Talmud - Bava Kamma 56a בבא קמא נ״ו א׳

the baraita is speaking of an unstable wall that was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner.

The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire, what are the circumstances? If we say that the baraita is referring to a case where the fire would reach the bent grain in a typical wind, let him also be liable for the damage according to human laws. Rather, it must be a case where the fire could reach the bent grain only in an atypical wind. Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

And Rav Ashi offered an alternative explanation and said: The baraita was stated in the case of a concealed item; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item because he made it into a concealed item that was subsequently damaged by fire, and the owner cannot reclaim his loss.

The Master says: With regard to the case mentioned in the baraita of one who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we say that he hired them for his own benefit, in order to extract payment from another, he is required to reimburse that person with money, and he is liable according to human laws for receiving money under false circumstances. Rather, the case is one where he hired false witnesses for the benefit of another. In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit.

The baraita teaches: And one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. With what circumstances are we dealing? If we say that the case involves two people who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it is obvious that each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression by Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the baraita to mention this case.

Rather, the case of the baraita concerns a single witness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara asks: And is there nothing else, i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? But there is such a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the baraita the Gemara presents a mnemonic device: One who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken. The Gemara returns to the first case: One who performs labor with water of purification, which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, or who performs labor with the red heifer of purification, invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is exempt according to human laws, since the damage he caused is not evident, but liable according to the laws of Heaven, as he caused a financial loss.

The Gemara adds: But there is the following halakha: With regard to one who places poison before another’s animal, and the animal eats it and dies, he is exempt according to human laws, since the animal caused its own death, but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who sends an exposed flame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one who frightens another without touching him, but causes him injury; he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara adds: But there is the case of one whose jug broke in the public domain and he did not remove the broken pieces, or one whose camel fell and he did not stand it up again. Rabbi Meir deems the owner of jug or of the camel liable for the damage thereby caused to others, and the Rabbis say that he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the baraita that there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven?

The Gemara answers: Yes, there are, in any event, many other cases, but Rabbi Yehoshua held that it was necessary for him to state the halakha of these four cases. The reason he stated them is lest you say that in these cases one should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Since the fence is about to collapse even without this person’s intervention, what did he really do? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who bends another’s standing grain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say: Let the one who bent the grain say to the owner: Did I know that an atypical wind would come and cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

And according to Rav Ashi, who said that Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling was stated with regard to the case of a concealed item, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven lest you say that the one who concealed the item could say: I covered it for you in order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

And Rabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability also in the case of one who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Let the one who hired them say: If the witnesses hear the statement of the teacher, i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, and the statement of the student, i.e., the one who hired them, to whose statement should they listen? Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. And based on this logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf is liable according to the laws of Heaven, lest you say that the witness could claim: Who says that had I come forward and testified on behalf of one litigant, the other litigant would admit liability? Perhaps he would have chosen to take a false oath and absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that he should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua teaches us that in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.

§ The mishna teaches: If the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. Rabba says: And this first instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case where the animal tunneled under the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.

The Gemara asks: But if the animal did not tunnel under the wall, what is the halakha? Would the owner be liable? What are the circumstances? If we say that the pen had a stable wall, then even if the animal did not tunnel, why is the owner liable? What should he have done? Clearly, he cannot be held liable for the damage. Rather, the pen had an unstable wall. The Gemara asks: Even if the animal tunneled under the wall and knocked it down, why is he exempt? The damage in this case is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident.

This works out well according to the one who said that in any case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, he is exempt from liability, since the ultimate cause of the damage was not his fault. But according to the one who says that in any case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident he is liable, as even without the accident his negligence could have caused damage, what is there to say?

Rather, the case of the mishna concerns a stable wall, and even if the animal did not tunnel under the wall the owner is exempt. And when the statement of Rabba was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna that says: If the owner left the animal in the sun or conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the animal went out and caused damage, the owner is liable. Concerning this Rabba stated: And the owner is liable even if the animal tunneled its way out under the wall of the pen.

The Gemara explains: It is not necessary for the mishna to mention the case where the animal did not tunnel its way out. In that case the owner is clearly liable, since the entire incident occurred due to his negligence of leaving the animal in the sun, thereby causing it distress and leading it to attempt escape by any possible means. But even if the animal tunneled its way out, the owner is liable, and this is the novelty in this ruling: Lest you say that this is a case of damage that is initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, because animals do not typically tunnel their way out of a pen, the mishna teaches us that it is considered as though the entire damage resulted from the owner’s negligence.

What is the reason that the owner is liable? It is that the one who suffered the damage can say to the owner of the sheep: You should have known that since you left it in the sun, it would utilize any means [tatzdeka] available for it to use and it would escape, so you are ultimately responsible for the damage.

§ The mishna teaches: If the bandits themselves took the sheep out, the bandits are liable.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 56a explores liability for bending grain toward fire and hiring false witnesses, distinguishing human law from divine accountability.