Talmud - Bava Kamma 105a בבא קמא ק״ה א׳

The reference here is to a case in which the father had already stood trial and was obligated to pay. In such a case, the debt is considered like a loan with a promissory note, which a creditor may collect from the debtor’s heirs. The Gemara rejects this: If it is a case in which the father had already stood trial and was obligated to pay, then the heir, who took a false oath and later confessed, would have to pay even the additional one-fifth payment as well, as this would be akin to any monetary obligation; but the baraita rules that he is obligated to pay only the principal. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The heir is exempt because one does not pay the additional one-fifth payment for the denial of a debt that is secured by a lien on land.

Rava said a different explanation: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the stolen item is still extant, yet the heir is exempt because his father’s sack [disakaya] containing the stolen item was deposited in the possession of others. Accordingly, the heir pays the principal, since the stolen item is extant, but he does not pay the additional one-fifth payment because when he took an oath that it was not in his possession, he took an oath truthfully, as he did not know that his father had stolen the item.

§ The mishna teaches that if the robbery victim forgave the robber concerning both payments, excepting less than the value of one peruta of the principal, he need not pursue him in order to return the remaining debt. Rav Pappa says: They taught that the robber is not obligated to pursue the robbery victim only when the stolen item is not extant, but if the stolen item is still extant, he must pursue him to return it, as we are concerned that perhaps the stolen item will appreciate in value, and the debt he owes will exceed the value of one peruta.

There are those who say that Rav Pappa said: The halakha is not different when the stolen item is extant, and it is not different when the stolen item is not extant. In either case he does not need to pursue him because we are not concerned that perhaps it will appreciate in value.

The Gemara cites another ruling with regard to a stolen item worth less than one peruta. Rava says: If one robbed another of three bundles of goods that were worth three perutot in total, and they depreciated in value and their value stood at two perutot, even if he returned two bundles to the robbery victim he is obligated to return the other bundle. And the tanna of the mishna also taught (96b): If one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, the robber says to the victim: That which is yours is before you, and he is not required to pay compensation, despite the fact that the robbery victim has suffered a monetary loss.

The Gemara explains the proof from the mishna: It may be inferred that the reason that he is not required to pay compensation is that the bread is still there in its unadulterated form; but if it is not there in its unadulterated form, even though now it is not worth money, since it was worth money initially, at the time of the robbery, he is required to pay. Here too, even though the third bundle is not worth one peruta now, since initially it was worth one peruta, he is required to pay.

Rava raises a dilemma: If one robbed another of two bundles of goods that were worth one peruta in total, and he returned one of them to the robbery victim, what is the halakha? Do we say that now there is no longer a stolen item in the possession of the robber, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta, and he has therefore fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item; or perhaps we say that since the robber did not return the stolen item that was in his possession in its entirety, he is obligated to return the second bundle?

Rava himself then resolves the dilemma: There is no stolen item here, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta; there is no returning of a stolen item here. The Gemara expresses surprise at this expression: If there is no stolen item here, as what remains is insignificant, it follows that there is fulfillment of the mitzva of returning the stolen item here, and the robber ought to be exempt, as he is no longer considered to be in possession of a stolen item. The Gemara explains that this is what Rava is saying: Even though the robber is exempt from returning the second bundle, as there is no stolen item here, there is nevertheless no fulfillment of the mitzva of returning a stolen item here, since the returned bundle was worth less than one peruta as well.

§ Following Rava’s previous dilemma, the Gemara cites a similar dilemma raised by Rava. And Rava says: The Sages said that a nazirite who shaved his head as required but left two hairs uncut has done nothing, and his obligation to shave his head has not been fulfilled. Rava raises a dilemma: If a nazirite shaved and left two hairs, and afterward he shaved one of them, and the other one fell out of its own accord, what is the halakha? Is this considered shaving one’s entire head or not? Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is Rava raising a dilemma as to whether one can shave his head one hair by one hair? How does this case differ from that of one who shaves his entire head one hair at a time, which is a fulfillment of his obligation?

Ravina said to him: No, a resolution to Rava’s dilemma is necessary in a case where one of the hairs fell out first, and then he shaved the other one. Do we say that now, in any event, there is no measure of hair left on his head that requires shaving, as one remaining hair is not significant, and he has therefore fulfilled his obligation; or perhaps we say that this is not considered shaving, as initially he left the significant amount of two hairs uncut, and now when he shaves a second time, there are not two hairs left for him to shave, and this does not qualify as shaving?

Rava himself then resolves the dilemma: There is no hair here; there is no shaving here. The Gemara expresses surprise at this expression: If there is no hair here, then there is shaving here, as no hair remains. The Gemara explains that this is what Rava is saying: Even though there is no hair here, as only one hair remains, nevertheless there is no mitzva of shaving here, as he failed to shave it all on the first attempt, and the second time he shaved less than the required amount.

§ The Gemara cites another dilemma raised by Rava. And Rava says: The Sages said (Kelim 10:6) that with regard to a sealed earthenware barrel that was punctured and was then sealed by sediments from its contents, the sediments have effectively saved the contents of the barrel from contracting ritual impurity if the barrel were to come into contact with an impure item, as it is once again considered a sealed barrel. Rava raises a dilemma: If one sealed half of the hole, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the hole is not currently large enough to allow ritual impurity to penetrate, the barrel is considered sealed; or perhaps we say that since the hole was initially large enough to allow impurity to penetrate, and it has not yet been sealed completely, the barrel retains its status and is not considered sealed?

The Gemara notes that Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Isn’t this halakha stated explicitly in our mishna, quoted by Rava above? As we learned in the continuation of that mishna: With regard to an earthenware barrel that was punctured and was then sealed by sediments, the sediments have effectively saved the contents of the barrel from contracting ritual impurity. If it was not sealed by sediments and instead one plugged the hole with a vine, its contents remain susceptible to contracting ritual impurity until he smears clay around the uncovered parts of the hole. If there were two vines placed in the hole in order to plug it, its contents remain susceptible to contracting ritual impurity until he smears clay from the sides of the hole inward, and between one vine and the other.

Rav Yeimar explains: The reason its contents become impervious to contracting ritual impurity is that he smeared clay over the uncovered sections of the hole, but if he did not smear clay over the uncovered sections, the contents would not be impervious to contracting ritual impurity. Why should this not be like the case in Rava’s dilemma? But let it be considered, when one plugs the hole with the vine, as though one had sealed half of the hole, since there is no apparent difference between a hole that is half-sealed and a hole that is partially plugged with a vine. Accordingly, Rava should not have stated his dilemma, as it is clear from the mishna that if the hole is only partially covered, the contents of the barrel are susceptible to contracting ritual impurity.

The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? There, if he does not smear clay around the vines, the vine will not remain in place. By contrast, in a case where he sealed half of it with a substance that remains in place, as in Rava’s dilemma, the seal remains in place and could be considered a seal. Rava’s dilemma remains unresolved.

§ The Gemara cites another dilemma raised by Rava. And Rava says: The Sages said that if one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, the robber may say to the victim: That which is yours is before you. Rava raises a dilemma:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 105a examines an heir’s liability for a stolen item and false oath, plus whether a robber must return a debt below one peruta.