Talmud - Hullin 81b חולין פ״א ב׳

But even if one slaughtered the offspring as a burnt offering and sprinkled its blood, and afterward slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is exempt. The reason is that the slaughter of the first animal is not an act of slaughter subject to consumption, as a burnt offering is entirely burned upon the altar, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is an act of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not considered slaughter.

And Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Consumption by the altar is considered consumption. What is the reason? The reason is that the verse states with regard to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18).

The repetitive expression “he’akhol ye’akhel” teaches that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is human consumption, and the other one is consumption by the altar, and both are considered consumption with regard to piggul and other matters. Therefore, the slaughter of a burnt offering is considered slaughter that is fit for consumption, and the slaughter of a mother animal and its offspring, one of which is sacrificed as a burnt offering on the same day as the slaughter of the other, renders one liable to receive lashes even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition.

All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed.

GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Rabbis in the mishna taught that one is liable when one of the animals is slaughtered for the sake of idol worship only when he slaughtered the first animal for the sake of idol worship and the second animal for his own table. But if he slaughtered the first animal for his own table and the second animal for the sake of idol worship, he is exempt from lashes for the second act of slaughter, as he receives only the greater punishment, that for idol worship, which is death.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater punishment. Rather, sometimes, even if he slaughtered the first for his own table and the second for the sake of idol worship, he is liable to receive lashes for the second act of slaughter.

This occurs, for example, where the witnesses forewarned him before the second act of slaughter with regard to the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, but they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship. Since he is not punished for performing idol worship, he receives lashes for the less severe transgression. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Since, had they forewarned him with regard to idol worship he would have been exempt from lashes; therefore, even if they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship, he is also exempt from lashes.

The Gemara notes: And they each follow their known lines of reasoning in this matter. As when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty if one performed it intentionally, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, and they were forewarned with regard to the monetary penalty but not with regard to the lashes or the death penalty, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to pay; and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable; since they did not forewarn him with regard to the severe transgression, he sinned unwittingly, and he remains liable only to pay the monetary payment. And Reish Lakish says that he is exempt; since had they forewarned him with regard to the severe transgression, he would have been exempt from the monetary payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is also exempt.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both of these cases. As, if it were taught to us only about this case where one slaughters the mother for his private use and afterward slaughters its offspring for idol worship, perhaps only in this case involving the death penalty and lashes does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that even if they did not forewarn the transgressor with regard to idol worship, he is still exempt from lashes for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, because the death penalty and lashes are similar in that they are both corporal punishments, and so the obligation of lashes does not take effect at all when the death penalty is potentially applicable. But in that case, involving the death penalty or lashes together with a monetary payment, say that he agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the transgressor is liable to pay the monetary payment.

And if the disagreement was stated only with regard to that case, where one unwittingly performed a transgression involving the death penalty or lashes together with a transgression bearing a monetary payment, perhaps only in that case does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is liable to pay the monetary payment. But in this case, where one slaughtered an animal and its offspring, and the second animal was slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, which involves the death penalty and lashes, but without a forewarning with regard to the death penalty, say that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one is exempt from lashes. Therefore, it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both cases.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters the red heifer of purification exempt from punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as that act of slaughter does not render the animal fit for consumption. The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the red heifer of purification considered an act of slaughter that is unfit for consumption? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit for consumption?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 81b examines whether burning an offering on the altar counts as consumption for the law of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day.