Talmud - Hullin 129b חולין קכ״ט ב׳

to others, such as the limb and flesh from a living animal, which are forbidden even to gentiles, is not called food.

Rabbi Zeira questioned the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to Rabbi Asi: If Rabbi Shimon is discussing the first clause in the mishna, claiming that a hanging limb or flesh is pure during the lifetime of the animal, the reason for his statement is not necessarily that food that is forbidden to all people is not considered food. Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon there is that since the flesh or limb is still attached to the animal, it is considered attached.

As it is taught in a mishna (Okatzin 3:8): With regard to a branch of a fig tree that was detached from the tree and remains attached only to the bark of the tree, Rabbi Yehuda deems the figs on the branch not susceptible to impurity, as they are considered attached to the tree. And the Rabbis say: If it is possible to reattach the branch to the tree and the branch can continue to live and produce fruit, then it is considered attached to the tree, and the fruit is not susceptible to impurity. But if not, the fruit is susceptible to impurity. And we said to you, Rabbi Asi: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And you said to us: Since the branch is still attached to the bark of the tree, it is considered attached. Therefore, the same logic applies to the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yoḥanan is explaining the reasoning for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in the middle clause of the mishna, which teaches: If the animal was slaughtered, the limb and the flesh were rendered susceptible to impurity with the blood of the slaughtered animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible with the blood of the slaughtered animal.

Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The reason is that the verse states with regard to impurity as food: “From all food which may be eaten, that on which water comes shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that only food that you can feed to others, including gentiles, is called food in this regard, but food that you cannot feed to others, such as the limb and flesh from a living animal, is not called food.

Rabbi Zeira questioned this explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan as well, and said to Rabbi Asi: If it is with regard to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in the middle clause of the mishna, perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in that clause is not that food that is forbidden to all is not called food.

Rather, it is either in accordance with the explanation of Rava or in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan cited earlier (127b–128a). According to both explanations of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the mishna is discussing a case where only the body of the animal, but not the partially severed limb, came into contact with the blood of slaughter. According to Rava, the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is that the body of the animal serves the partially severed limb as a handle, and he holds that a handle of a food item transmits impurity to the attached food, but a handle that comes into contact with liquid does not render the attached food susceptible to impurity. And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Shimon holds that if one grasps a small part of a large item such that the large part does not ascend with the small part, the small part is not considered part of the item with regard to impurity (see 127b).

Rather, actually, one must explain the statement of Rabbi Shimon as it was explained originally, that he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna. And he is not referring to the case of a partially severed limb, but rather to the case of partially severed flesh. Therefore, the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If the animal died without slaughter, Rabbi Meir holds that the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity in order to impart impurity as food, and Rabbi Shimon deems the limb not susceptible to impurity even if it came into contact with liquid.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The reason is that the verse states with regard to impurity as food: “From all food which may be eaten, that on which water comes shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that only food that you can feed to others, including gentiles, is called food with regard to being susceptible to impurity as food, but food that you cannot feed to others, such as flesh from a living animal, which is forbidden even to gentiles, is not called food.

MISHNA: The limb and the flesh of a person that were partially severed and remain hanging from a person are ritually pure, although there is no potential for healing. If the person died, the hanging flesh is ritually pure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living person. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the flesh and the limb ritually pure.

GEMARA: The Gemara challenges the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the latter clause of the mishna: Whichever way you look at it, the ruling of Rabbi Shimon is difficult. If death renders a hanging limb fallen off, i.e., if after the person dies the hanging limb is considered to have fallen off his body beforehand, the limb should impart impurity as a limb severed from the living. And if death does not render a hanging limb fallen off, and the limb is considered attached to the body at the time of death, then the limb should impart impurity as a limb from a corpse.

The Gemara explains: This statement of Rabbi Shimon is not referring directly to the case in the mishna. Rather, the statement of Rabbi Shimon is referring to the matter of a limb that separates from a corpse in general. Rabbi Shimon inferred from that which the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, said: The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse, that evidently, in general the limb of a corpse imparts impurity. And in reference to this Rabbi Shimon said to him: In general, the limb of a corpse does not impart impurity, if it does not contain an olive-bulk of flesh.

Another pair of tanna’im had the same dispute as Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: I heard that a limb severed from the living imparts impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: May one infer from this statement that a limb from a living person imparts impurity but a limb from a corpse does not? But it can be inferred a fortiori that a limb from a corpse imparts impurity: If with regard to a living person, who is pure and does not impart impurity, nevertheless a limb that separates from him is impure, then with regard to a corpse, which is impure, all the more so is it not clear that the limb that separates from it is impure?

Furthermore, Rabbi Yehoshua adds that it is written in Megillat Ta’anit: On Minor Passover, i.e., the fourteenth of Iyyar, one does not eulogize. Should one infer from here that on Major Passover, i.e., the fourteenth of Nisan, it is permitted to eulogize? Clearly that is not the case. Rather, if one may not eulogize on the fourteenth of Iyyar, all the more so one may not eulogize on the fourteenth of Nisan. Here too, if a limb from a living person is impure, all the more so a limb from a corpse is impure. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Despite this reasoning, such is the ruling I heard from my teachers.

§The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to a partially severed limb of a person, after the person dies the limb imparts impurity as a limb from a living person but not as a limb from a corpse. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the impurity of a limb from a living person and the impurity of a limb from a corpse? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of an olive-bulk of flesh, or a bone the volume of a barley grain, that separates from the severed limb of a living person.

As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 6:3): In the case of an olive-bulk of flesh that separates from a limb severed from a living person, Rabbi Eliezer deems it impure, and Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure. In the case of a bone the volume of a barley-grain that separates from a limb severed from a living person, Rabbi Neḥunya deems it impure, and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure.

The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this dispute between tanna’im, it is possible to say that the difference between the first tanna in the mishna, i.e., Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Shimon is also with regard to the cases of an olive-bulk of flesh and a bone the size of a barley grain. Rabbi Meir states that the partially severed limb of a person imparts the impurity of a limb from a living person but not the impurity of a limb from a corpse. The difference between these two types of impurity is with regard to a case where either an olive-bulk of flesh or a bone the size of a barley grain was separated from the severed limb; Rabbi Neḥunya holds that flesh that separated from a limb of a living person is pure, but a bone that separated from a limb of a living person is impure, and Rabbi Eliezer holds vice versa. Rabbi Meir consequently holds in accordance with one of these two opinions. Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua that both a bone and flesh that separated from a limb of a living person are pure.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 129b examines Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning on impurity susceptibility of a hanging limb, debating attachment status versus food that is forbidden to everyone.