Talmud - Hullin 41b חולין מ״א ב׳

appear to emulate [yeḥakkeh] the heretics.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, but one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. The Gemara asks: What is different about slaughter into seas? Is it that one may not perform it, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to the angel of the sea? If so, slaughter into a round excavation containing water should also be prohibited, as onlookers will say: He is slaughtering to his reflection [bavua], which is also similar to idolatry. Rava said: The tanna’im taught that halakha in the case of murky water, in which no reflection can be seen.

§ The mishna states: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. The Gemara asks: How is it permitted to slaughter and have the blood flow into a hole inside his house? But didn’t you initially say that one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all? Abaye said: The first clause of the mishna, where there is a blanket prohibition against having the blood flow into a small hole, is referring to a small hole that is in the marketplace.

Rava said to him: But isn’t it so that from the fact that the latter clause teaches: And in the marketplace one may not do so, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are not dealing with the marketplace?

Rather, Rava said that this is what the mishna is saying: One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all. And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied in blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not appear to emulate the heretics.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If one was traveling on a ship and he has no place on the ship to slaughter an animal, he extends his hand with a knife, holds the head of the animal outside the walls of the ship, and slaughters the animal there; and the blood flows and descends down the sides of the ship. He may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow directly into the sea. And one may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all.

And one who wishes to clean his courtyard and ensure that it will not be sullied with blood, how does he do so? He fashions a place with an incline or a furrow outside the small hole, and slaughters the animal there, and the blood flows and descends into the hole. And in the marketplace, one may not do so, as it is stated: “Neither shall you follow their statutes” (Leviticus 18:3). And if he did so, he requires examination after his actions to ascertain whether he is a heretic.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, his slaughter is not valid, as it appears that he is consecrating animals and slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the Temple. And Rabbi Shimon deems his slaughter valid.

If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, for the sake of a guilt offering for a definite transgression, for the sake of the offering of a firstborn, for the sake of the offering of animal tithe, or for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. All of these offerings may be brought only as obligations and not as gifts. Therefore, there is no concern that he consecrated the animals.

This is the principle: For any item, i.e., offering, which is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is forbidden. And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift but is an obligation that is incumbent upon him, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, the slaughter is not valid. This is because one who slaughters for the sake of any type of offering that is consecrated as a vow or as a gift renders the animal forbidden. The Gemara asks: Is a provisional guilt offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? A provisional guilt offering is brought only when one is obligated to do so due to uncertainty whether or not he is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says in a mishna (Karetot 25a): A person donates a provisional guilt offering every day if he chooses, due to concern that perhaps he violated a prohibition.

The Gemara asks: Is a Paschal offering fit to be consecrated as a vow or as a gift? The time is fixed for its offering on Passover eve, when bringing it is an obligation, and it may not be brought on any other day. Rabbi Oshaya said: The Paschal offering is different, since although the date for bringing and slaughtering it is the fourteenth of Nisan, its designation can be performed throughout the entire year.

Rabbi Yannai says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid only if the animals were unblemished. But with regard to animals with blemishes, the slaughterer knows that they are blemished and disqualified from sacrifice. Therefore, despite his declaration, there is no concern that his actual intent was to slaughter the animal for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Slaughter of an animal for the sake of an offering is not valid even if the animals were blemished as well, as there are times that an item is cast over the blemish and covers it, and he does not know that the animal is blemished.

The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, his slaughter is valid, as, since one cannot voluntarily contribute a sin offering, there is no concern that the onlookers will draw the wrong conclusion. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught that slaughter of an animal for the sake of a sin offering is valid only with regard to a slaughterer who is not liable to bring a sin offering. But a slaughterer who knows that he is liable to bring a sin offering, his slaughter is not valid. Say that he is performing consecration and slaughter for the sake of his sin offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a sin offering, and he did not say: For the sake of my sin offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of my sin offering.

The mishna teaches: With regard to one who slaughters for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have an animal consecrated as an offering inside his house for which it can be the substitute, but if he has an animal consecrated as an offering in his house, say that he is substituting this animal for it, and the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, and he did not say: For the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of a substitute for my animal consecrated as an offering.

The mishna states that this is the principle: For any offering that is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake, the animal is forbidden. The Gemara asks: What case does this clause add? The list in the mishna appears to be comprehensive. The Gemara answers: The clause serves to add the burnt offering of a nazirite. As, lest you say there is no concern in that case, as that person did not vow to become a nazirite and could not possibly be obligated to bring that offering, therefore, the tanna teaches that there is a concern if he said he was slaughtering for the sake of the burnt offering of a nazirite. Say that perhaps he vowed to become a nazirite in private, and no one else was aware of it.

The Gemara asks: What is added by the second half of the principle: And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or as a gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth. If one slaughters an animal for the sake of a burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, the slaughter is valid, as it is an obligation.

Rabbi Elazar says: The Sages taught that the slaughter is valid only in a case where he does not have a wife. But if he has a wife, say that he performs consecration and slaughter of the animal for her sake and therefore the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara asks: But didn’t he say before the slaughter: For the sake of the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, and he did not say: For the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth? Why, then, is that a concern? Rabbi Abbahu said: Indeed, the reference is to a case where he says: I am slaughtering this animal for the sake of the burnt offering of my wife after childbirth.

The Gemara objects: This is obvious. Clearly, if he explicitly declared that the slaughter is for the sake of the burnt offering of his wife after childbirth the slaughter is not valid.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 41b examines slaughtering practices that avoid resembling idol worship, discussing blood flow into water, holes, and courtyard drainage methods.