Talmud - Hullin 4b חולין ד׳ ב׳

it is permitted immediately, due to the fact that they exchange the forbidden leavened bread in their possession with permitted leavened bread belonging to gentiles immediately after Passover.

The Sages who cited this proof assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? They assumed it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is forbidden after Passover by Torah law. The Gemara comments: And nevertheless it is taught that it is permitted due to the fact that the transgressors exchange their leavened bread with that of gentiles. Apparently, even one who performs transgressions does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, where the permitted food is easily accessible.

The Gemara asks: From where in the baraita can this be proven? Perhaps the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is prohibited after Passover by rabbinic law. And accordingly, when we are lenient it is with regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, whereas with regard to prohibitions by Torah law, e.g., the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass, we are not lenient.

The Gemara answers: And let the baraita be even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Does the tanna teach: As I say that they exchanged their leavened bread for the leavened bread of a gentile, which would indicate that it is an assumption? He teaches: Due to the fact that they exchange, as a statement of fact, as they certainly exchange. And if in cases involving prohibitions by rabbinic law the transgressor does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, then in prohibitions by Torah law is it not all the more so reasonable that he would not forsake the permitted in favor of the forbidden?

Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rava: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan, and even an uncircumcised man, and even a Jewish transgressor. The Gemara asks: This uncircumcised man, what are the circumstances? If we say that he is an uncircumcised man whose brothers died due to circumcision and the concern is that he might suffer a similar fate, clearly he may slaughter, as he is a full-fledged Jew and not a transgressor at all. Rather, it is obvious that he is a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised, as he refuses to be circumcised, and the tanna holds that he may nevertheless slaughter an animal since a transgressor concerning one matter is not a transgressor concerning the entire Torah.

Say the latter clause of the baraita: And even a Jewish transgressor. This transgressor, what are the circumstances? If he is a transgressor concerning another matter besides eating unslaughtered animal carcasses, that is identical to the case of a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised. Rather, is it not that he is a transgressor concerning the same matter of eating unslaughtered carcasses, and the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who said that one may even rely on the slaughter of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, ab initio?

The Gemara rejects that proof: No, actually I will say to you: The slaughter of a transgressor concerning the same matter is not valid. What is the reason? It is that since he has become accustomed to performance of that transgression, it is like a permitted act for him, and the concern is that he is not at all careful to slaughter the animal properly. Rather, the transgressor mentioned in the baraita is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Anan, as Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters.

§ The Gemara analyzes the matter itself: Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters, as we found with regard to Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, who partook of the feast prepared by Ahab, king of Israel, who was a transgressor with regard to idol worship, as it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him to go up with him to Ramoth Gilead” (II Chronicles 18:2).

The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps Ahab slaughtered the animals, but Jehoshaphat did not eat the meat of those animals. The Gemara explains: It is written: “And incited him,” indicating that there was an element of persuasion that presumably involved food. The Gemara challenges this explanation: And perhaps Ahab incited him with his words. The Gemara answers: There is no incitement with words.

The Gemara asks: And is there not incitement with words? But isn’t it written: “If your brother…entices you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7)? The Gemara answers: There too the incitement is with eating and with drinking. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written that God said to Satan, who denounced Job: “And you incited Me against him, to destroy him gratuitously” (Job 2:3)? Clearly Satan did not incite God with food and drink. The Gemara answers: Incitement against the One on High is different, as the term is used metaphorically. By contrast, incitement with regard to people involves food and drink.

The Gemara challenges: And perhaps Jehoshaphat drank at the feast but did not eat. The Gemara responds: What is different about drinking wine with Ahab that it would be permitted? It would be permitted because we say: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah and therefore his wine is not forbidden. With regard to eating a transgressor’s food too, a transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, the meat of an animal that he slaughters is not forbidden.

The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? With regard to drinking, Ahab’s wine is considered ordinary wine of gentiles, and the ordinary wine of gentiles was not yet prohibited, as the Sages issued that decree only several generations later. Therefore, it was permitted for Jehoshaphat to drink Ahab’s wine. But with regard to eating, I will say to you: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, it was prohibited for Jehoshaphat to eat the meat from the animals slaughtered by Ahab.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say: It is clear that Jehoshaphat ate at the feast, as it is not typical conduct of a king to drink wine without eating. And if you wish, say instead: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him,” is written, indicating: With what did Ahab incite Jehoshaphat? It was with slaughter of an animal. Apparently, it is permitted to eat from an animal slaughtered by a transgressor with regard to idol worship.

The Gemara suggests: And perhaps Obadiah, who was the majordomo of Ahab’s household and a righteous man, slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: “In abundance” is written, and Obadiah would not have managed to slaughter all the animals himself.

The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the seven thousand righteous people slaughtered the animals, as it is written: “And I will leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth that has not kissed it” (I Kings 19:18). The Gemara rejects that suggestion: They were hiding from Jezebel, Ahab’s wife, and would not have gone to the palace to slaughter animals for the feast.

The Gemara suggests: And perhaps, although Ahab was an idolater, the men in the employ of Ahab were upstanding people, not idolaters, and they slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind, as it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked” (Proverbs 29:12).

The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat were also not upstanding, and the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat ate, and the animals that Obadiah slaughtered, Jehoshaphat ate.

The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind; from the fact that it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked,” it may be inferred that if a ruler hearkens to matters of truth, all his servants are righteous.

The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, Ahab and his men ate, and the animals that the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat slaughtered, Jehoshaphat and his men ate.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 4b explores whether transgressors would swap forbidden leaven for permitted goods, debating Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon on Torah versus rabbinic prohibitions.