Talmud - Kiddushin 60a קידושין ס׳ א׳

and another man came and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after ten days, she requires a bill of divorce from the first man and last man, but she does not require a bill of divorce from the middle one.

Abaye explains: This is the halakha whichever way you look at this case: If this expression is a condition that she should be betrothed from now if he does not retract within thirty days, the betrothal of the first man is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those other men are not betrothals. If it is a retraction, i.e., if after saying: From now, he changed his mind and delayed the moment of betrothal, then only that betrothal of the last one is a betrothal, whereas the betrothals of those first two men are not betrothals, as they both postponed their betrothals to a later date. Either way, the betrothal of the middle man is of no consequence.

The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case; what is the novelty of Abaye’s statement? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this formulation means a condition and also means a retraction, and therefore she should require a bill of divorce from each and every one of them, including the middle man, due to the uncertainty. It is possible the first man retracted while the second one imposed a condition, in which case only the betrothal of the second person takes effect. Abaye therefore teaches us that according to the opinion of Rav, the uncertainty concerns the meaning of this expression itself, and there is no uncertainty with regard to the intention of each individual person who says this formula. Consequently, there is no possibility that this woman is betrothed to the middle man.

Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if one hundred betrothed her in this manner, their betrothal is effective with regard to her. And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even the betrothal of one hundred is effective with regard to her. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan: These one hundred men have rendered themselves like a row [sheraga] of bricks, each and every one of whom leaves a gap for the other. Since there is a period of time before the betrothal of each man takes effect, another betrothal can intervene in the meantime.

Rav Ḥanina raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. And therefore if he dies she performs ḥalitza, but does not enter into levirate marriage. Since she might not be divorced, the obligation of levirate marriage applies to her, but in practice she cannot perform levirate marriage in case she was in fact divorced and is thereby forbidden to her late husband’s brother, a transgression which is punishable by karet.

Rav Ḥanina explains his objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, the baraita supports him, as Rav maintains that the meaning of this expression is uncertain. According to the opinion of Shmuel as well, although he claims that the phrase is a condition rather than a retraction, he can explain as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim in that case that it is uncertain if she is divorced, and I, Shmuel, say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that this is a phrase that leaves room for additional betrothals, in a case where he uses this phrase with regard to a bill of divorce, this should not be the halakha, as there is a principle: Any bill of divorce that leaves a remnant of the marital bond is not worth anything, as a bill of divorce must completely sever the marital bond between the husband and the wife. If this bond is not fully severed, she is not divorced. Therefore, her late husband’s brother should be allowed to enter into levirate marriage with her.

Rava said: Since a bill of divorce serves to remove a wife from her husband, and death also serves to remove her and dissolve their marital ties, permitting the woman to remarry, one can say that whatever part is left over from that bill of divorce is nevertheless completed by death, and therefore there is a complete act of severance. Abaye said to him: Are the two comparable; can these stages be viewed as completing one another? A bill of divorce removes her not only from her husband’s authority but also from the authority of the yavam, as a divorced woman does not perform levirate marriage, whereas death brings her into the authority of the yavam, because it renders her obligated in levirate marriage.

Rather, Abaye said: One must reject the above explanation, and ask what is the reason there for the concern about that bill of divorce, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It is not because the bill of divorce is in any way valid. Rather, it is a rabbinic decree due to the case of one who says to his wife: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die. Everyone agrees that this is a bill of divorce that goes into effect from that day if he dies. Since one might confuse the two cases, the Sages decreed that if one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, the bill of divorce is considered valid to the extent that the woman does not enter into levirate marriage.

The Gemara asks: But let us also issue a decree in a case where he said: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, that she should perform ḥalitza, due to its similarity to a bill of divorce that includes the stipulation: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death. The Gemara answers: The Sages do not require her to perform ḥalitza, as, if you say that she performs ḥalitza, people will mistakenly think that the yavam performed ḥalitza because he did not want to marry her, and if he had wanted to she could have entered into levirate marriage. In fact, she is divorced and is forbidden to the yavam, and a decree of this kind could mislead people and result in a later transgression.

The Gemara asks: Here too, in the case of where he says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today and after my death, if you say that she performs ḥalitza, people will mistakenly say that she could have entered into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: This concern is not important, as let her perform levirate marriage and there is no problem with that. The fact that she is treated as a divorcée and is forbidden to the brother-in-law is merely a concern of the Sages, who enacted a decree due to the similarity of the case where one says: This is hereby your bill of divorce from today if I die, whereas it is in fact not a bill of divorce and it is permitted for her to enter into levirate marriage.

MISHNA: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me with this peruta on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed immediately and he shall give her the money. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days, if he gave the money to her within thirty days she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed.

If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have two hundred dinars, she is betrothed if he has this sum. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed, and he shall show the money to her. And if he is a moneychanger and shows her money belonging to others on the moneychangers’ table, she is not betrothed, as his statement means that he will show her money of his own.

GEMARA: It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the text of this mishna: Rav Huna says that it reads: And he shall give, i.e., it is a valid betrothal from the outset, and the man is obligated to give her the promised amount. Rav Yehuda says that the correct version of the mishna is: When he gives, meaning that the betrothal takes effect only when he actually gives her the money. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says that the phrase: And he shall give, indicates that this is a condition stipulated by the man, which means that the woman is immediately betrothed and he merely proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says that the mishna reads: When he gives, which indicates that when he will give the money it will be a betrothal, but for now at least it is not a betrothal.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? Both agree that if he does not give her the money she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man during the period between the initial betrothal and the delivery of the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna the betrothal of the second man is not a valid betrothal, as he maintains that when the first man gives her the money the betrothal takes effect retroactively from the time of his earlier statement. According to the opinion of Rav Yehuda, the betrothal of the second man is a valid betrothal, as the betrothal of the first man does not take effect until after he actually gives her the money.

The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna concerning bills of divorce like this case (Gittin 74a): With regard to one who says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, she is divorced and she shall give him the two hundred dinars. It was stated that the amora’im disputed the correct version of this statement. Rav Huna says: And she shall give; Rav Yehuda says: When she gives. The reasons are as stated above in the discussion about betrothal: Rav Huna says: And she shall give, as it is a condition, and therefore she proceeds to fulfill the condition. Rav Yehuda says: When she gives, as when she will give the money to him it will be a valid bill of divorce, but now, in any event, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Kidushin 60a explores conflicting betrothal declarations involving multiple suitors and examines how conditional or retracted wording affects which marriage actually takes effect.