Talmud - Hullin 120a חולין ק״כ א׳

maintaining that the dispute is with regard to that which is taught in the mishna: The attached hide, and the congealed gravy attached to the meat, and the spices, and the meat residue, and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves all join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

Reish Lakish said: The Sages taught that only a bone and the other items mentioned in the mishna join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because they constitute protection for the meat. But a hair does not join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because it is not protection for the meat. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even a hair is protection for the meat and therefore joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity.

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But the hide protects the flesh, and the hair is on top of the hide. Is the halakha of protection applicable with regard to protection that is on top of another protection? Rabbi Yoḥanan answered: The hair penetrates through the hide and touches the flesh, thereby providing protection directly for the flesh.

Rav Aḥa objects to this answer: If that is so, that there are perforations in the hide through which the hairs penetrate, how can we write phylacteries? Don’t we require phylacteries to be written with a perfect writing with no perforations in the letters? And that is not possible if there are perforations in the hide.

The Gemara answers: That halakha which they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, escaped Rav Aḥa: Any perforation over which the ink passes and which it covers is not considered a perforation that invalidates the writing.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish opinion from the mishna taught later (124a): In the case of the hide of an animal carcass upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh, one who touches a strand of flesh emerging from the flesh or touches a hair that is on the side of the hide opposite the flesh is ritually impure, even though he did not touch an olive-bulk of the flesh. What is the reason that one who touches the strand of flesh or the hair becomes impure? Is it not because they constitute protection for the flesh? The Gemara answers: No, it is because the hair constitutes a handle for the flesh.

The Gemara asks: For what function is one hair fit such that it constitutes a handle? The Gemara answers: One can explain that mishna as Rabbi Ela said in explanation of a different mishna: It is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns. Here too, the mishna is stated with regard to the case of a hair among many hairs and not the case of a single hair. The hair serves as a handle for the flesh because one can hold the hair and lift the flesh without the hair becoming detached.

And where was the opinion of Rabbi Ela stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: An awn that is on top of a stalk can become impure and impart impurity, but it does not join together with the grains to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity. It was asked: For what function is an awn fit such that it is considered to be a handle for the stalk? Rabbi Ela said: The mishna is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns.

§The mishna teaches: The gravy [rotev] joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of gravy itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term rotev referring? Rava said: The term rotev is referring to the fat that floats on top of a soup of cooked meat.

Abaye said to Rava: That fat itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to impurity of food. Rather, the term rotev is referring to fat that oozed out of the meat and congealed. That fat is not eaten, but it does join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

The Gemara asks: Why is the mishna referring specifically to congealed fat? Even in a case where the fat did not congeal it joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, as Reish Lakish said: Brine on a vegetable, even though it is a liquid, combines with the vegetable to constitute a large date-bulk [kakotevet] with regard to rendering one liable for violating the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur. Similarly, liquid fat should combine with the meat to constitute the requisite volume to impart the impurity of food.

The Gemara answers: Liquids and solids do not join together to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food. The reason for the halakha there, with regard to Yom Kippur, is because one is liable even for the consumption of a liquid that is not characterized as food if the mind of the one who consumes it is settled. This is because with regard to the fast of Yom Kippur the Torah is concerned with a person’s affliction, as the verse states: “You shall afflict your souls” (Leviticus 23:27). Therefore, one is liable on Yom Kippur for any eating that settles his mind.

But that is not the case here with regard to impurity. For two substances to join together to impart impurity, a combination between substances that have a common requisite measure for imparting impurity is necessary. Liquid and solid foods do not have the same requisite measure. Therefore, if the fat is congealed, it joins together with the meat. If it is not congealed, it does not join together with the meat.

§The mishna teaches: The spices [kifa] join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of kifa itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term kifa referring? Rabba said: The term kifa is referring to a congealed hash of cooked meat that settled to the bottom of the pot.

Abaye said to Rabba: That hash itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The term kifa is referring to spices, which are not eaten themselves but do join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

§Since the mishna mentions kifa, which, according to Rabba, is referring to a congealed substance, the Gemara discusses the halakha of one who congealed a forbidden substance and consumed it. We learned in a baraita there: One who caused blood to coagulate and ate it or melted forbidden fat and swallowed it is liable.

The Gemara objects: Granted, one who caused blood to coagulate and ate it is liable. Although blood is not normally eaten in such a manner, since he caused the blood to coagulate, he ascribed the significance of food to it, and the Torah prohibits the eating of blood, as it is written: “You shall eat neither fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). But why is one who melted forbidden fat and swallowed it liable? Eating, and not drinking, is stated in the Torah with regard to the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat, as it is written: “You shall eat no fat of ox or sheep or goat” (Leviticus 7:23), and this swallowing of a liquid is not eating.

Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking the melted forbidden fat of an animal. The verse states: “For all who eat the fat of the animal that one could offer from it a fire offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:25). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks the fat.

The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: If one took bread, dissolved it in water, and swallowed this mixture on Passover, the halakha is as follows: If it is leavened bread, he is punished with karet; if it is matza, then a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food.

