Talmud - Shabbat 148b שבת קמ״ח ב׳

If you say that, in order to draw water in an unusual manner, we should require a woman to spread a cloth over the vessel, she may come to violate the prohibition of squeezing water from the cloth. And if we would cover it with a lid, sometimes it is severed from the pitcher, and one will then come to tie it. Therefore, since it is impossible to require women to draw water any other way, women draw water on a Festival in the usual manner.

And Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Did we not learn in a mishna that one may not clap hands, or clap one’s hand against one’s body, or dance on a Festival? And we see, however, that people do these things, and we do not say anything to stop them. Abaye responded: And according to your reasoning, what about this halakha that Rava said: One may not sit on Shabbat at the entrance of a private alleyway next to the post, which delineates its boundaries, lest an object roll away into the public domain and he come to bring it back? And yet we see that women put down their jugs and sit at the entrance of the alleyway, and we do not say anything to stop them. Rather, in these matters we rely on a different principle: Leave the Jewish people alone, and do not rebuke them. It is better that they be unwitting in their halakhic violations and that they not be intentional sinners, for if they are told about these prohibitions they may not listen anyway.

There were those who understood from this statement that this halakha applies only to rabbinic prohibitions but not to Torah prohibitions, with regard to which we must certainly reprimand transgressors. However, that is not so. There is no difference between rabbinic prohibitions and Torah prohibitions. In both cases one does not reprimand those who violate unwittingly and would not listen to the reprimand. For the requirement of adding to Yom Kippur by beginning the fast while it is still day is from the Torah, and we see women who eat and drink on the eve of Yom Kippur up until nightfall, and we do not say anything to them. Thus, this rule, which applies to rabbinic prohibitions, applies to Torah prohibitions as well.

We learned in the mishna: And similarly, a woman may borrow loaves of bread from another on Shabbat. However, as in the previous halakha, she may not ask for them using the word loan. The Gemara asks: Is it only on Shabbat that it is prohibited, but on a weekday it seems well. Is it permitted to borrow bread as a loan on a weekday? If so, let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, for we learned in a mishna: And thus Hillel would say: A woman may not loan a loaf of bread to another until she calculates its monetary value, lest wheat become more valuable and they come to violate the prohibition against lending with interest. If the price of wheat rises and the borrower returns the same sized loaf of bread, she will have returned something of greater value than what she borrowed, and therefore she will have paid interest on her loan. From here we see that even on weekdays it is prohibited to borrow a loaf of bread from another person.

The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, we may distinguish between the cases such that there is no contradiction: This case, in which the mishna permits borrowing a loaf of bread as a loan, is applicable in a place where the price of the loaf is set, while this statement, which was said by Hillel, is applicable in a place where its price is not set.

The mishna taught further that if the lender does not trust the one who borrows from him on Shabbat or a Festival, the borrower may leave his cloak as collateral. On this topic, the Gemara cites that which was said in an amoraic dispute with regard to loans on a Festival: Rav Yosef said that such a loan cannot be claimed in court. Although the borrower is obligated to return the object or reimburse the lender, the lender cannot force him to do so by taking legal action. And Rabba said that such a loan is like any other type of loan and can be claimed in court. The Gemara explains these two positions: Rav Yosef said that a loan made on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, for if you say that it can be claimed, there is a concern that the lender may come to write the details of the loan on the Festival so that he can claim it later. Rabba said that it can be claimed, for if you say that it cannot be claimed, the lender will not give him anything to borrow, and the potential borrower will refrain from rejoicing on the Festival.

We learned in the mishna that if he does not trust him, he may leave his cloak with him as collateral. The Gemara attempts to show that this halakha supports Rav Yosef’s position: Granted, this halakha makes sense if you say that loans given on a Festival cannot be claimed, in accordance with Rav Yosef’s position. Due to this, he leaves his cloak with him and makes a calculation with him after Shabbat. However, if you say that loans given on a Festival can indeed be claimed in court, why then would he leave his cloak with him? Let him give him the item on loan and bring him to court if he does not return it. The Gemara rejects this argument because the lender can say: I do not want to stand in judgment before judges; he may prefer taking collateral so that he will not need to go to court at a later time.

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection to the view of Rav Yosef, based on a mishna pertaining to one who slaughters a cow and divides it among purchasers on Rosh HaShana of a year that follows the Sabbatical Year [shemitta]. Even during the times of the Temple, they were already celebrating two days of Rosh HaShana. The first day was possibly the last day of the month of Elul and possibly the first day of the month of Tishrei, which is the actual date of Rosh Hashana. The question therefore arises as to whether those who bought the meat of the cow initiated their debt on the final day of the Sabbatical Year, in which case the debts would be canceled, or whether the transactions took place on the first day of the following year, in which case the debts may still be collected. The mishna said that if it becomes clear that Elul of the previous year was a full thirty-day month, the Sabbatical Year cancels the debts because the very end of the Sabbatical Year cancels the ability to collect all previous debts. And if this was not the case, and the first day of Rosh HaShana was actually the first day of the new year, the Sabbatical Year does not cancel the loan.

Based on that mishna, Rav Idi bar Avin makes the following argument: If a loan given on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, what is the meaning of the word cancels? In any event, the lender could not have presented his claim against the borrower in court. The Gemara rejects this argument: It is different there, in an instance in which the month of Elul has thirty days, for it has become clear that the first day of Rosh HaShana was a regular weekday. The loan could therefore be claimed in court, if not for the fact that it was canceled by the Sabbatical Year.

