Talmud - Hullin 136a חולין קל״ו א׳

The term “your house [beitekha]” is similar to the term: You enter [bi’atkha], indicating that one places the mezuza in the way that you enter the house. When a person lifts his foot to begin walking, he lifts his right foot first. Therefore, the mezuza is affixed to the right side of the doorway, as one enters.

Similarly, with regard to tithe, Rabbi Ilai concedes that joint owners of produce are obligated, even though it is written: “The tithe of your grain [deganekha]” (Deuteronomy 12:17), using the singular pronoun, from which one might have inferred that with regard to your grain, yes, one is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership, one is not obligated. The reason is that the Merciful One writes: “All your tithes [ma’asroteikhem]” (Numbers 18:28), using the plural pronoun, indicating that even partners are obligated in this mitzva. The Gemara asks: But if so, for what purpose does the term: “The tithe of your grain [deganekha],” using the singular pronoun, come? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude produce owned in partnership with a gentile from the obligation of tithes.

Likewise, with regard to the gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, Rabbi Ilai concedes that the joint owners of an animal are obligated, even though the Merciful One writes: “And this shall be the priests’ due from the people, from those who slaughter an animal, whether it be ox or sheep; and he shall give to the priest the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw” (Deuteronomy 18:3).

The Gemara elaborates: It is possible to say that one should derive a verbal analogy between giving mentioned in the context of gifts to the priesthood and giving from the first sheared wool. The Torah states: “He shall give,” with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, and it states: “Shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), with regard to the first sheared wool; just as there, with regard to the first sheared wool, sheep owned in partnership do not render their owners obligated, so too here, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, an animal owned in partnership does not render the owners obligated. But the Merciful One writes: “From those who slaughter an animal,” in the plural, indicating that even the owners of an animal owned in partnership are obligated to give the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw.

The Gemara challenges: But according to this inference, the reason the joint owners of an animal are obligated in the gifts of the priesthood is that the Merciful One writes: “From those who slaughter an animal,” in the plural. But were it not so, I would say that they are exempt, as derived by means of a verbal analogy from the first sheared wool. On the contrary, since the term “shall you give him” is also referring to teruma, one should derive by means of a verbal analogy from teruma: Just as the obligation of teruma applies to those who own produce in partnership, so too, the requirement of the gifts of the priesthood applies to partners that own an animal together.

The Gemara explains: Yes, it is indeed so; the obligation of partners with regard to gifts of the priesthood is derived from teruma. But if so, why do I need the phrase “from those who slaughter an animal”? It is necessary for that which Rava taught, as Rava said: The priest issues his demand to receive the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw from the butcher who slaughtered the animal, not from the buyer.

Similarly, with regard to the first fruits, Rabbi Ilai concedes that the joint owners of produce are obligated, even though it is written: “And you shall take of the first of all the fruit of the ground, which you shall bring in from your land [be’artzekha]” (Deuteronomy 26:2), using the singular pronoun. One might have inferred from the singular pronoun that with regard to your land, yes, one is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership one is not obligated.

Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “The first fruits of all that is in their land, which they bring to the Lord, shall be yours” (Numbers 18:13). The use of the plural pronoun indicates that even from land owned in partnership one is obligated to bring first fruits. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “your land [artzekha],” using the singular pronoun? The Gemara answers: This serves to exclude produce grown outside of Eretz Yisrael from the mitzva of the first fruits.

Likewise, with regard to the mitzva to attach ritual fringes to one’s garment, Rabbi Ilai concedes that a jointly owned garment is obligated, even though the Merciful One writes: “You shall make yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your covering [kesutekha]” (Deuteronomy 22:12), using the singular pronoun. It might have been inferred from the singular form that with regard to your covering, yes, it is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership it is not obligated.

Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And they shall make for themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, throughout their generations, and they shall put with the fringe of each corner a thread of blue” (Numbers 15:38). The use of the plural pronoun indicates that even jointly owned garments are obligated. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “your covering [kesutekha],” using the singular pronoun? The Gemara answers: This is necessary for that which Rav Yehuda taught, as Rav Yehuda said: A borrowed cloak is exempt from the mitzva of ritual fringes throughout the first thirty days.

Similarly, with regard to the obligation of establishing a parapet around a roof, Rabbi Ilai concedes that the joint owners of a roof are obligated, even though the Merciful One writes: “When you build a new house, then you shall make a parapet for your roof [legaggekha],” using the singular pronoun, “and you shall not bring blood upon your house, if any man falls from there” (Deuteronomy 22:8). One might have inferred from the singular form that with regard to your roof, yes, one is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership one is not obligated.

Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “If any man falls from there,” indicating that wherever the danger of falling from the roof exists, there is an obligation to erect a parapet. The Gemara asks: But if so, for what purpose does the term “your roof [gaggekha],” using the singular pronoun, come? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude synagogues and houses of study.

§ Rava maintains that although Rabbi Ilai holds that if a sheep is owned in partnership its owners are exempt from giving the first sheared wool to a priest, he concedes that partners are obligated with regard to all the other issues discussed above, including the mitzva of the firstborn animal and the gifts of the priesthood. Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: These principles stated by Rava are not accepted, as it is taught in a baraita: An animal owned by partners is obligated in the mitzva of a firstborn, i.e., its offspring is subject to firstborn status. And Rabbi Ilai exempts the animal from having its offspring subject to firstborn status.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Ilai? As it is written: “And the firstborn of your herd and of your flock [bekarekha vetzonekha]” (Deuteronomy 12:17), using the singular pronoun, indicating that only privately owned animals are consecrated. The Gemara comments: But it is also written: “And the firstborn of your herd and of your flock [bekarkhem vetzonekhem]” (Deuteronomy 12:6), using the plural pronoun. The Gemara explains: This verse is referring to the obligation of all Jews to bring their firstborn animals to the Temple, but this applies only to animals with a single owner.

Rav Ḥanina of Sura also said: These principles stated by Rava are not accepted, as it is taught in a baraita: An animal owned by partners is obligated, i.e., renders its owners obligated, to take gifts of the priesthood from it, and Rabbi Ilai exempts the partners from the obligation. What is the reason for Rabbi Ilai’s statement? He derives a verbal analogy between giving mentioned in this context and giving from the first sheared wool. The Torah states: “He shall give” (Deuteronomy 18:3), with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, and: “Shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), with regard to the first sheared wool. Just as there, with regard to the first sheared wool, in the case of sheep owned in partnership the owners are not obligated according to Rabbi Ilai, so too here, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, if the animal is owned in partnership the owners are not obligated.

Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura adds: And if it enters your mind to accept Rava’s statement that in the case of teruma Rabbi Ilai deems partners obligated, this is not possible. The reason is that the term “shall you give him” is also used with regard to teruma. Accordingly, instead of deriving the halakha of an animal owned by partners with regard to gifts of the priesthood by verbal analogy from the first sheared wool, one should derive by verbal analogy between giving mentioned with regard to gifts of the priesthood and giving from teruma, as follows: Just as joint owners of produce are obligated to separate teruma from that produce, so too with regard to an animal owned in partnership, the owners are obligated to take the gifts of the priesthood from it. Rather, conclude from the baraita that with regard to teruma too, Rabbi Ilai deems partners exempt, and therefore their exemption from the gifts of the priesthood can be derived either from the first sheared wool or from teruma.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If it is possible to derive halakhot of the gifts of the priesthood from teruma by verbal analogy, one could also say: Just as with regard to teruma the halakha is that in Eretz Yisrael, yes, it applies, whereas outside of Eretz Yisrael it does not apply, so too, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, in Eretz Yisrael, yes, they apply, whereas outside of Eretz Yisrael they do not apply. Rabbi Yosei of Neharbil said: Yes, it is indeed so, and it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ilai says: The gifts of the priesthood apply only in Eretz Yisrael. And likewise, Rabbi Ilai would say: The mitzva of the first sheared wool applies only in Eretz Yisrael.

What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Ilai? Rava said: He derives by means of a verbal analogy between giving mentioned in the context of the first sheared wool and giving from teruma that just as with regard to teruma the halakha is that in Eretz Yisrael, yes, it applies, whereas outside of Eretz Yisrael, it does not apply; so too, with regard to the first sheared wool, in Eretz Yisrael, yes, it applies, whereas outside of Eretz Yisrael it does not apply.

Abaye said to Rava: If one compares the first sheared wool to teruma by means of a verbal analogy, one can say that just as with regard to the requirement to separate teruma, it produces the halakhic status of forbidden untithed produce, so too the requirement to separate the first sheared wool produces the halakhic status of untithed produce, i.e., wool from which the first sheared wool has not been separated should be forbidden. Yet this is not the halakha. Rava said to him that the verse states: “And the first sheared wool of your flock, shall you give him,” i.e., the priest, which indicates that you, i.e., the priest, have a right to the first sheared wool only from its designation as the first sheared wool and onward. Since the first sheared wool does not belong to the priest prior to its designation, it does not render the rest of the wool forbidden.

