Talmud - Hullin 134a חולין קל״ד א׳

The Gemara objects: But one can raise a contradiction from a baraita: If a priest sells his animal to an Israelite and stipulates: I am selling it on the condition that the gifts are mine, the Israelite is not obligated to give the gifts to that priest. Rather, he gives the gifts to any priest that he wants. Since the priest sold his animal, the priest cannot issue a condition involving the gifts, as they no longer belong to him but to the entire tribe of priests. The baraita indicates that the Israelite is nevertheless obligated to give the gifts, which apparently contradicts the ruling of the mishna.

The Gemara responds: Do you raise a contradiction from a baraita that discusses a case where the priest states: On the condition that the gifts are mine, with regard to the case of the mishna, where the priest states: Except for the gifts? That is not a contradiction, as the word except is a term of retention, i.e., the priest retains the gifts and does not sell them to the Israelite. By contrast, the term: On the condition, is not one of retention, as the priest does not keep the gifts for himself but instead stipulates that the buyer must give the gifts to him. The priest is not authorized to issue such a stipulation and it is therefore disregarded entirely, and because the Israelite owns the gifts he must give them to a priest.

The Gemara objects: But one may raise a contradiction against the previous baraita from another baraita: If a priest sells his animal to an Israelite and stipulates: I am selling it on the condition that the gifts are mine, the gifts are his and the Israelite must give the gifts to that priest. The Gemara responds: There is a dispute between the tanna’im of these baraitot, and they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that the term: On the condition, is one of retention, and the priest therefore retains possession of the gifts. And one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that: On the condition, is not a term of retention, and the priest is not authorized to stipulate that the buyer must give the gifts to him.

§ The mishna teaches that if one said to a butcher: Sell me the innards of a cow that you slaughtered, and there were gifts, i.e., the maw, included with it, the buyer gives the gifts to the priest and does not deduct its value from the money that he pays to the butcher. If he bought the innards by weight, the buyer gives the maw to the priest and deducts its value from the money he pays to the butcher. With regard to innards purchased by weight, Rav says: The Sages taught that the buyer gives the maw to the priest only when the buyer weighed the innards for himself when purchasing them. In such a case, the priest claims the maw from the buyer. But if the butcher weighed the innards for the buyer, the judgment is also with the butcher, i.e., the priest may claim the maw from either the butcher or the buyer. And Rav Asi says: Even if the butcher weighed the innards for the buyer, the judgment is with the buyer alone.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree with regard to a statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: In a case where one robbed another of an item, and the owners had not despaired of retrieving it, and another person came and consumed the stolen item, if the owner wants, he may collect the value of the stolen item from this one, the robber, and if he wants, he may collect from that one who consumed it. The suggestion is that one Sage, Rav, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and he therefore holds that the priest may claim the maw from either the buyer or the butcher; and one Sage, Rav Asi, does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and the priest may therefore claim the maw from the buyer alone.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and here they disagree with regard to whether or not gifts of the priesthood can be stolen. As one Sage, Rav, holds that they can be stolen, and accordingly the robber remains responsible for them even if they are consumed by another. Consequently, if the butcher weighed the innards, the priest may claim the gifts from either the butcher or the buyer. And one Sage, Rav Asi, holds that gifts of the priesthood cannot be stolen. Since technically one cannot steal the gifts, the obligation to return them to the priest rests solely on the one in physical possession of them. Accordingly, the priest may claim the gifts from the buyer alone, as the gifts are in his custody.

The Gemara notes that some teach this halakha, that there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Asi as to whether or not gifts of the priesthood can be stolen, by itself, i.e., as an independent dispute between them rather than in explanation of another dispute: Rav says that gifts of the priesthood can be stolen, and Rav Asi says that gifts of the priesthood cannot be stolen.

MISHNA: In the case of a convert who converted and he had a cow, if the cow was slaughtered before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts to the priest. If the animal was slaughtered after he converted, the convert is obligated to give the gifts. If there is uncertainty whether it was slaughtered before or after the conversion, the convert is exempt, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if there is an uncertainty whether an individual is obligated to give gifts of the priesthood, he is exempt from giving them. In this regard, the Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan: We learned in the mishna that when there is an uncertainty one is exempt from giving the gifts. Evidently, in cases of uncertainty the halakha is to be lenient.

But one can raise a contradiction from that which is taught in another mishna (Pe’a 4:11) with regard to gleanings left for the poor: In a case of grain found in ant holes that are inside the standing crop in an area of the field that was not harvested, these are the property of the owner of the field, as this grain does not have the status of gleanings. And in the case of grain found in ant holes that are behind the harvesters in an already harvested area, the upper wheat stalks, i.e., those stalks found at the mouth of the holes, belong to the poor, as they are assumed to be gleanings that fell from the bundles when that area was harvested, and the lower wheat inside the holes are the property of the owner, since it is possible that they were collected by the ants before the harvest and are not gleanings.

