Talmud - Bava Kamma 15a בבא קמא ט״ו א׳

free men and members of the covenant. The mishna states: Free men, to exclude Canaanite slaves from being valid witnesses, and it states: Members of the covenant, to exclude gentiles.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to teach both exceptions, as had the Torah taught us only about a slave, I might have presumed that he is disqualified from serving as a witness because he has no lineage, i.e., the child of a Canaanite slave is not legally considered to be his child in any sense; but a free gentile, who has lineage, I might say no, he is qualified. And similarly, had the Torah taught us only about a gentile, I might have presumed that he is disqualified from serving as a witness because he has no connection to the mitzvot of the Torah; but with regard to a Canaanite slave, who does have a connection to the mitzvot, as he is obligated to keep the mitzvot that a woman is obligated to keep, I might say no, he is qualified. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both exceptions.

§ The mishna continues: And women are included in the halakhot of damages in the same way as men. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived?

The Gemara presents three sources for this halakha. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states with regard to the liability of one who takes a false oath that he had not stolen: “When a man or woman shall commit any of the sins of a person” (Numbers 5:6). The verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah.

The school of Rabbi Elazar taught: The verse states with regard to the civil laws given following the revelation at Sinai: “And these are the civil laws that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). The reference to “them” in the verse is referring to all those who stood at the revelation, both men and women. The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all civil laws in the Torah.

The school of Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili taught: The verse states with regard to liability in a case where one’s ox kills a person: “And it killed a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:29). The verse thereby equates a woman with a man with regard to all killings in the Torah, i.e., the liability incurred is the same whether the person killed was a man or a woman.

The Gemara notes: And all three sources are necessary, as had the Torah taught us only the first source, one might have said that it is there that men and women are equated, as the Merciful One had pity upon a woman and made her liable in order that she should achieve atonement through paying restitution. But with regard to civil law, one might say that for a man, who is involved in business dealings, yes, the civil laws apply to him, but to a woman, who generally is not involved in business dealings, the laws do not apply.

And had the Torah taught us only that men and women are equated in civil law, one might have said that this is in order that she should be able to sustain herself by engaging in business dealings. If civil laws did not apply to a woman, one would be wary about conducting business with her. But with regard to obligating a woman to achieve atonement, one might have said that a man, who is obligated in mitzvot, yes, he is similarly obligated to achieve atonement; but a woman, who is not obligated in all the mitzvot to the same extent as a man, no, the obligation does not apply to her.

And had the Torah taught us only these first two sources, one might have limited the fact that a woman and man are equated to these two cases, here due to the fact that she also needs atonement, and there due to the fact that she needs to be able to sustain herself. But with regard to one’s liability for his ox killing a person, one might have said that only for killing a man, who is obligated in all mitzvot, yes, the owner of the ox is liable to pay a ransom; but for killing a woman, who is not obligated in all mitzvot, one might say he is not liable.

And had the Torah taught us only the equivalence of a man and woman with regard to a ransom, one might have thought that this is because it is a very serious matter as there is a loss of life, but in these first two sources, where there is not a loss of life, I would say no, a woman is not included. Accordingly, it is necessary to have all three sources.

§ The mishna continues: And both the injured party and the one liable for the damage are involved in the payment.

An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to the payment of half the cost of the damage made when one’s innocuous ox gores another’s animal. Rav Pappa says: It is monetary restitution for the injured party’s loss. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: It is a fine.

The Gemara elucidates: Rav Pappa says: The payment is monetary restitution, as he holds that even ordinary oxen, which have not been forewarned with regard to Goring, are not presumed to be safeguarded, as their nature does not prevent them from acting in a belligerent manner. Therefore, the owner is responsible to safeguard them, to prevent them from doing so. Accordingly, if an ox causes damage by goring, by right it should have been that the owner needs to pay the full cost of the damage. Nevertheless, the Merciful One had pity upon him, as his ox had not yet been forewarned and he was not fully aware of the possibility that it might gore, and accordingly, the Torah reduced the extent of his liability.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: It is a fine, as he holds that ordinary oxen are presumed to be safeguarded, as their nature prevents them from acting in a belligerent manner. Therefore, the owner is not responsible for safeguarding them to prevent them from doing so. Accordingly, if an ox causes damage by goring, by right it should have been that the owner does not pay at all. Nevertheless, the Merciful One penalized him in order that he will safeguard his ox, even before it is forewarned, and decreed that the fine should be given to the injured party even though he is not really entitled to be compensated for his loss.