Abaye continues to question Rava: If one compares the first sheared wool to teruma by means of a verbal analogy, one can say that just as non-priests who partake of teruma intentionally are liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, and those who do so unwittingly are obligated to pay an additional one-fifth of its value, so too, non-priests who derive benefit from the first sheared wool intentionally should be liable to death at the hand of Heaven, and those who do so unwittingly should be obligated to pay an additional one-fifth of its value.

Rava replies: The verse states with regard to a non-priest who partakes of teruma: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die because of it, if they profane it…and if a man eat of the holy thing through error, and he shall add its fifth part to it, and shall give to the priest the holy thing” (Leviticus 22:9–14). Rava infers: “He shall add its fifth part to it,” and not to the first sheared wool. “And die because of it,” and not because of the first sheared wool. Consequently, a non-priest is liable to death at the hand of Heaven or to pay an additional one-fifth for partaking of teruma, but not for deriving benefit from the first sheared wool.

Abaye further questions Rava: If one compares the first sheared wool to teruma by verbal analogy, one can say that just as with regard to teruma, the first and second tithes are separated from the produce after teruma is separated, so too with regard to the first sheared wool, first and second tithes should be separated from the fleece after it. Rava replies: The verse states that the first sheared wool is “the first.” Since the verse already stated “first” with regard to teruma, its repetition indicates that in this case there is no second separation. One does not have any separation in this case other than the first one.

Abaye continues to question Rava: If one compares the first sheared wool to teruma by means of a verbal analogy, one can say that just as with regard to teruma one may not separate from the new produce of this year on behalf of the old produce from last year, so too, one may not separate the first sheared wool from the new shearing of this year on behalf of the old shearing from last year. On this occasion Rava replied: Yes, that is the halakha.

Rava proves his point: And it is likewise taught that this is Rabbi Ilai’s opinion, through a contradiction between two baraitot. One baraita teaches: A person had two sheep; he sheared them and left the shearing in his possession, and the following year he again sheared them and left the shearing in his possession, and continued in this manner for two or three years. Although the accumulated wool is equivalent to the wool of five sheep, to which the obligation of the first sheared wool applies, the wool does not accumulate to constitute the minimum amount, as only two sheep were shorn. This indicates that if the wool is from five sheep, then it accumulates, and one is obligated to give the priest the first sheared wool, despite the fact that the wool was shorn in different years.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita that even wool from five sheep shorn in different years does not accumulate to create an obligation? Rather, conclude from this contradiction that this second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ilai, who compares the first sheared wool to teruma. Therefore, he holds that wool from separate years does not accumulate. And that first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not compare the first sheared wool to teruma. Therefore, they maintain that wool from separate years does accumulate.

Abaye asks Rava: If one compares the first sheared wool to teruma, one can say that just as with regard to teruma, if a Jew purchased a field from a gentile then produce that grew under the ownership of a Jew, who is obligated to separate teruma from his produce, is obligated, whereas produce that grew under the ownership of a gentile, whose produce is exempt, is exempt even after purchase by a Jew; so too, with regard to the first sheared wool, the fleece that grew under the ownership of a Jew, who is obligated in the first sheared wool, is obligated, whereas the fleece that grew under the ownership of a gentile, who is exempt, is exempt even after purchase by a Jew.

Abaye adds: And with regard to teruma, from where do we derive that produce that grew when owned by a gentile is exempt? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a Jew who purchased a field in Syria from a gentile, if he bought the field before the produce reached one-third of its growth, he is obligated to separate teruma. If he bought the field after the produce reached one-third of its growth, Rabbi Akiva deems him obligated to separate teruma from the growth added after he bought the field, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. All agree, though, that he is exempt with regard to the part of the produce that grew under the gentile’s ownership.

And if you would say: Indeed, Rabbi Ilai holds that wool that grew under the ownership of a gentile is exempt from the mitzva of the first sheared wool, that is difficult, as didn’t we learn in the mishna (135a): One who purchases the fleece of the sheep of a gentile is exempt from the obligation of the first sheared wool? It can be inferred from the mishna that if one purchased the gentile’s sheep when they were ready for shearing, he is obligated in the mitzva of the first sheared wool. Rava replied: The mishna

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 136a explores mezuza placement on a doorway’s right side and examines when jointly owned produce or animals still trigger tithing and priestly gift obligations.