Talmud - Kiddushin 63a קידושין ס״ג א׳

With regard to the verse: “You shall not deliver a slave to his master” (Deuteronomy 23:16), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse is speaking of one who acquires a slave, not to enslave him but in order to emancipate him. The court may not deliver the slave to this master, as this master has no right to enslave him. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: For example, if the new master wrote to the slave in his bill of manumission: When I will purchase you, you are hereby acquired to yourself from now. In that case the slave acquires himself from that moment, despite the fact that the buyer does not own him. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that a person can transfer an item that has not yet entered the world, as one can emancipate his slave before acquiring him.

Rabbi Meir also holds that one can transfer an entity that has not yet come into the world, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or: After I am emancipated, or: After you are emancipated, or: After your husband dies, or: After your sister dies, or: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: She is betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: She is not betrothed.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that in some of these cases, by Torah law she is betrothed. And for what reason did the Sages say she is not betrothed? Due to enmity. Giving betrothal to a married woman that will take effect after her husband dies can engender enmity between the woman and her husband. Giving betrothal to one sister that depends on the death of the other can engender enmity between the sisters. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintain that one can betroth a woman who is currently forbidden to him.

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi among those who maintain that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world. The reason it asks is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is merely called Rabbi above. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the same as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; they are one person.

The Gemara asks: And let us also count Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a mishna (see Nedarim 85a): If a woman stated a vow to her husband: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam, i.e., forbidden like an offering, for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks.

Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not legally entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him. That excess is an entity that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to this ruling that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: This is referring to a woman who says: Let my hands be sanctified to their Maker? She sanctifies her actual hands, and these hands exist in the world; therefore the vow takes effect.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will speak in your favor to the authorities, e.g., to help her address some legal matter, or: On the condition that I will act for you as a laborer, if he spoke in her favor to the authorities or acted for her as a laborer, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says: And this halakha applies only if he gave her an item worth one peruta at the time of the betrothal. She is not betrothed via his recommendation to the authorities or via the work itself, as these are merely conditions appended to the betrothal. The Gemara asks: And is she not betrothed by the monetary value of his recommendation or action? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me by the monetary value you received when I had you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you received when I had you sit on a wagon [karon], or: By the monetary value you received when I had you ride in a boat, she is not betrothed, as she has already done the action and therefore owes him this debt, and one cannot betroth a woman with a loan.

But if he says to her: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride on a donkey, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you sit on a wagon, or: By the monetary value you will receive when I will have you ride in a boat, she is betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, the baraita says: By the monetary value, which indicates that she is betrothed via this sum.

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that if a woman says to a man: Sit together with me and I will be betrothed to you, or: Perform entertainment before me, or: Dance before me, or: Perform work for me like this layer [dimus] of a building, the court appraises the monetary value of his action. If the action he performs for her is worth the value of one peruta, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. And if you would say that here too, it is referring to a case where he gave her an item worth one peruta, and the betrothal is with that; but the baraita says: The court appraises it. If this were merely a condition, there would be no need for an appraisal. Isn’t this a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish?

The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish could have said to you: This tanna of the baraita maintains that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired. Consequently, she is betrothed via money rather than by a loan. And the tanna of our mishna maintains that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end. Since the debt accumulates throughout the duration that the service is performed, by the time he has finished the work she owes him the entire sum, and a debt cannot be used for a betrothal.

The Gemara asks: And what forces Reish Lakish to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and that it is referring to a case where he gave her the value of one peruta? Why does he reject the possibility that the mishna is referring to one who did not give an extra peruta, and instead he betrothed her with the value of the service he performed, in accordance with the opinion that the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired?

The Gemara replies: Rava said that the mishna was difficult for Reish Lakish: Why does the tanna specifically teach: On the condition? Let him teach: By the monetary value, as stated in the baraita. Rather, conclude from it that any statement of: On the condition, is referring to a stipulation, and therefore the mishna must be dealing with a case where he has already given her the value of one peruta. Consequently, the value of his service cannot be the money for the betrothal itself, and instead serves as a later condition.

MISHNA: With regard to one who betroths a woman and says to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal, if his father wants it, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If the father dies, she is betrothed, despite the fact that he did not reveal his wishes. If the son dies, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal, so that the betrothal will never have taken effect, thereby enabling her to avoid the requirement of levirate marriage.

GEMARA: What is the meaning of: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal? If we say it means they are not married until his father says yes, indicating his agreement, then say the middle clause of the mishna: If the father dies, she is betrothed. But how can she be betrothed? After all, he did not say yes, and the condition was not fulfilled. Rather,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 63a explores whether one can legally transfer an item or betrothal that does not yet exist, debating slave manumission and conditional marriage vows.