Talmud - Bava Kamma 26a בבא קמא כ״ו א׳

The Gemara asks: Are we saying that based on the a fortiori inference one should have to pay the full cost of the damage caused in the public domain for Eating and Trampling? That would be false, as the verse indicating one’s liability to pay the full cost of the damage limits the application to damage caused in “the field of another.” We are saying only that he should be liable for half the cost of the damage there, just as with regard to Goring.

The Gemara rejects this as well: This is also incorrect, as the verse states with regard to the payment of half the damages: “And divide its monetary value” (Exodus 21:35). The use of the expression “its monetary value,” and not “the monetary value,” emphasizes that it is specifically the price of this ox that caused damage classified as Goring whose money will be divided, i.e., the owner of the ox will be obligated to pay half the cost of the damage, but not the price of another, i.e., not in other cases of damage caused by one’s ox.

The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: And let one be held liable to pay only half the cost of the damage caused by Eating and Trampling even if the incident took place on the property of the injured party. This can be inferred via an a fortiori inference drawn from Goring, as follows: And if for damage classified as Goring, which is governed by a stricter halakha, as one is held liable for damage classified as Goring even if it occurs in the public domain, yet one nevertheless pays only half the cost of the damage caused on the property of the injured party, then with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, which are governed by more lenient halakhot, as one is completely exempt from liability for damage caused in the public domain, is it not right that he should have to pay only half the cost of the damage caused on the property of the injured party?

The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to Eating and Trampling: “The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay” (Exodus 22:4). The intent of the verse is to emphasize that the owner of the ox pays a proper, meaning complete, amount of payment, and not half the cost of the damage.

The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: And let one not be held liable at all with regard to damage classified as Goring in the public domain. This can be inferred via an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if for damage classified as Eating and Trampling, for which one is liable to pay the full cost of the damage for incidents that took place on the property of the injured party, one is completely exempt for damage caused in the public domain, then with regard to damage classified as Goring, which is governed by a more lenient halakha, as one is held liable for only half the cost of the damage caused on the property of the injured party, is it not right that one should be exempt in the public domain?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse states in reference to an innocuous ox: “And the carcass they shall also divide” (Exodus 21:35), to indicate that there is no difference with regard to the payment of half the cost of the damage, whether the damage occurs in a public domain or whether it occurs on private property.

The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: And let a person who inadvertently kills another be liable to pay ransom. This can be inferred via an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if the owner of an ox, who is not liable to pay the four types of indemnity, i.e., pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, if his ox injures a person, is nevertheless liable to pay ransom if it killed someone, then with regard to a person, who is liable to pay the four types of indemnity if he injures another, is it not right that he should be liable to pay ransom if he were to kill him?

The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to an ox killing a person: “He shall give for the redemption of his life whatever is imposed upon him” (Exodus 21:30). “Upon him”: This means upon the owner of an ox who kills a person, but not upon a person who kills another.

The Gemara suggests the reverse derivation: And let the owner of an ox that injured a person be liable to pay the four types of indemnity. This can be inferred via an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if a person, who is not obligated to pay ransom if he kills someone, is nevertheless liable to pay four types of indemnity if he injures another, then with regard to the owner of an ox, who is liable to pay ransom, is it not right that he should also be liable to pay the four types of indemnity?

The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to this matter: “And if a man maims another” (Leviticus 24:19), from which it can be derived that this halakha applies when a man harms another person but not when an ox harms another person.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to Trampling, in the case of an animal that tramples a child in the courtyard of the injured party and kills the child, what is the halakha with regard to the liability of the owner of the animal to pay ransom? The Gemara explains the different sides of the question: Do we say that this halakha is just as it is with regard to Goring? Accordingly, just as with regard to Goring, once an animal has gored two or three times this becomes defined as its usual manner and therefore it is deemed forewarned and the owner must pay ransom in the event that it kills a person by an act classified as Goring, here too it is not different, as with regard to the category of Trampling the owner is deemed forewarned from the start and he must therefore pay ransom.

