Talmud - Bava Kamma 18a בבא קמא י״ח א׳

The dispute concerns a case where the chicken propelled pebbles from underfoot as it was hopping, and it is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Sumakhos and the Rabbis, cited earlier, that the tanna’im in the baraita disagree. One tanna holds that the owner pays the full cost of the damage for pebbles propelled by an animal in the course of its walking, and the other tanna holds that its owner pays half the cost of the damage.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an additional attempt to resolve the dilemma from a baraita: In a case where chickens were pecking at the rope tied to a bucket and the rope was severed and the bucket fell and broke, the owner of the chickens pays the full cost of the damage. Conclude from the baraita that we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage in determining liability for damage. The Gemara rejects this conclusion, and one cannot adduce proof from the baraita. Interpret instead that the reference in the baraita is to the damage caused to the rope, while the owner pays only half the cost of the damage for breaking the bucket.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t eating a rope atypical behavior for a chicken, and therefore it should be classified within the primary category of Goring, not the primary category of Eating? Why then must the owner of the chicken pay the full cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The reference in the baraita is to a case where the rope was filthy [ma’us] with kneaded dough, and in those circumstances it is typical for a chicken to peck at it. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna teach in the baraita: And the bucket broke, indicating that the dispute is with regard to damage done to the bucket, not to the rope? The Gemara explains: Rather, this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says: In the case of pebbles propelled by an animal, the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, say the latter clause of the baraita: If a shard was propelled from the bucket broken by a chicken and it fell upon another vessel and broke it, the owner of the chicken pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, and half the cost of the damage for the second one. And if the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, is he of the opinion that one pays half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles?

And if you would say that there is a difference, according to Sumakhos, between damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action, e.g., pebbles, and damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by its action, e.g., damage caused by the shard of the bucket, and in the latter case Sumakhos concedes that the owner pays half the cost of the damage, that would result in a difficulty. The Gemara asks: But what of this dilemma raised by Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Sumakhos, what is the halakha with regard to damage caused by a force generated by a force generated by the animal’s action? Is the status of that secondary force like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action, in which case the owner is liable, or is its status not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action?

Why did Rav Ashi state his dilemma; why did he not resolve the dilemma and conclude that according to Sumakhos its status is not like that of damage caused by a force generated by its action? Since Rav Ashi does not resolve the dilemma based on this baraita, apparently, Sumakhos does not distinguish between the two types of force.

The Gemara suggests: Rather, is it not so that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and conclude from the baraita that we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage when determining one’s liability for the damage. Therefore, an owner is liable for any damage resulting from his animal’s typical behavior, and he pays the full cost of the damage done to the bucket even if the damage took place in another location.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: There is no proof from the baraita, as it could be explained that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the bucket is continually propelled from the impetus of the chicken, who caused the bucket to break. That is why the ruling in the baraita is that the owner of the chicken pays the full cost of the damage. The dilemma with regard to the case where an animal treads upon a vessel that rolls away and breaks elsewhere remains unresolved.

§ Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one’s liability to pay half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of a walking animal, does the owner of the animal pay restitution exclusively from the body of the animal, just as one pays half the cost of the damage caused by an innocuous ox with regard to damage categorized under the primary category of Goring? Or does he pay restitution from his superior-quality land, as he does for other forms of damage? The Gemara elaborates: Does he pay restitution exclusively from the body of the animal, as we do not find any case where one pays half the cost of the damage from his superior-quality land? Or perhaps he pays restitution from his superior-quality land, as we do not find any case where an animal causes damage in its typical manner where the owner pays restitution exclusively from the body of his animal?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: With regard to hopping, a chicken is not deemed forewarned. And some say that it is forewarned. The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: Does it enter your mind to raise the possibility that a chicken is not forewarned with regard to hopping? Hopping is the typical manner of movement for chickens. Rather, is it not that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused the damage?

And it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: The one who says that the chicken is not deemed forewarned holds that its owner pays restitution from the body of the animal, as is the halakha when an innocuous animal gores, while the one who says that the chicken is forewarned holds that he pays restitution from his superior-quality land, as is the halakha when a forewarned animal causes damage. According to this analysis, Rava’s dilemma is the subject of a tannaitic dispute.

The Gemara rejects this: No, perhaps the dispute in the baraita is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Sumakhos and the Rabbis with regard to the legal status of damage caused by a force generated by the animal’s action. It is with regard to the similarity of damage caused by an action performed by an animal’s body to the case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused the damage that the tanna’im in the baraita disagree.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from a mishna (21b): If the dog took a loaf [ḥarara] that was baking on hot coals and went to a stack of grain to eat the loaf, and the dog ate the loaf and ignited the stack of grain with one of the coals attached to the loaf, the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage for the damage to the loaf, as it is classified in the primary category of Eating, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the damage to the stack of grain. Rabbi Elazar says: He pays the full cost of the damage for the damage to the stack of grain as well.

What is the reason that the first tanna holds that the owner pays half the cost of the damage caused to the stack of grain? Is it not due to the fact that it is analogous to propelling pebbles, as the coal fell from the loaf held in its mouth and ignited the grain? And it is taught in a baraita in that regard that when the first tanna said that he pays half the cost of the damage, he pays restitution exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of his animal. Apparently, half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles is paid from the body of the animal that caused the damage.

The Gemara rejects this explanation: And can you understand the baraita in that way? According to that understanding, with regard to Rabbi Elazar, who disagrees with the first tanna and holds that the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage caused to the grain, do we find anywhere that according to Rabbi Elazar one pays restitution exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of his animal?

Rather, the baraita can be explained in a case where the dog acted atypically with this coal with which he lit the stack of grain. Since the dog’s behavior was atypical, the damage is classified under the primary category of Goring, not under the category of Eating. And Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says in a mishna (24b): The halakha of Goring in the courtyard of the injured party is atypical, as there, the owner of the ox pays the full cost of the damage, in contrast to half the cost of the damage that he pays when it transpires in the public domain. Nevertheless, since it was an innocuous animal that caused the damage, restitution is paid from its body.

The Gemara rejects that explanation: But that is not so. What is the reason that you interpreted that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon? It is due to the difficulty presented by the halakha that he pays the full cost of the damage exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of the animal, which would not be so according to Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara suggests: There is an alternative explanation. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says that one pays the full cost of the damage caused by pebbles, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to a forewarned ox: The aspect of innocuousness, which dictates that the owner pays half the cost of the damage from the body of the ox, remains intact. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the owner of a forewarned ox pays half the cost of the damage from the body of his ox and half the cost of the damage from his superior-quality land. And when the tanna of the baraita teaches that the owner pays restitution from the body of his animal, the reference is to the aspect of innocuousness, i.e., half the cost of the damage. He pays the other half from his superior-quality land as he would in the case of any forewarned animal.

Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda stated that the aspect of innocuousness remains intact with regard to damage categorized under the primary category of Goring, where the ox was initially innocuous and then became forewarned. In the case of propelled pebbles, which is a subcategory of Trampling, where the ox is forewarned from the outset,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 18a examines liability for damage from chickens scattering pebbles or severing a rope, weighing Sumakhos's view against the rabbis on full versus partial payment.