Talmud - Kiddushin 60b קידושין ס׳ ב׳

What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Even Rav Huna agrees that she cannot marry someone else until she gives him the money. Until that point the bill of divorce does not come into effect and she remains married to the first man. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave him the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna it is a valid bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect from the moment he gives her the document. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda it is not a valid bill of divorce, as he maintains that the bill of divorce goes into effect only later, which is impossible as it is either torn or lost.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state both disputes, the one with regard to betrothal and the one with regard to divorce, as neither halakha could be derived from the other. As had it taught us only that the two Sages disagree with regard to betrothal, one might have said that it is there that Rav Huna says that the betrothal takes effect immediately, despite the fact that he must still give her the money, because betrothal comes to draw her near to him. Therefore, it is likely that he meant for the betrothal to take immediate effect. But with regard to divorce, when he comes to distance her, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce comes into effect only from the moment she gives him the money.

And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only with regard to this case concerning a bill of divorce, one might have claimed that Rav Huna says that the bill of divorce comes into immediate effect only in this situation, because he is not ashamed to demand the money from her whenever he wants, and therefore he divorces her immediately. But here, concerning a betrothal, when she is ashamed to claim the money from him, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the woman does not accept the betrothal until she actually receives the money. It is therefore necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda from a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:5): If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, even if the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. But she may not marry another man until she gives him the money. This ruling apparently accords with Rav Huna’s opinion that the bill of divorce goes into immediate effect from the moment it is given.

And it is further taught in a baraita: With regard to a man who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and he died childless, if she gave him the money she is not bound by a levirate bond to the yavam, as she is already divorced. But if she did not give him the money she is bound by a levirate bond to the yavam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she did not give it to her husband during his lifetime she may give the money to her late husband’s brother, or to his father, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is retroactively divorced.

The Gemara analyzes this ruling: The tanna’im disagree only with regard to the following: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that by the phrase: On the condition that you will give me, he meant: To me specifically but not to my heirs. Consequently, if she does not give the money to him she is not divorced, as she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the husband meant: Even to my heirs. In any event, everyone agrees that it is a condition and the divorce takes effect from the moment the bill of divorce is given. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the phrase: On the condition, indicates that an action should take effect now provided that a certain action is fulfilled later. And the Rabbis disagree with him, claiming that this expression does not mean that the action should take immediate effect, but only from when the condition is fulfilled. And Rav Yehuda would conclude by adding: And I spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in Babylonia we would say: With regard to that which Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states that the agreement will take effect retroactively from now, that is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, but the Rabbis disagree with him.

When I ascended to there, to Eretz Yisrael, I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying the following ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: All concede that with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, he is like one who states that the divorce will take effect retroactively from now. They disagreed only with regard to one who said to his wife: From today and after my death, whether he is considered to have added a condition or to have retracted from his initial statement.

And it is taught in a baraita that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is uncertain whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he has changed his mind from his initial intention of giving the document that day, and now wishes to give a bill of divorce after his death, which is not effective, or whether he was merely adding a condition that the bill of divorce should take effect from today only when he dies. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the tanna’im also disagree with regard to one who says to his wife: On the condition, instead of disagreeing with regard to the case where one says to his wife: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to a case where the husband used the expression: On the condition.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda maintains that they disagree over both cases, and the baraita taught the dispute in this manner to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that even if the husband says to his wife: From today and after my death, this is also a valid bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: And let them disagree with regard to a husband who says to his wife: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that it is not a valid bill of divorce even in that case. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency. It is always better to formulate a dispute in a manner that emphasizes the extent of the lenient opinion.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days have elapsed, if he gives her the money within the allotted time she is betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that this is the case. The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that the specified time period is not a proper condition, and he said so only to motivate himself to prove the sincerity of his intentions. The mishna therefore teaches us that the time period is an essential part of his condition, and if he fails to give her the money within this period the betrothal is void.

The mishna further teaches that if he says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I have two hundred dinars, if he in fact possesses the specified amount, she is betrothed, but if he does not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he has this sum, although he fails to show it to her. How can his betrothal be nullified if there is no conclusive evidence that he does not have the money? And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that we are concerned that perhaps he has the money.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which is not established in this case, as he has failed to demonstrate that he has the funds. By contrast, that case, in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal. The betrothal cannot be entirely disregarded, as he might have the money after all.

The mishna teaches that if a man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed and he must show her the money. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): This woman intended to see only his own money, not simply to be shown any two hundred dinars. With regard to the subsequent ruling of the mishna: And if he showed her the money on the table she is not betrothed, the Gemara comments: This is obvious, as the woman wants to see his own money. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach that even if he holds somebody else’s money as part of a joint business venture, nevertheless, as the money does not actually belong to him he has failed to fulfill the condition.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess tillable land of a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. If he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, and he shall show her. And if he showed her land in a valley, i.e., a field that does not belong to him among other fields, she is not betrothed.

GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that she is betrothed only if he actually possesses a beit kor of earth, the Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps he in fact possesses land of this size. And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a baraita that we are concerned in this situation that perhaps he possesses land of this size. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as this case, the one in the mishna, is referring to a definite betrothal, which has not yet been established because he has not proven he owns a field of this kind; and that case, the one in the baraita, is referring to an uncertain betrothal.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need this mishna to teach this halakha with regard to land, and why do I also need the previous mishna to teach the same ruling with regard to money? There is no clear difference between the two cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state the halakha in both cases, as had one mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to money one might have said that it is only in that case that it is uncertain whether she is betrothed, because people tend to hide their money, and therefore his financial status might not be well known. But in the case of land, you might say that if he had land this fact would generate publicity, as one cannot hide land. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is also possible for him to own land without people being aware of it.

§ The mishna teaches: If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: It is obvious that if he does not possess land in that place she is not betrothed, as that was precisely his condition. The Gemara explains that this ruling is necessary lest you say that he can say to her: What difference does it make to you whether the field is in that location or elsewhere, as even if it is farther away I will go to the trouble of bringing the produce from the field to our house, so what loss have you incurred? The mishna therefore teaches us that despite this claim the betrothal is invalid, due to his failure to fulfill the condition.

§ The mishna further teaches: If a one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. A Sage taught (Tosefta 3:6): The woman intended to see only his own land. The mishna further teaches: And if he showed her a plot of land in a valley, she is not betrothed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; after all, this land does not belong to him. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he maintains the field as a sharecropper [distora], i.e., he owns a share in it. Nevertheless, as the land does not belong to him she did not have this field in mind, and consequently she is not betrothed.

The Gemara comments: With regard to consecrated property, we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 25a):

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 60b examines the timing dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda over when betrothal and divorce legally take effect relative to payment.