Talmud - Kiddushin 7a קידושין ז׳ א׳

and I will be betrothed to you by means of these one hundred dinars that you give to that individual, she is betrothed, as derived from the halakha of a guarantor. How so? With regard to a guarantor, is it not the case that he commits himself to repaying the debt even though he receives no benefit, as the money from the loan is given to the debtor? And with regard to this woman too, even though she receives no benefit, as the one hundred dinars are given to someone else, nevertheless she commits and transfers herself to the man who gives the money.

The Gemara discusses a similar case: If a man gives one hundred dinars to a woman and says to her: Here are one hundred dinars for you, and with this money you become betrothed to so-and-so, she is betrothed, as derived from the halakha of emancipating a Canaanite slave. With regard to a Canaanite slave, is it not the case that he acquires himself and is freed when someone gives his master money to emancipate the slave, even though he loses nothing of his own? With regard to this man too, i.e., the third party, even though he loses nothing of his own, he acquires this woman by means of the other man’s payment.

The Gemara discusses a similar case: A woman says to a man: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and I will be betrothed to him. If he gives the money, she is betrothed, as is derived from a combination of the halakha of both of these cases, that of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. How so? With regard to a guarantor, is it not the case that he commits himself to repaying the debt even though he receives no benefit? With regard to this woman too, even though she receives no benefit, nevertheless she commits and transfers herself.

This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: Are these cases comparable? In the case of a guarantor, the one who acquires the item in question, which in this case is the commitment of the guarantor, is the one who loses money when he gives the loan. By contrast, in the situation at hand, this man, the third party, acquires the woman and loses nothing of his own. Therefore, the Gemara comments: The emancipating of a Canaanite slave can prove it, as he does not lose his own money and nevertheless he acquires himself.

This consideration alone is insufficient, as one could still ask: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a slave, the one who transfers ownership is the one who acquires it, as the master transfers ownership of the slave to the slave, and he himself acquires the money from the donor. Here, this woman transfers herself and she does not acquire anything. Rather, in this regard the case of a guarantor can prove it, as even though he receives no benefit from the creditor, nevertheless, he commits himself, just like the woman in this case. In this manner one can derive that the woman is betrothed in this case from a combination of those two halakhot.

Rava raises a dilemma: If a woman said to a man: Here are one hundred dinars and I will be betrothed to you, what is the halakha? Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: She is betrothed. Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: If so, this is an example of a case in which property that serves as a guarantee is acquired with property that is not guaranteed. Land is property that serves as a guarantee, and, as derived by way of a verbal analogy, the same applies to people. Money is property that does not serve as a guarantee. Through his acquisition of the money, this man acquires the woman as well.

Rav Ashi asks: But we learned the opposite in a mishna (26a): Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired with property that serves as a guarantee through giving money, through giving a document, or through taking possession of them. By contrast, property that serves as a guarantee cannot be acquired by means of acquiring property that does not serve as a guarantee. Mar Zutra said to Rav Ashi: Do you maintain that she wants her acquisition to be performed by means of money, i.e., he will acquire her as well through monetary acquisition? Not so, as here we are dealing with an important man, as, due to the benefit she receives from the fact that he consents to accept a gift from her, she agrees to transfer herself to him.

The Gemara reverts back to the earlier discussion with regard to the derivation from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. It was also stated in the name of Rava: And similarly, with regard to monetary matters, one can conduct a valid acquisition in the modes derived from the cases of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and monetary acquisitions.

The Gemara elaborates: As, had he taught us only the case of betrothal, one would have said that this halakha applies specifically in that case, because a woman is amenable to be betrothed with any form of benefit, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish said: There is a popular saying among women: It is better to sit as two bodies, i.e., be married, than to sit alone like a widow. A woman prefers any type of husband to being left alone. Consequently, she would be willing to commit herself to betrothal by any form of benefit. But with regard to monetary matters, one might say that these types of unusual acquisitions are not effective.

And conversely, if he had taught us only that this is the halakha with regard to monetary matters, one might have said that it applies solely to a case of this kind, because a monetary claim can be waived. One can relinquish his claim to money that is in someone else’s possession without receiving anything in return. But with regard to betrothal, which does not entirely depend on the will and agreement of the woman, as she must actually receive her betrothal money, one might say that the halakhot of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave are not comparable to this case. Therefore, it is necessary to state that this is the halakha in both cases.

§ Rava says that if a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to half of me, she is betrothed. But if he said to her: Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed. Abaye said to Rava: What is different between the two cases that if he says: Half of you is betrothed to me, she is not betrothed? Is it because the Merciful One states: “When a man takes a woman, and marries her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), indicating he must take “a woman,” and not half a woman? So too, the Merciful One states: “A man,” and not half a man.

Rava said to Abaye: How can these cases be compared? There, a woman is not eligible for two men. If one attempts to betroth half a woman it means he wants to leave her other half for someone else. This is impossible, as a woman cannot be married to two men. But isn’t a man eligible to marry two women? And when he declares: Be betrothed to half of me, this is what he is saying to her: If I wish to marry another woman, I will marry another woman.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But in a case where he says to her: Half of you is betrothed to me, let the betrothal spread through all of her, and she will be completely betrothed. Isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Temura 1:5) that if one says about an animal: The leg of this animal is a burnt-offering, all of it is a burnt-offering, as the sanctity of the leg spreads throughout the animal’s entire body?

Mar Zutra adds: And even according to the one who says that it is not entirely a burnt-offering, that statement applies only where he consecrated the leg of the animal, which is not a matter upon which the animal’s life depends. It is possible for an animal to survive the removal of a leg. But if one consecrates a matter upon which the animal’s life depends, everyone agrees that all of it is a burnt-offering. Here too, as the woman cannot survive without half of her body, why doesn’t the betrothal spread throughout all of her?

The Gemara rejects this opinion: Is it comparable? There, in the case of the animal, it involves a creature without intellectual capacity. Here, the issue depends on another mind, that of the woman herself. The woman must indicate that she wants the betrothal to be effective.

This case is comparable only to that halakha which Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to an animal that belongs to two partners, if one of them consecrated the half of it that belonged to him, and he goes back and acquires the other half from his partner and consecrates the other half, it is consecrated, despite the fact that it was consecrated on two separate occasions. But although it is consecrated, it may not be sacrificed, because when he first sanctified it the animal was not fit to be sacrificed. The consecration does not spread throughout the entire animal without the consent of the other partner. This flaw cannot be remedied and the animal is permanently disqualified from being sacrificed as an offering.

But, as it is consecrated now, this is enough to render a non-sacred animal that is exchanged with it a substitute. If one exchanges this animal with another, non-consecrated, animal, the second animal becomes consecrated as well. And yet its substitution is like it, i.e., it too is consecrated but may not be sacrificed either.

The Gemara comments: One can learn from the statement three halakhot.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 7a examines betrothal through third-party payments, drawing legal parallels to guarantor obligations and Canaanite slave emancipation cases.