The Gemara objects: Granted, if it is matza, a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food, as the Merciful One states with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat unleavened bread with it, even the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3), indicating that one must eat the bread of affliction, but this bread dissolved in water is not considered the bread of affliction. But if the bread is leavened bread, why is he punished with karet? Eating is written with regard to the prohibition against leavened bread, and in this case he did not eat it but rather drank it.

Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking leavened bread. The verse states: “For all who eat leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Exodus 12:15). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks leavened bread.

The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in the Tosefta (Zavim 5:9) with regard to one who eats the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird: One who liquefied the carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird in fire and drank the substance is impure. But one who liquefied it in the sun and drank it is pure. And we discussed it: Eating and not drinking is stated with regard to the impurity of a carcass, as it is written: “And every soul that eats an unslaughtered carcass or that which is mauled by an animal, whether he is native or stranger, he shall wash his garments, bathe in water, and shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Why, then, does one who drinks a kosher bird carcass become impure?

Reish Lakish said: He becomes impure because the verse states: “And every soul.” The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include one who drinks. The Gemara objects: If so, one who drinks a carcass that is melted in the sun should also become impure. The Gemara explains: A carcass takes a long time to melt in the sun. Therefore, the liquid becomes rotten and unfit for consumption.

The Gemara cited three instances in which Reish Lakish interpreted the term “soul” as including one who drinks. The Gemara explains: All three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to forbidden fat, liability for drinking liquefied leavened bread could not have been derived from it, since the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat has an element of stringency that does not apply to leavened bread in that the forbidden fat had no period of fitness for consumption. Leavened bread, on the other hand, may be consumed before Passover. Likewise, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of forbidden fat because the consumption of forbidden fat is punishable by karet, which is not the case with regard to the consumption of a carcass.

And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to leavened bread, liability for drinking melted forbidden fat could not be derived from it, as there are no circumstances in which the general prohibition against eating leavened bread was permitted. The consumption of forbidden fat, on the other hand, is permitted with regard to the fat of an undomesticated animal. And similarly, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of leavened bread, because the halakha of leavened bread has an element of stringency that does not apply to a carcass in that its consumption is punishable by karet.

And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to a carcass, those prohibitions against drinking melted fat and liquefied leavened bread could not be derived from it, because a carcass has an element of stringency that does not apply to those prohibitions in that it transmits impurity to one who eats it. Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.

The Gemara objects: It is true that one halakha cannot be derived from either one of the others, as detailed above. Nevertheless, one can derive the halakha of one of them from the other two. The Gemara responds: This is not possible, as which halakha can one derive from the others? Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to a liquefied carcass and derive it from these other prohibitions against eating forbidden fat and leavened bread. One can refute this derivation: What is notable about these other prohibitions? They are notable in that one who transgresses them is punished with karet, contrary to one who eats a carcass.

The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to dissolved leavened bread and derive it from these halakhot of forbidden fat and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that they had no period of fitness for consumption, as opposed to leavened bread, which was fit for consumption before Passover.

The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to forbidden fat and derive it from these halakhot of consuming leavened bread and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted. Shall you say the same with regard to forbidden fat, whose general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances? Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.

The Gemara asks: And what is the case in which forbidden fat is permitted? If we say that it is the fat of a domesticated animal that is permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple to the Most High, a bird carcass is also permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple. Although pinching the nape of the neck of a bird renders it an unslaughtered carcass and forbidden for consumption, bird offerings are sacrificed to the Most High in such a manner.

And if the reference is rather to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person, one may respond that a carcass is also permitted for a person’s consumption in a certain case, as the pinching of the nape of the neck of a bird sin offering renders it fit for consumption of the priests.

The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person. And that which is difficult for you with regard to the fact that the priests eat the carcass of a bird which is brought as a sin offering is not difficult, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Since this carcass is permitted as an offering to God, it is permitted to the priests as well. Therefore, this does not qualify as a case of an unslaughtered carcass permitted to ordinary people.

§The Gemara challenges: But that which is taught in the following baraita is difficult. The Torah states with regard to the prohibition against eating creeping animals: “These are they that are impure [hatteme’im] to you among all the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:31). The Sages interpret the letter heh in the term “hatteme’im” to forbid their juice that oozes from their carcasses, and their gravy that is produced when they are cooked, and sediments of their flesh that congeal at the bottom of the dish when cooked. The Gemara explains the challenge: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? Let this halakha be learned from these halakhot of melted forbidden fat, a liquefied bird carcass, and dissolved leavened bread.

The Gemara answers: It is necessary for this halakha to be written, as if the Merciful One had not written this halakha with regard to creeping animals and instead the halakha was derived from the other halakhot, I would say: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Accordingly, just as there, one who consumes melted forbidden fat, a liquefied carcass, or dissolved leavened bread is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk, so too here, with regard to consuming the juice, gravy, and sediments of creeping animals, one is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk. Therefore, a separate verse is necessary to teach that one is liable even for consuming a lentil-bulk of the juice, gravy, or sediments of a creeping animal, just as one is liable for consuming this measure of the creeping animal itself.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 120a examines whether animal hide, bones, and even hair combine with meat to reach the volume needed for ritual impurity.