Talmud - Kiddushin 48a קידושין מ״ח א׳

In the case of one who sells a promissory note to another, and he, the seller, went back and forgave the debtor his debt, it is forgiven, since the debtor essentially had a non-transferable obligation to the creditor alone. And even the creditor’s inheritor can forgive the debt. It can be explained that one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Since the man can forgive the debt, the woman will not rely on her ability to collect using the promissory note she has received for her betrothal. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, is not of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel; the woman relies on her ability to collect using the promissory note and is betrothed.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and here they disagree with regard to a woman who is becoming betrothed. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a woman relies on a promissory note she receives, since she says to herself: He would not leave aside my benefit and forgive the debt of others. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that even a woman who received the promissory note for betrothal does not rely on being able to collect the debt, since she is concerned he might forgive it.

Having enumerated several possibilities for the dispute in the case of a loan with a promissory note, the Gemara explains the dispute in the case of a loan by oral agreement: In the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan by oral agreement, with regard to what do they disagree? They disagree with regard to the statement of Rav Huna, who quoted a statement that Rav says, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, give it to so-and-so, if he stated this in the presence of all three parties, i.e., the one who had the money, the one who was the owner of the money, and the intended recipient, the intended recipient has acquired it.

One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that when Rav said that it can be acquired in the presence of all three parties, this applies in the case of a deposit, since the item is intact. But in the case of a loan, which is meant to be spent, he did not rule that it can be transferred this way, since there is no actual money but merely a debt. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds: There is no difference whether it is a loan or a deposit. The third party acquires it in both cases. A woman is therefore betrothed if he gave her a loan in the above manner.

The Gemara again suggests: Let us say that Rav’s statement that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan is subject to a dispute between tanna’im. A baraita teaches: If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with a document, Rabbi Meir says she is not betrothed, and Rabbi Elazar says she is betrothed, and the Rabbis say the court appraises the paper the document is written on: If the paper itself has the value of one peruta, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

The Gemara clarifies the case of this baraita: What are the circumstances of this document? If we say it is a promissory note of a debt owed him by others, then the statement of Rabbi Meir is difficult in light of another statement of Rabbi Meir, as he stated in the previous baraita that a woman can be betrothed by giving her a promissory note. Rather, this baraita must be referring to a promissory note of a debt owed him by her, and they disagree with regard to the halakha of one who betroths a woman with a loan.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that this is not necessarily so. With what are we dealing here? With a case where he betrothed her with a document of betrothal that had no witnesses to it.

And Rabbi Meir conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says with regard to a bill of divorce: Signatory witnesses on the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and the same applies to a document of betrothal. Since no witnesses signed the document, it cannot be used for betrothal. And Rabbi Elazar conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: Witnesses to the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce, and she is betrothed if the document was handed over in the presence of witnesses. And the Rabbis are uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. Therefore, they rule that the betrothal is not effected by means of the document, but it is betrothal effected by means of giving an item worth money. The court appraises the paper: If it has the value of one peruta, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

And if you wish, say instead that this baraita is referring to a case where he wrote the document of betrothal not for her sake, i.e., not for this particular woman’s sake. And they disagree with regard to a statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish asks: What is the halakha of a document of betrothal that the scribe wrote not for her sake? The Gemara clarifies the question: Do we juxtapose becoming a wife through betrothal to leaving a marriage through divorce and say: Just as in the document that causes her to leave the marriage we require that it be written for her sake, so too, in the document that causes her to become betrothed we require that it be written for her sake as well. Or perhaps we juxtapose different ways of becoming betrothed to each other: Just as in the act of becoming betrothed by means of money we do not require that money be minted for her sake and he can use any money, so too, with regard to the act of becoming betrothed by means of a document, we do not require that it be written for her sake.

After Reish Lakish raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: The verse states: “And she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). The verse thereby juxtaposes the verb becoming to the verb leaving, so a bill of divorce and a document of betrothal must be written for her sake to be valid. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, and maintains that she is not betrothed if the document was not written for her sake. And one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, is not of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish. The Rabbis remain uncertain, and therefore view the case as betrothal by means of giving an item worth money.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, and with what are we dealing here? With a case where he wrote the document for her sake but unbeknownst to her. And they disagree concerning the dispute between Rava and Ravina, and Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya, as it was stated that these amora’im engaged in a dispute with regard to the following issue: If he wrote a document of betrothal for her sake but unbeknownst to her and gave it to her for betrothal, Rava and Ravina say she is betrothed; Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say she is not betrothed.

The Gemara again suggests: Let us say that Rav’s statement that one cannot betroth a woman with a loan is subject to a dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: Make bracelets, earrings, and rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you as payment for your work, once he has made them she is betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this money mentioned by the Rabbis? If we say it means that very money, i.e., the jewelry she requested, then by inference the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, holds that even that same money is also not required to be given for her to be betrothed, but she is betrothed as soon as he made the jewelry. But with what does he betroth her? It is only with the jewelry that she is betrothed, since he has given her nothing but the jewelry. Rather, is the statement of the Rabbis not referring to when he betroths her with the other money, i.e., the payment she owes him for his service, and they hold that she is not betrothed? And conclude from it that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, since the payment she owes him for making the rings is like a loan.

The Gemara clarifies: And it must be they hold that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, i.e., the obligation to pay for a service begins when the hired party starts to work, and the sum owed increases as he proceeds. And it is therefore a loan, as when he gives her the finished article she was already obligated to pay for the work he had performed earlier. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this, i.e., that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that in the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is betrothed, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that in the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed?

The Gemara rejects this: No, it is possible that everyone agrees that in the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed, and here they in fact disagree over the question of whether or not the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 48a examines betrothal via a transferred promissory note or oral loan, weighing Shmuel's ruling against debt forgiveness by the creditor.