The Gemara attempts to bring a different proof: Come and hear a proof for this from what we learned in the latter clause of that mishna: If the month of Elul did not turn out to be a full month, such that the first day of Rosh HaShana was actually the first day of the new year, the Sabbatical Year does not cancel the loan. Granted, if you say that a loan given on a Festival can be claimed, that which was taught that it does not cancel the loan is understandable. But if you say that it cannot be claimed, why does it teach that it does not cancel the loan? In any event, the lender cannot make a claim on it in court. The Gemara explains: A loan given on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, but since it has not been canceled, if the borrower gives him the money he may take it.

The Gemara is surprised at this statement: Does this prove by inference that, in the first clause of the mishna, if the borrower gives him the money, he may not take it? One does not have to refuse repayment of a loan that the Sabbatical Year has canceled. One is simply not allowed to demand repayment from the borrower. The Gemara explains the difference between the two clauses of the mishna: In the first clause of the mishna, in which the first day of Rosh HaShana turned out to be the last day of Elul, the lender must say to him: I relinquish my claim against you. However, in the latter clause of the mishna, in which the first day of Rosh HaShana is the first day of the new year, he does not need to say to him: I relinquish my claim. This is as we learned in a mishna: When one repays a debt during the Sabbatical Year, the lender should say to him: I relinquish my claim.

And if the borrower says to him: Nonetheless, I want to repay you, he may accept it due to that which is stated: “And this is the manner of the release [devar hashemitta], every creditor shall release that which he has lent to his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor or brother because the Lord’s Sabbatical Year has been proclaimed” (Deuteronomy 15:2). The manner of the release, devar hashemitta, can be rendered: The statement of release. The Sages derived that, although the creditor must verbally release the debtor from obligation, if the debtor persists in his desire to repay the debt, the creditor may accept payment. If, however, the loan was made after the Sabbatical Year, as is the case in the latter clause of the mishna, the creditor need not verbally release the debtor from obligation.

The Gemara relates that Rav Avya would take collateral for loans that he gave on a Festivals. Rabba bar Ulla would circumvent the issue by taking something from the borrower after the conclusion of the Festival and holding onto it until the repayment of the loan.

We learned in the mishna: And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem, when it occurs on Shabbat, one who needs to obtain an animal for the Paschal lamb may leave his cloak with the owner of the lamb as collateral and then make the appropriate calculations with him after the Festival. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A person may consecrate his Paschal lamb on Shabbat and his Festival peace-offering on the Festival. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna supports him? It states: And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem which occurred on Shabbat, one may leave one’s cloak with him and take his Paschal lamb and make the appropriate calculation with him after the Festival. Here, we see that the lamb itself is consecrated on Shabbat, which follows the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not necessarily the case, for with what are we dealing here? With a case in which one registers others to participate with him in bringing his Paschal lamb. In other words, the case is not one in which a person consecrates a previously unconsecrated animal but rather a case in which one allows others to join with him in registering for an animal that was already consecrated from the outset.

The Gemara challenges this: But we learned in a mishna: One may not initially register for an animal on the Festival. Therefore, even if the animal has been consecrated in advance, it is prohibited to register for it on the Festival, and it should certainly be prohibited to do so on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: The case here is different. Since each person who joins regularly registers together with him, the legal status of that person is like that of one who registered for it from the outset.

The Gemara raises another proof to the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan: But Rabbi Hoshaya taught: One who wants to bring a Paschal lamb and does not have his own lamb may go to a shepherd to whom he normally goes, and the shepherd may give him a lamb to be used for his Paschal lamb, and he may consecrate it and fulfill his obligation with it. This indicates that one may consecrate an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: There, too, it is referring to a special case. Since he normally goes to him every year, the shepherd has already consecrated it beforehand, prior to Shabbat. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But it taught that one may consecrate it, indicating that the animal is only now being consecrated. The Gemara answers: This is not an actual sanctification in the normal sense, but rather consecration by valuation. By consecrating their animals on their own, the owners add further sanctity to the offering. This process is merely rabbinic, and it may be performed on Shabbat according to all opinions.

The Gemara questions the very basis of this discussion: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this? But Rabbi Yoḥanan stated as a general principle that the halakha is always in accordance with an unattributed mishna, i.e., a mishna that does not mention the name of the Sage whose ruling is quoted in the mishna. And we learned in an unattributed mishna: One may not consecrate, or take a valuation vow, or consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple, or separate terumot or tithes; they said all of these prohibitions with regard to a Festival, and it is an a fortiori inference that these activities are prohibited on Shabbat as well. How, then, would Rabbi Yoḥanan have permitted sanctifying an animal on Shabbat or on a Festival? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the case in which Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it permitted, it is referring to obligations that have a set time, such that if the person does not consecrate the animal right now he will no longer be able to fulfill the mitzva. There, in the mishna that prohibits these activities, the prohibition is referring to obligations that do not have a set time, and one can therefore consecrate the animal after Shabbat.

MISHNA: One may count his guests who are coming to his meal and his appetizers, as long as he does so from memory; but one may not read them from a written list, the reason for which will be explained in the Gemara. A person may draw lots with his children and family members at the table on Shabbat, in order to determine who will receive which portion, as long as he does not intend to set a large portion against a small portion in such a lottery. Rather, the portions must be of equal size. And one may cast lots among the priests for sanctified foods on a Festival, but not for the specific portions.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Shabbat 148b explores drawing water on a Festival and the principle of not rebuking Jews for unwitting violations of rabbinic or Torah law.