Talmud - Hullin 81a חולין פ״א א׳

transmuted it from the standard prohibition of: It shall not be accepted, which is violated in the case of the other disqualifications, into a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva. What is the reasoning by which this is derived? It is derived from that which the verse states: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering” (Leviticus 22:27), which teaches that from the eighth day after its birth, yes, it may be sacrificed as an offering, but initially, before the eighth day, no, it may not be sacrificed. Therefore, this is a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva, which is not considered a negative prohibition for which one is flogged, but rather a positive mitzva.

The Gemara asks: But this verse is required for the statement of Rabbi Aptoriki, as Rabbi Aptoriki raises a contradiction: It is written: “Then it shall be seven days with its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), indicating that on the night after the seventh day it is already fit to be sacrificed. But it is also written in that verse: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted,” indicating that from the eighth day forward, yes, it is fit, but on the night before it is not.

How can these texts be reconciled? The night after the seventh day is fit for consecration, which is permitted at that time, while the eighth day is fit for effecting acceptance, and only then may it be sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara answers that another verse is also written that specifies this positive mitzva: “So shall you do with your ox and with your sheep; seven days shall it be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:29).

§ The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rav Hamnuna says that Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring does not apply to sacrificial animals. What is the reason? The reason is that since Rabbi Shimon says that an act of slaughter that is unfit to permit consumption is not considered to have the halakhic status of an act of slaughter, the prohibition will not apply here. This case of slaughtering sacrificial animals is also considered slaughter that is unfit, in that the flesh may not be burned upon the altar or eaten until the blood has been presented.

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: If one slaughtered an animal itself and its offspring and both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition in slaughtering it outside the Temple, as Rabbi Shimon would say: With regard to any offering that is fit to come to the altar after a certain amount of time and is offered outside the Temple before that time, he who slaughters it transgresses a prohibition, but there is no liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any offering slaughtered outside of the Temple for which there is no liability to receive karet because it is unfit to be an offering at that time, he who sacrifices it also does not transgress a prohibition.

And this statement in the baraita is difficult for us: If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition for slaughtering outside the Temple. According to Rabbi Shimon, slaughter that is unfit for consumption is not considered slaughter. Therefore, with regard to the first animal, it is as if he has killed it without ritual slaughter, since its slaughter was unfit, and the second animal would be accepted inside the Temple upon the altar. Therefore, let one who slaughters it outside of the Temple be liable to receive karet as well.

And Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one slaughters an animal and its offspring that are both sacrificial animals, and both of them are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first animal is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and therefore, for its slaughter one is exempt from punishment for violating the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.

According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter of both of them, including the second one alone, is punishable by karet. This is because the slaughter of the first is not considered slaughter, and therefore it does not disqualify the second through the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one outside the Temple courtyard, and the second one inside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple, because he slaughtered it inside the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the second animal is fit for the altar, and it is sacrificed, as the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, and therefore the slaughter of the second does not violate the prohibition of a mother and its offspring.

If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one inside the Temple courtyard and the second one outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first animal is fit for the altar, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment, as its slaughter is perfectly legitimate. The second is unfit for the altar, as it was slaughtered outside the Temple, but its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple because it is unfit for the altar, as its time has not yet arrived. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple one transgresses a prohibition, as he holds that an offering whose time has not yet arrived that was slaughtered outside the Temple violates a prohibition.

Rava now explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals, then with regard to slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple, why does one transgress only a prohibition and nothing more? Let him be liable to receive karet as well, as since its slaughter does not violate the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it would be fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals.

Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna is saying: Though the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals, the administering of lashes for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals.

The reason is that since as long as one has not sprinkled the blood, the flesh is not permitted to be burned on the altar or eaten, at the time that one slaughters the second animal, when he receives a forewarning that his action violates the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is an uncertain forewarning, because if the blood will not be sprinkled, the flesh will not be permitted, sparing him from violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. And an uncertain forewarning is not considered a valid forewarning that renders one liable to receive lashes.

And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava says: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one does not incur punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, for a slaughtering that is unfit, if she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is a peace offering, and one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward one slaughtered her offspring that is a peace offering on the same day, he is exempt for slaughtering the offspring. This is because the forewarning for slaughtering the offspring is uncertain as its blood might not be sprinkled, rendering the slaughter unfit.

But if one slaughtered the offspring that is a peace offering first and sprinkled its blood, and afterward he slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is liable to receive lashes for slaughtering the mother. Once the non-sacred mother is slaughtered, the meat is fit; therefore, the forewarning is definite. And Rava says: If she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering, and both are slaughtered on the same day, it is not necessary to state that if one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward he slaughtered her offspring as a burnt offering, that he is exempt.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 81a examines the eighth-day rule for offering a newborn animal as a positive mitzva rather than a prohibition, alongside Rabbi Shimon's view on sacrificial animals.