Talmud - Kiddushin 62b קידושין ס״ב ב׳

A convert requires the presence of three Jews for his conversion. What is the reason for this requirement? It is written with regard to a convert: “You shall have one manner of law, for the convert as for the homeborn” (Leviticus 24:22), which indicates that a conversion is considered a judgment that requires three judges. And if he requires three judges, who says that those three will be available to him? Since he cannot convert at a time of his choosing, it is not considered within his power to convert.

Rabbi Abba bar Memel objects to this: If that is so, and anything that is in one’s power to perform is not considered lacking in its action, one who gives one peruta to his Canaanite maidservant and says: You are hereby betrothed to me after I emancipate you, so too will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to emancipate her? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, the Canaanite maidservant initially had the legal status of an animal, i.e., she is not subject to betrothal at all, whereas now she has an independent mind. Once she has been emancipated she has the status of a Jew and is not considered the same person at all. Consequently, the attempted betrothal is certainly considered lacking an action.

The Gemara asks: But that which Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to one who gives one peruta to his wife and says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me after I divorce you, she is not betrothed, so too according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan will you say that it is a betrothal because he has the power to divorce her? The Gemara answers: Although he has the power to divorce her, does he have the power to betroth her against her will? It is not in his power to effect the betrothal, as once she has divorced him the matter is no longer exclusively dependent upon him.

The Gemara comments: Being that it is not in his power to effect the betrothal, you can use this logic to resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Oshaya: What is the halakha with regard to one who gives two perutot to a woman, and with one he says to her: Be betrothed to me today, and with the other one he says to her: Be betrothed to me after I divorce you? What is her status after he divorces her? That dilemma was left unanswered, and the Gemara suggests that you can resolve from here that it is not a betrothal. The Gemara explains that this case is different, and Rav Oshaya’s dilemma was actually as follows: Perhaps in that situation, just as the betrothal is effective now, it is also effective afterward. Since she is currently under her own authority and agrees to betroth herself to him, it is possible that she can now consent to a betrothal that will take effect at a later time.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not separate teruma from the detached for the attached, and if he separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. How so? If he said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed, he has not said anything of consequence, as the obligation to separate teruma applies only to detached produce. But if he said that the attached produce will be teruma when they will be detached, and they become detached, his statement is valid, as he has the power to detach them.

Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that even if one said: The detached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the attached produce of this garden bed, or: The attached produce of this garden bed will be teruma for the detached produce of this garden bed when they, i.e., the attached produce, will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, although at the time they had yet to ripen which means that the obligations of terumot and tithes do not apply to them, when they will reach one-third of their growth and are detached, his statement is upheld.

Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says this ruling only with regard to fodder, produce that has grown stalks even if it is not yet ripe. But he did not refer to produce that is still completely soft [agam]. Rav Yosef says: He even referred to soft produce. In relation to this dispute, the Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word agam is a term of growth [butzlana]? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar said that this is as the verse states: “Is it to bow down his head as a bulrush [ke’agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5), i.e., like a soft, drooping plant.

§ The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: With regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the other’s wife is not pregnant. But if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers: The baraita can be explained in accordance with everyone’s opinion. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, it is referring to a situation where her fetus was already noticeable, just as the stalks of fodder are recognizable. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, the halakha of the baraita applies even if her fetus was not yet noticeable.

And there are those who say a different version of this dispute. Rabba says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says his ruling only with regard to fodder of a non-irrigated field, which is not watered. But he did not speak about fodder of an irrigated field. Since the produce of this field will not grow on its own if it is not watered, it is not considered as if this produce has entered the world. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov referred even to fodder of an irrigated field, as this produce too is treated as having entered the world when it reaches the stage of fodder.

The Gemara asks: According to this version of the dispute, in accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in the following baraita: If one says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female she is betrothed to me, he has not said anything? And Rabbi Ḥanina says: They taught this only when his wife is not pregnant, but if his wife is pregnant his statement is upheld. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The baraita must be referring to a case where her fetus was noticeable, and therefore everyone agrees with this ruling. The baraita is in accordance with the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Yosef, as even Rav Yosef agrees that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov was referring only to fodder whose stalks were already noticeable.

Abaye says: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Meir all hold the following principle: A person can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world. That is, one can perform an act of acquisition for an item that is not yet in existence. The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov is referring to that which we just said, that one can separate teruma even for produce not yet included in this mitzva. Where does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi state a similar opinion? As it is taught in a baraita:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 62b explores conversion requiring three judges and analyzes conditional betrothal cases involving future emancipation or divorce.