who admits to part of a claim. And the Rabbis say: Any item that is attached to the land is viewed as the land itself, and the halakha is that there is no oath in cases of claims with regard to land.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In this mishna, we are dealing with grapes that are ready to be picked. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds they are considered as grapes that have been picked, i.e., movable property, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds they are not considered as grapes that have been picked. This suggestion is rejected: No, this cannot be proven from here, as you may even say that the opinion of the Rabbis with regard to the hair is similar to the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the mishna. Only there, with regard to the vines, Rabbi Meir says that they are viewed as already picked, because the more he leaves them on the vine, the more they become lean and deteriorate. Consequently, the grapes are viewed as picked. But in the case of his hair, the more he leaves it on his head the more it improves, as longer hair has a greater value. Consequently, it cannot be said that hair that is ready to be shorn is viewed as already shorn.

§ The mishna teaches that cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges, and that an animal that copulated with a person is also judged by twenty-three judges. The Gemara comments: The mishna categorically teaches this halakha, indicating that there is no difference if this was an ox that copulated with a male, and there is no difference if it was an ox that copulated with a female. The Gemara asks: Granted, the source for this halakha is clear in the case where it copulated with a female, as it is written explicitly: “And if a woman approaches any animal and lies down with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal” (Leviticus 20:16). But with regard to an ox that copulated with a male, from where do we derive that the animal is to be killed?

The Gemara answers: As it is written: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). If this verse is not needed for the matter of the one who actively lies with the animal, i.e., a male who sexually penetrates the animal, apply it to the matter of the one who causes the animal to lie with him, by being penetrated by the animal. There is another verse (Leviticus 20:15) that explicitly addresses a man penetrating the animal sexually; this verse from Exodus is therefore understood to be referring to the case where he causes the animal to penetrate him. And the Merciful One brought this forth using the active term “lies,” to compare one who causes the animal to lie with him to one who actively lies with the animal, in order to teach that just as in a case of one who lies with an animal, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges, so too, in the case of one who causes an animal to lie with him, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges.

§ The mishna teaches that an ox that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. Consequently, it follows that twenty-three judges are necessary to adjudicate the case of the ox that is to be stoned. Abaye said to Rava: From where do we know that this phrase: “And also its owner shall be put to death,” comes to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Sanhedrin 15a examines valuation vows tied to movable property, detailing expert appraisal requirements and redemption of consecrated items.