Talmud - Hullin 37a חולין ל״ז א׳

The Gemara asks: What is the resolution of the dilemma raised by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: When regard for sanctity is effective in rendering an item susceptible to impurity, is it only to disqualify that item itself, but to count the descending levels of first-degree impurity and second-degree impurity, it is not effective; or perhaps once it is rendered susceptible to impurity there is no difference whether it is rendered susceptible by means of regard for sanctity or by means of contact with liquids? The Gemara answers: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail.

This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where is it known that the flesh of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted by means of slaughter? The Gemara responds with a question: And from where would it enter your mind that it is prohibited? The Gemara explains that one may have thought it is prohibited, as it is written: “These are the living beings [haḥayya] that you may eat among all the animals that are on the earth” (Leviticus 11:2). One might have thought that the verse is saying: Eat an animal that is fit to live [ḥayya], but do not eat an animal that is not fit to live. And this animal in danger of imminent death is not fit to live.

The fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states that you shall not eat an unslaughtered animal carcass, as it is written: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21); one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now if an animal is prohibited while alive, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, and the prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass,” includes both. The Gemara answers: It would not enter your mind to say so, as it is written: “And if any animal of which you may eat dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). This indicates that it is after death that the Merciful One calls the animal a carcass; while alive, the animal is not called a carcass.

The Gemara questions that understanding. And perhaps, actually I will say to you: The halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, but if one slaughters the animal in danger of imminent death while alive, he would be in violation of a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat” (Leviticus 11:2), whereas after its death, he would be in violation of a prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21).

Rather, the fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states you shall not eat an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], as it is written: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa]” (Exodus 22:30). From here, one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now that an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking any limb is prohibited, is it necessary to state that a tereifa, an animal that was mauled and lacking body parts, is prohibited?

The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of a tereifa that is lacking body parts is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts, and both are included in the category of tereifa. This would render one who slaughters either to be in violation of both a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat,” and a prohibition: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa].” The Gemara questions that understanding: If so, why do I need the prohibition that the Merciful One writes with regard to an unslaughtered carcass? If while an animal is alive one stands in violation of a prohibition and a positive mitzva, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

The Gemara objects: And that is not a legitimate question, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as a tereifa that is lacking body parts, and is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts. Therefore, when the Torah writes the word “carcass,” it is the same as though it had written tereifa and the same as though it had written an animal in danger of imminent death. The Torah prohibits each, and the result will be that he will violate two prohibitions and a positive mitzva.

Rather, the fact that the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted is derived from here: “And the fat of a carcass and the fat of a tereifa may be used for any purpose; but you shall not eat it” (Leviticus 7:24). And the Master says: In order to derive what halakha is this verse written? Would one imagine that because it is an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa its fat would be permitted for consumption? The Torah states: Let the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists. One who eats the forbidden fat of an unslaughtered carcass is liable for violation of both prohibitions. Likewise, the word “tereifa” in the verse teaches: Let the prohibition against eating a tereifa come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists, so that one who eats the forbidden fat of a tereifa is liable for transgressing both prohibitions.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 37a discusses signs validating ritual slaughter of a dying animal, alongside an unresolved question about impurity susceptibility levels.