Rabbi Meir says: Everything goes to the poor, as grain whose status as gleanings is uncertain is considered gleanings. According to Rabbi Meir, the halakha is stringent in the case of an uncertainty with regard to gifts left for the poor. This apparently contradicts the mishna’s statement that one is lenient in the case of an uncertainty with regard to gifts of the priesthood, as these gifts are similar in this regard to gifts left for the poor. Since any unattributed mishna is considered to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is apparently a contradiction with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Do not trouble me with this contradiction, as I teach that baraita in the singular, i.e., it is not certain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir; rather, it is merely the claim of one Sage that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Grain whose status as gleanings is uncertain is considered gleanings; grain whose status as forgotten sheaves is uncertain is considered forgotten sheaves; and grain whose status as pe’a is uncertain is considered pe’a. Therefore, one should not raise a contradiction to the mishna from the statement of a single Sage claiming to represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even if you teach that baraita only in a language whereby a certain imbecile named ben Tedal states that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, a question remains, as isn’t there a stated reason for stringency in cases of uncertainties with regard to gifts left for the poor? As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Do justice to the afflicted and destitute” (Psalms 82:3)? Specifically, what is the meaning of “do justice”?

If we say that it means that one should do justice in judgments, i.e., a judge should sway judgments in favor of the afflicted and destitute, but isn’t it written: “Neither shall you favor a poor man in his cause” (Exodus 23:3)? Rather, the verse is teaching that in cases of uncertainty with regard to gifts left for the poor, be righteous with that which is yours and give it to the poor. Why, then, is the halakha stringent in the case of gifts left for the poor but lenient with regard to gifts to priests?

Rava said in response: Here, in the case of gifts of the priesthood, the halakha is lenient because the cow of a convert maintains the presumptive status of exemption, as the obligation of the gifts did not apply to the cow before the convert converted. By contrast, the halakha is stringent in the case of the gifts left for the poor, as the standing crop maintains the presumptive status of obligation.

Abaye said to Rava: But with regard to the dough of a convert, the halakha is that if it was prepared before he converted he is exempt from separating ḥalla from this dough, and if it was prepared after he converted, he is obligated to separate ḥalla from it. And if there is an uncertainty as to whether the dough was prepared before or after his conversion, he is obligated, despite the fact that dough prepared by a gentile is exempt from ḥalla. Why isn’t the convert exempt from separating ḥalla just as he is exempt from giving gifts of the priesthood in the case of an uncertainty, as both the dough and the cow maintain a presumptive status of exemption?

Rava said to Abaye: There is a difference between ḥalla and gifts of the priesthood. Although the dough maintains the presumptive status of exemption, here there is also uncertainty with regard to a prohibition, as a non-priest who consumes ḥalla is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven. And whenever there is an uncertainty with regard to a prohibition, the halakha is to be stringent. Conversely, uncertainties with regard to gifts of the priesthood involve no prohibition and are strictly monetary, and whenever there is an uncertainty with regard to monetary matters, the halakha is to be lenient. Consequently, one relies on the presumptive status of exemption in the case of a cow, and the convert is exempt from giving the gifts to the priest.

As Rav Ḥisda said, and Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches likewise: Eight instances of uncertainties were stated with regard to the convert; in four instances the halakha is that there is an obligation, and in the other four instances the halakha is that there is an exemption.

These are the four instances where the halakha is stringent: The first is an uncertainty with regard to the offering of one’s wife who gave birth, where it is uncertain whether she gave birth before her conversion and she is exempt from bringing an offering, or after her conversion and she is obligated. This case involves a prohibition, as a woman who does not bring her atonement offering is liable to receive karet for consuming sanctified items. And the second case is an uncertainty with regard to the obligation to separate ḥalla from his dough, which also involves a prohibition, as explained above. And the third case is an uncertainty with regard to a male firstborn non-kosher animal, i.e., a firstborn donkey, where it is uncertain if it was born before or after the owner’s conversion, which involves the prohibition against deriving benefit from it before its redemption. And the fourth case of an uncertainty is with regard to a male firstborn of a kosher animal, where it is uncertain if it was born before or after the owner’s conversion, where one can be liable to receive karet for slaughtering it outside the Temple courtyard. In these four cases, the halakha is that there is an obligation.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 134a explores whether a priest selling his animal to an Israelite can validly reserve the priestly gifts, contrasting conditional language with outright exclusion.