Talmud - Kiddushin 79a קידושין ע״ט א׳

both men who might have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce in order to render her permitted to marry someone else. And if they wish and agree between them, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her.

And similarly, with regard to a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and she then went and betrothed herself to someone else, if her own betrothal preceded that of the agent, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, and if that of her agent preceded hers, the agent’s betrothal is a valid betrothal. And if they do not know whose betrothal came first, both men who may have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce. And if they wish, one may give a bill of divorce and the other marries her.

GEMARA: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to one who betroths his daughter as well as with regard to a woman who betroths herself. As had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the father himself, one might say that it is because a man is expert with regard to lineage, and his decision to betroth his daughter on his own after having appointed an agent must have been due to the superior lineage of the man that he found willing to marry her. But with regard to a woman, who is not expert with regard to lineage, one might say her betrothal should not be considered a valid betrothal, as she still intends for her agent to be able to accept betrothal for her from a man with superior lineage.

And conversely, had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the woman herself, one might say that it is because a woman is particular about whom she marries, i.e., she is careful when selecting a husband for herself. Therefore, she would have chosen the partner she deems most suitable and would not want the agent to act on her behalf after she had found someone on her own. But with regard to the father, one might say that he does not care to the same extent, and he may authorize the agent to act in any case. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to include both cases.

§ It was stated that the amora’im discussed the following question: If her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, Rav said: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her. Therefore, even if he did betroth her at some point, his betrothal is assumed not to have taken effect. And Shmuel said: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them.

The Gemara clarifies the case: When did the father’s betrothal occur? If we say it occurred during the six months when the daughter was no longer a minor and had the status of a young woman, in that case would Rav say: She is a grown woman at present? It is reasonable to say that it is only now that she has reached her majority, i.e., assumed the status of a grown woman, and in that case her father’s betrothal should take effect, since a father can betroth his daughter when she is a young woman. Rav would not rule that the father’s betrothal is disregarded. Rather, perhaps it occurred after the six months had elapsed since she became a young woman. In that case would Shmuel say: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them? But doesn’t Shmuel say: The difference between the status of a young woman and the status of a grown woman is six months alone, after which the girl has the status of a grown woman, which means her father can no longer betroth her?

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he betrothed her on the day that these six months were completed. Rav said: She is a grown woman at present. There is therefore a presumption that since she is now a grown woman, she was also a grown woman when her father betrothed her in the morning. And Shmuel said: Perhaps it is only now that her signs indicating puberty came, but she might have still been a young woman when her father betrothed her.

The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a ritual bath? As we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 2:2): With regard to a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty se’a of water, which was then measured and found deficient in its quantity of water, what is the halakha? All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. This indicates that the current situation, i.e., the deficient ritual bath, is presumed to extend back until when it was known with certainty to have contained the requisite amount of water. In this case too, the woman should be considered a grown woman at the time of the first betrothal, and the second betrothal should not take effect.

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a ritual bath, it is different, since it can be said: Maintain an impure item in its presumptive status and say that it was not properly immersed. There, the presumptive status of the item being ritually impure is supported by the current state of the ritual bath, which is now deficient.

The Gemara continues to compare the two cases: On the contrary, it could be said: Maintain the ritual bath in its presumptive status, that it was known to have previously contained the requisite forty se’a, and say that it was not deficient at the time of the immersion and that the items should be considered ritually pure. The Gemara answers: There is a deficient ritual bath at present, which counteracts the presumptive status that it contained the requisite forty se’a. The Gemara asks: Here too, there is a grown woman before you, which should counteract the fact that she was previously a young woman. The Gemara answers: In this case, it is only now that she has reached her majority. The Gemara asks: There too, in the case of a ritual bath, one can also say it is only now that it has become deficient. Perhaps it contained the requisite forty se’a shortly beforehand.

The Gemara responds: There, in the case of the ritual bath, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, there is a deficient ritual bath at present; second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.

The Gemara poses another question: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a barrel? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:8): If one would inspect the contents of a barrel to see if it still contained enough wine to continually mentally separate teruma from it to exempt other untithed wine he had, until all the wine in that barrel would be teruma and would be given to a priest, and afterward the contents of the barrel were found to be vinegar, which cannot be set aside as teruma for untithed wine, then all three days after he had last inspected it is definitely viewed as having been wine, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is tithed. From then onward, more than three days after the previous inspection, it is uncertain as to whether it had already turned to vinegar, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is not tithed.

Before stating the difficulty with Shmuel’s opinion, the Gemara first clarifies the baraita. And we raised a contradiction between the halakha of the barrel and that of the ritual bath: What is different in that here, with regard to the ritual bath, the halakha is that the items are definitely impure, and what is different in that there, with regard to the barrel, it is only uncertain whether the produce remains untithed? In both cases the situation at present, the ritual bath being deficient and the contents of the barrel having turned to vinegar, should lead to a definite conclusion.

The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: And Rav Ḥanina from Syria says: Who is the tanna that taught the halakha of the barrel? It is Rabbi Shimon, who with regard to a ritual bath also considers it as a matter of uncertainty rather than as definitively impure. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the baraita and the mishna.

As it is taught in a baraita: All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in the ritual bath that was found to be deficient, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. And Rabbi Shimon says they are impure due to the uncertainty, and therefore, if the ritual bath was located in the public domain, they are pure, in accordance with the principle that uncertain cases of impurity in the public domain are deemed pure. But if the ritual bath was located in the private domain, the decision is suspended, i.e., if the impure items came into contact with teruma, one may not partake of the teruma due to the uncertainty, but it is also not burned as though it were definitely impure.

The Gemara returns to complete the difficulty with Shmuel’s opinion: But according to the Rabbis, who hold that in the case of the ritual bath the items are definitely impure, with regard to the wine that had been exempted from teruma by means of separating teruma from the contents of the barrel, that wine will be untithed produce retroactively, since they hold that the current status extends to the past. This is unlike the ruling of Shmuel, who ruled that in the case of the woman who was betrothed to two men it is uncertain to whom she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the barrel, it is different, as it can be said: Maintain the untithed produce in its presumptive status, as when it first grew it was definitely untithed, and say it was not fixed, i.e., exempted.

The Gemara asks: On the contrary, why not maintain the wine in its presumptive status, and say it had not turned to vinegar? The Gemara rejects this: That is impossible, as it is turned to vinegar at present. The Gemara replies: In the case of the betrothal, here too, she is a grown woman at present; what is the difference? The Gemara rejects this claim: With regard to the woman, it is possible that only now has she reached her majority. The Gemara challenges: Here too, it could be that it is only now that it has turned to vinegar, but not earlier.

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the barrel, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the wine is tithed: First, it is vinegar at present; second, the wine has a presumptive status of being untithed. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of a young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 79a examines conflicting betrothals arranged by an agent versus a father or the woman herself, weighing lineage concerns and personal choice in marriage.