Or perhaps, should we say that the halakha with regard to Goring is more stringent, as Goring requires the animal’s intent to cause damage, and that is why the owner must pay ransom in the event of a death; but in a case of Trampling, where there is no intent to cause damage, the owner would be exempt from paying ransom?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from a baraita: If one brought his ox into the courtyard of a homeowner without his permission, and it gored the homeowner and he died, the ox is killed by stoning and the owner of the ox is obligated to pay the full amount of the ransom, regardless of whether the animal was innocuous or forewarned. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

The Gemara proceeds to clarify: From where does Rabbi Tarfon derive that with regard to an innocuous ox the owner must also pay the full amount of the ransom? Is it not because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the owner of an innocuous ox that killed a person pays half the ransom if the incident took place in the public domain? And he derived this ruling via an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of Trampling: And if in a case of Trampling, for which one is exempted entirely from liability when it occurs in the public domain, one must nevertheless pay the full ransom if the incident took place on the property of the injured party, with regard to Goring, for which one must pay half the ransom when it occurs in the public domain, is it not right that one should be obligated to pay full ransom for an incident that took place on the property of the injured party? Evidently, it is clear that there is a ransom payment in the case of Trampling.

Rav Shimi of Neharde’a said: It is possible to explain that the tanna derived his a fortiori inference from damage caused by Trampling: And if in a case of Trampling, for which one is completely exempt from liability when it happens in the public domain, one pays the full cost of the damage done on the property of the injured party, with regard to Goring, for which one must pay half the ransom payment if the ox kills a person in the public domain, is it not right that one would certainly be obligated to pay the full ransom if the person was killed on his own property? According to this reasoning there is no indication that one pays a ransom payment in the case of a child that was killed by Trampling.

The Gemara asks: But if this is the basis for Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion, let the Gemara refute it in this way: What can be learned about ransom from damage caused by Trampling? These same halakhot apply to Fire; nevertheless, there is no obligation to pay ransom when a person is killed by Fire, as was stated explicitly in a baraita above (10a). Consequently, the attempt to derive an a fortiori inference about ransom from Trampling is obviously flawed. The Gemara answers: The a fortiori inference can be based on the damage to concealed articles caused by Trampling on the property of the injured party. One would be exempt for damage such as this if it were caused by Fire.

The Gemara responds to this challenge with a different one: What is notable about damage to concealed articles caused by Trampling? It is notable in that these same halakhot apply to the category of Pit, but nevertheless there is no ransom paid if a person is killed by a pit. Consequently, an attempt to derive an a fortiori inference about ransom from this halakha is obviously flawed. The Gemara answers: The a fortiori inference can be based on damage caused to vessels by Trampling on the property of the injured party. One would be exempt for damage of this nature if it were caused by a pit.

The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about damage caused to vessels by Trampling? It is notable in that these same halakhot apply to the category of Fire. The Gemara answers: The a fortiori inference can be based on damage caused to concealed vessels by Trampling. In this case, one would be liable for Trampling but exempt from liability for both Fire and Pit, so this can be the basis for the ransom payment, via the a fortiori inference stated by Rav Shimi of Neharde’a. The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about damage caused to concealed vessels by Trampling? It is notable in that these same halakhot apply to the category of Man, as a person is liable for damage to these items but does not pay ransom if he inadvertently kills another person.

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that since the halakhot of the ransom payment with regard to Goring cannot be deduced from the halakhot of damages with regard to Trampling, the tanna derived his a fortiori inference based on the halakhot of ransom in a case of Trampling, and therefore it may be concluded that apparently there is ransom in a case of Trampling? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so. Consequently, in the case of a child trampled to death by Trampling while on his parents’ property, the owner of the animal must pay ransom.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: So too, it is reasonable to say that there is an obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling, as, if it enters your mind to say that there is no obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling, and the tanna derived his a fortiori inference from damage caused by Trampling, let the Gemara refute it in this way: What is notable about damage caused by Trampling? It is notable in that these same halakhot apply to Trampling, while there is no obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling. In other words, it would be possible to derive the obligation to pay a full ransom where a person was killed by the Goring of an innocuous ox while on the property of the victim only if there is also an obligation to pay ransom where the person was killed by Trampling.

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that an a fortiori inference must be based on the obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling, and therefore it may be concluded that evidently, there is an obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

MISHNA: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned. Therefore, whether the damage was unintentional or intentional, whether he was awake while he caused the damage or asleep, whether he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full cost of the damage.

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It teaches in the mishna: He blinded another’s eye, and presumably this is similar to the other example: Broke vessels. From this it can be inferred that just as there, in the case of the broken vessels, yes, one must pay for the damage he caused but he does not pay the four types of indemnity, so too, in a case where he blinds another, yes, he must pay for the damage he caused, but he does not pay the four types of indemnity, since he caused the injury while asleep or unintentionally.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bava Kamma 26a explores Talmudic reasoning on liability for damage by Eating and Trampling versus Goring, debating full versus half payment obligations.