Talmud - Bava Kamma 87a בבא קמא פ״ז א׳

and so did Rabbi Yehuda exempt a blind person from all judgments of civil law that are in the Torah. The Gemara explains: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states with regard to an unintentional killing: “Then the congregation shall judge between the smiter and the avenger of blood, according to these laws” (Numbers 35:24), to teach that anyone who is subject to the halakha of a smiter and to the halakha of an avenger of blood is subject to civil laws, and anyone who is not subject to the halakha of a smiter or to the halakha of an avenger of blood, including a blind person, is not subject to civil laws.

The Gemara presents another statement of Rabbi Yehuda. It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: A blind person does not have, i.e., receive, compensation for humiliation, and so did Rabbi Yehuda exempt a blind person from all mitzvot that are stated in the Torah. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: “And this is the commandment, statutes, and laws” (Deuteronomy 6:1), to teach that anyone who is subject to civil laws is also subject to the commandments and statutes, and anyone who is not subject to civil laws, including a blind person, is also not subject to the commandments and statutes.

Rav Yosef, who was blind, said: At first, I would say: If I hear one who says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A blind person is exempt from the mitzvot, then I will host a festive day for the Sages. What is the reason? It is that I am not commanded and nevertheless I perform mitzvot.

Rav Yosef continues. But now that I heard this statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: One who is commanded and performs a mitzva is greater than one who is not commanded and performs it, I say: If I hear one who says to me that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then I will host a festive day for the Sages. What is the reason? It is that as I am commanded, I have more reward.

MISHNA: This halakha is a stringency with regard to a person who caused injury, compared to the halakha with regard to an ox that caused injury: The halakha is that the person pays compensation for damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation; and if he caused a woman to miscarry he also pays compensation for miscarried offspring, as the verse states (see Exodus 21:22). But in the case of an ox that caused injury, the owner pays only compensation for damage, and he is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

The mishna continues: One who strikes his father or his mother but did not cause them to have a bruise, and therefore is not liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, and one who injures another on Yom Kippur, the punishment for which is not court-imposed capital punishment, is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity.

One who injures a Hebrew slave is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity. This is except for compensation for loss of livelihood suffered during the time that the injured slave belongs to the one that injured him. Since the right to the slave’s labor belongs to his master, his inability to work is his master’s loss. One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so the one who injures the slave pays only the other four types of indemnity.

The mishna continues: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous. In other words, no favorable outcome is possible for someone involved in an incident with one of these people, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt. This is because they lack awareness and are not responsible for their actions.

Similarly, with regard to a slave and a married woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt, because they do not have money with which to pay compensation. But they pay compensation at a later time. The exemption is only temporary, as, if the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and they then have their own money, they are liable to pay compensation.

The mishna continues: One who strikes his father or his mother and causes them to have a bruise, or one who injures another on Shabbat, is exempt from paying all of the five types of indemnity, because he is judged with losing his life. The court imposes capital punishment for these acts, so there is no additional monetary punishment.

And one who injures his own Canaanite slave is exempt from paying all of the five types of indemnity, because his slave is his property.

GEMARA: The Gemara discusses a case of compensation for injury. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: In a case of one who injures the minor daughter of others, to whom does he pay compensation for the injury?

Rabbi Elazar explains the dilemma: Do we say that since the Merciful One granted the profits of her youth to the father, as he receives her betrothal money, compensation for injury also belongs to her father? What is the reason that he should receive it? The reason is that the one who injured her lowered her monetary value, resulting in her father receiving gifts of lesser value when she is betrothed. Or perhaps it is only the profits of her youth that the Merciful One granted to her father, because if he desires to give her in marriage to a man afflicted with boils, he can give her to him, but with regard to injury, since if he desires to injure her he may not injure her, just as he may not injure any other person, the Merciful One did not grant him the right to receive the compensation when she is injured.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 87a examines Rabbi Yehuda's view exempting a blind person from civil law and mitzvot, plus Rav Yosef's reflection on commanded versus voluntary observance.