Talmud - Hullin 83a חולין פ״ג א׳

The verse comes to provide a positive mitzva to burn the leftovers, in the second part of the verse that states: “But that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire.” This positive mitzva is stated after the prohibition against leaving it over was stated in the first part of the verse, to say that one is not flogged for transgressing the prohibition. This is because any prohibition that can be rectified by the performance of a positive mitzva does not carry a punishment of lashes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. If not for this reason, Rabbi Yehuda evidently would hold that he receives lashes. The forewarning given in this case is uncertain, as he must be forewarned before morning, and at that time he might still consume it.

Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason [hashem]. Rather, it is because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The transgression is simply the failure to consume all the meat during the allotted time rather than the performance of an action. And one is not flogged for the violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution with regard to the opinion of Sumakhos from a baraita discussing the sciatic nerve: If one ate two sciatic nerves from two thighs of two different animals, he incurs the penalty of eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in this case? If we say that he ate them one after the other and with two separate forewarnings, what is the reasoning of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The violator receives forty lashes and nothing more? After all, he violates two separate prohibitions with two separate forewarnings. Rather, it is obvious that he ate them at the same time and with a single forewarning.

Who is the first tanna, who holds that in such a case one receives eighty lashes? If we say that it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about: Itself and its offspring, that would contradict their opinion: Now, if there, in that mishna in a case where there are various animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis deem him exempt from a second set of lashes, here, in the baraita about two sciatic nerves, which are not separate entities, should they not all the more so deem him exempt from a second set of lashes? Rather, is it not Sumakhos who is the first tanna? Consequently, in his opinion one who eats the same prohibited item, such as an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, twice after a single forewarning receives two sets of lashes.

The Gemara responds: Actually, he ate the two sciatic nerves one after the other with separate forewarnings, incurring two sets of lashes even according to the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about: Itself and its offspring. And as for that which you say: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda who holds that the transgressor incurs only a single set of lashes? This is a case where the volume of one of the sciatic nerves is not even an olive-bulk, and Rabbi Yehuda follows his line of reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: If one ate the entire sciatic nerve, and its volume is not even an olive-bulk, he is liable to incur forty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless it has a volume of at least an olive-bulk.

MISHNA: On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it,or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of Sukkot, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well.

Rabbi Yehuda said: When must he inform the buyer on those days? He must do so at a time when the seller has no interval between the sale of the mother and the offspring, as they were both sold on that day. But if the seller has an interval between the sales, he does not need to inform the buyer, as presumably each buyer purchased the animal to slaughter it on the day he purchased it. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sells the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, that even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer, as it is obvious that they are both planning to slaughter their animal on one day, for their wedding feast.

On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will; even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has only one dinar worth of meat, i.e., he already paid the butcher for one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal and give him a dinar’s worth of meat. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, although no act of acquisition was performed, it dies at the expense of the buyer, and he loses his dinar. But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. On other days, until the buyer performs the act of pulling to assume ownership of the portion of the bull that he is purchasing, the bull remains in the butcher’s possession. Therefore, if the bull dies before the transaction is complete, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that on the four occasions mentioned it is the seller’s responsibility to inform the purchaser that the mother or offspring of the animal he is purchasing was sold that day. With regard to this it is taught: Consequently, the purchaser has no obligation to clarify the situation, and if the seller did not inform him, the purchaser may go and slaughter the animal he has purchased and need not refrain from doing so.

The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: When must he inform the buyer on those days? It then teaches: And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sold the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach that the butcher sold specifically the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride? It could have taught: He sold one to the groom and the other to the bride. The Gemara answers: It teaches us a related matter in passing, that it is proper conduct for the groom’s household to exert more effort than the bride’s household in the marriage preparations. Therefore, the groom purchases the mother, the larger animal, while the bride purchases the smaller animal, the offspring.

§ The mishna teaches: On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will, and even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has paid for only one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, it dies at the expense of the buyer. The Gemara challenges: But the buyer did not yet pull the animal to effect acquisition; consequently, although he paid the seller, the animal is not his. Rav Huna said that Rav said: The case is where he pulled it, and thereby acquired it. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause: But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. Therefore, if the bull dies, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money. But according to Rav, didn’t the buyer pull the animal? If so, why is its death at the expense of the seller?

Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Actually, the case in the mishna is one where the buyer did not pull the animal, and it is a case where the seller transfers ownership to the customer by means of another person, i.e., by instructing another to acquire a dinar’s worth of the ox’s meat on the customer’s behalf, without having obtained the customer’s consent. Therefore, on those four occasions, where it is for the customer’s benefit, as he wants meat for the Festival, the principle: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, applies. By contrast, during the rest of the days of the year, where it is to the customer’s disadvantage to acquire the meat before the bull is slaughtered, as he does not want to incur avoidable expenses, one cannot act to the disadvantage of another person in his absence. Therefore, if the bull dies, it is at the expense of the seller.

Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is a different explanation: On those four occasions the Sages based their statement on the Torah law that giving money effects acquisition, and therefore, the payment of the buyer acquires the meat for him with no need for pulling.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, giving money effects the acquisition of movable property with no need for pulling. And what is the reason that the Sages said that pulling effects acquisition? It is a rabbinic decree lest the seller, once he receives the money, be unconcerned about the welfare of the movable property that he has sold, and, for example, not protect it from fire, so that he will say to the buyer: Your wheat was burned in the upper story of my house and I have no responsibility for it. For the benefit of rejoicing on the Festival, the Sages ordained that Torah law remains in effect on those four occasions and the buyer’s money effects acquisition, and one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will.

MISHNA: With regard to the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night. Therefore, one may slaughter an animal during the day and slaughter its offspring that night, but one may not slaughter an animal at night and slaughter its offspring the following day. Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma derived this by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated in the act of Creation: “One day” (Genesis 1:5), and it is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring: “One day” (Leviticus 22:28). Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma taught this explanation: Because the entire section of the Torah where the prohibition: Itself and its offspring, appears speaks only about sacrificial animals, and with regard to sacrificial animals the night follows the day, one might have thought that even with regard to this prohibition it is so. Therefore, the following derivation is required: It is stated here, with regard to the slaughter of an animal and its offspring: “One day,” and it is stated in the act of Creation: “One day.” Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 83a explores whether leaving over sacrificial meat overnight incurs lashes, debating positive mitzvot, action-based prohibitions, and sciatic nerve violations.