We learned in the mishna: Both the injured party and the one liable for the damage are involved in the payment. Granted, according to the one who says that the payment of half the cost of the damage is monetary restitution, this assumes that the injured party is theoretically entitled to receive the full value of his damaged animal but in practice receives only half. This is what the mishna means by saying that the injured party is also involved in the payment, because it is as though he is compelled to forgo half of the cost of the damage that by right he should be paid. But according to the one who says that the payment of half the cost of the damage is a fine, which assumes that the injured party is not really entitled to be compensated for his loss, now that even the money that he takes is not his by right, is it accurate to describe him as being involved in the payment?

The Gemara explains: The mishna’s statement is necessary only with regard to the fact that the injured party is the one who absorbs the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass between the animal’s death and the time that the case is brought before the court. Since he must absorb this financial loss, it may be said that he is involved in the payment.

The Gemara asks: How can one claim that the mishna is referring to the diminishing value of the carcass? Isn’t it already taught in the first clause of the mishna, which by using the term: Payments of restitution for damage, teaches that the owner of the injured animal attends to, i.e., retains ownership of, the animal carcass? And therefore it follows that he bears any depreciation in its value, as the Gemara (10b) explained above.

The Gemara explains why the mishna needs to teach this principle twice: One mention is made with regard to an innocuous ox and the other one is made with regard to a forewarned ox.

And it is necessary to state both cases, because if it would teach us the principle only with regard to an innocuous ox, I might say that only there does the Torah limit the liability of the owner of the ox, because it has not yet been forewarned. But with regard to a forewarned ox, I would say the Torah does not limit the owner’s liability at all and the owner must also bear the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass. And similarly, if it would teach us the principle only with regard to a forewarned ox, I might say that only there does the Torah limit the owner’s liability because he is paying the full cost of the damage, so the Torah does not overly burden him. But with regard to an innocuous ox, where he is liable for only half of the damage, I would say the Torah does not limit his liability any further, so he must bear the loss of the diminishing value of the carcass. Therefore, it is necessary to state the principle in both cases.

The Gemara attempts to prove whether the payment of half the cost of the damage is considered to be monetary restitution or a fine: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (16b): What is the difference between the liability incurred for damage caused by an innocuous ox and that caused by a forewarned ox? The difference is that the owner of an innocuous ox pays half the cost of the damage exclusively from proceeds of the sale of its body, and the owner of a forewarned ox pays the full cost of the damage from his superior-quality property.

The Gemara explains the challenge posed by the mishna: And if it is so, that payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is considered a fine, let the mishna also teach this additional distinction: The owner of an innocuous ox does not pay based on his own admission, in accordance with the halakha that one does not pay a fine based on one’s own admission, whereas the owner of a forewarned ox pays based on his own admission.

The Gemara answers: The tanna could have taught this distinction; however, he taught only certain distinctions and omitted others, including this one. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that he omitted this? A tanna would never omit just a single case, perforce there must be another halakha he omitted.

The Gemara answers: He omitted the halakha that if an innocuous ox kills someone, its owner does not pay even half of the ransom payment, whereas if the ox is forewarned, he pays the full ransom.

The Gemara rejects this: If one claims that the mishna omits the halakha of one who admits his liability due to the fact that it also omits the halakha that the owner of an innocuous ox does not pay even half of the ransom, that is a flawed claim, as this is not an omission, because one could say: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that when an innocuous ox kills a person, one pays half the ransom, and therefore the distinction between an innocuous and forewarned ox is included in the mishna’s ruling that the owner of an innocuous ox pays half the cost of the damage. Accordingly, no proof can be adduced from the mishna.

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ketubot 41a):

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 15a examines why both slaves and gentiles are excluded from testifying as witnesses, then explores biblical sources equating women with men in damage laws.